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Information security research states that corporate security policy and information security 
training should be socio-technical in nature and that corporations should consider training as a 
primary method of protecting their information systems.  However, information security policies 
and training are predominately technical in nature.  In addition, managers creating security 
policies rely heavily on security guidelines, which are also technically oriented.  This study 
created a series of information security training videos that were viewed by four groups of 
managers.  One video discussed the socio-technical aspects of security, another discussed only 
the social aspects of security, the third detailed only the technical aspects of security, and the 
fourth was a control video unrelated to information security.  Each group was shown the video, 
and after this viewing, each group’s values toward information security were ascertained and 
converted into security objectives following Keeney (1992)’s value-focused thinking approach.  
Each group’s list of security objectives were used as the input to Schmidt (1997)’s ranking 
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Delphi methodology, which yielded a more concise and ranked list of security objectives.  The 
results thus obtained, indicate that manager’s objectives towards information security are 
affected by the nature and scope of the information security training they receive. Information 
security policy based on each group’s value-based security objectives indicate that manager’s 
receiving socio-technical training would produce the strongest information security policy when 
analyzing the value-focused thinking list of security objectives. However, the quality of security 
policy decreases when analyzing the ranked Delphi list of security objectives, thus providing 
mixed results.  The theoretical contribution of this research states that technically oriented 
information security training found in corporations today affects manager’s values and security 
objectives in a way that leads them to create and support technically oriented security policies, 
thus ignoring the social aspects of security.  The practical contribution of this research states that 
managers should receive socio-technical information security training as a part of their regular 
job training, which would affect their values and lead to socio-technical information security 
policy based on the manager’s socio-technical security objectives.  The methodological 
contribution of this research demonstrates the successful use of the value-focused thinking 
approach as the input to the ranking of the Delphi methodology.    
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1.  Introduction 
 
1.1 Background: 
This research investigated how different kinds of information security training affect the nature 
and scope of information security policies within a firm.  Maximizing information security 
within an organization starts with the creation of information security policies.  They are the 
security objectives for protecting the firm’s information systems (Karyda et. al., 2005).  For 
example, many firms have security policies regarding acceptable computer use, e-mail, and 
passwords (Rotvold, 2008).  Information security training, also known as security awareness 
training, is a method of educating all employees on how best to protect the firm’s information 
systems.  For example, employees may learn about viruses and worms, or how to recognize 
phishing e-mails.  The goal is for employees to utilize what they learned in training in real-time 
working, so that the organization optimizes the security of its information systems.    
Why are information security policies and training so important?  Security policies and training 
are important today because companies now rely heavily on information systems in almost every 
aspect of the business, making information security vital to corporate success.  Information 
systems aid business strategy, organizational design, management control systems, the creation 
and maintaining of competitive advantages, and much more.  The technological aspects of 
information systems give firms a presence on the Internet, make telecommuting possible, aid in 
unified communication of multiple media, create virtual meeting places, and much more.  A 
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firm’s information systems also include its data repositories, where sensitive corporate 
information, such as intellectual property and customer data may be kept.  Because of the 
dependency on information systems and the potential high cost of disruptions or breaches, a top 
priority of any modern company is protecting its information systems.  Information security 
policies are the backbone for protecting information systems and information security training is 
the mechanism used to educate employees about security policies.  
The importance of security policies emerges without question when weighed against the billions 
of dollars that are lost each year from firms inadequately protecting their information systems.  
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 2006 survey reported that businesses lose 5% of 
their revenue to fraud each year, which equates to a $652 billion in total losses (ACFE, 2006).  In 
the 2008 version of the survey, those numbers had increased to 7%, or $913 billion in total 
losses, indicating a sharp rise in the magnitude of the problem (ACFE, 2008).  Organizations 
must do everything they can to protect their information systems.  The risks of not doing so can 
be more costly and last longer than the immediate monetary loss caused by the crisis, in the form 
of collateral damage to the company’s reputation and trust with stakeholders (ACFE, 2006).  
Now that we accept the importance of information security policies and training for the 
protection of information systems and know that failing to do so properly can cost billions of 
dollars, what is this research attempting to demonstrate that can forward the cause of information 
security?  This research attempted to demonstrate that the nature and scope of information 
security training a manager receives affects the nature and scope of the information security 
policies they will create.  Previous research has demonstrated that socio-technical solutions are 
the best way to maximize information security (Backhouse & Dhillon, 1996; Dhillon and 
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Backhouse, 2000, 2001; Trompeter & Eloff, 2001; Siponen, 2001; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; 
Dhillon, 2007).  Socio-technical solutions refers to a mix of technical aspects of security- such as 
access controls, virus detection, and encryption, as well as social aspects of security- such as 
having an ethics program and a strong security culture.  If the nature and scope of information 
security training is socio-technical, will the manager’s value-based objectives toward 
information security be socio-technical and what impact would socio-technical security 
objectives have on information security policy?  These are fundamental questions this research 
attempted to answer.    
Four different training videos were created and given to four different groups of managers, or 
future managers.  The training consisted of a socio-technical video, social only video, technical 
only video, and control video.  Using the value-focused method developed by Keeney (1992), 
each group developed a list of value-based security objectives that were then ranked using a 
ranking Delphi method developed by Schmidt (1997).  Analysis of the data thus obtained 
demonstrates that socio-technical training given to managers will yield a stronger mix of socio-
technical policies than social only training, technical only training, or no training at all.    
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows:  Section 1.2 describes the current problem that is 
to be addressed by this research.  Section 1.3 and 1.4 describe the argument and research 
questions used to justify this research.  Section 1.5 describes the definitions of common terms 
used throughout this research, such as information security and information security policies. 
Section 1.6 describes the remaining chapters of this research.    
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1.2 Current Problem: 
Many researchers have stated that a socio-technical approach is best for maximizing information 
security and have stressed the importance of social aspects for information security (Backhouse 
& Dhillon, 1996; Straub & Welke, 1998; Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000, 2001; Trompeter & 
Eloff, 2001; Siponen, 2001; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Dhillon, 2007).  Recognizing the social 
aspects of information security can be known as the socio-technical or socio-organizational 
perspective (Siponen, 2001).  For example, Dhillon (2001, p. 147) stated that the “socio-
organizational perspective is the way forward if security of information systems is to be 
achieved.”  If recognizing social and technical aspects of information security is so important, 
one would expect organizations to have socio-technical information security policies and 
information security training.  However, current research has reported that information security 
policies lack social aspects of security (Rotvold, 2008; CWS, 2010; Fulford & Doherty, 2003).  
For example, Rotvold (2007) reported 24 top security policies in use by organizations and only 
two were socially related policies, concerning ethics and social engineering.  Ethics policies were 
used in 60.4% of the organizations and social engineering policies were used in 14.3% of the 
surveyed organizations.  The top policies used by organizations were acceptable use policy 
(89%), e-mail policy (84.6%), and password policy (78%).  In other research, the Cybersecurity 
Watch Survey 2010’s top three security policies were password policy, acceptable use policy, 
and Internet monitoring policy (CWS, 2010).  Of the more than 30 top security policies reported 
by the survey, over 90% used technical solutions.  Fulford & Doherty (2003)’s research also 
demonstrated the lack of social aspects security in their list of security policies which are 
currently being used by organizations.  
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The content of information security training is predominately adopted from information security 
policies (Rotvold, 2007; CSI, 2006, 2007).  Rotvold (2007) reported that security policies were 
the number one topic of security training.  The CSI Survey (2006, 2007) also reported 
information security policies as a top topic of information security training.  In discussing the 
content of information security training, Straub and Welke (1998, p. 451) stated that the content 
should include “employee policies…and other topics that have a bearing on preventing misuse of 
system assets.” If information security policies are technically oriented, then so will be the 
information security training.    
To further complicate the problem, researchers call for information security training to be a 
primary method for protecting information systems (Straub & Welke, 1998; Solms & Solms, 
2004; May, 2008; Rezgui and Marks, 2008).  Practitioners seem to be following the advice.  The 
2010 Cybersecurity Watch Survey reported that information security training was a top method 
for protecting information systems (CWS, 2010).  What this means is that organizations are 
using information security awareness training as a primary means of protection, but their 
information security polices and policy-based training lacks social aspects of security.  Those 
creating information security policies need to create socio-technical policies so that the 
information security training is socio-technical and information security is maximized.    
Corporate information security policy is created at the strategic level of the organization by 
managers that have very little experience or knowledge of creating security policy (Hone & 
Eloff, 2002).  The authors’ state that those creating the policy often lack the knowledge to be 
able to do so.  Their “lack of skills and understanding” in developing a security policy often 
compels the authors to “turn to other organization’s policies, commercially available sources or 
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templates available from public sources, such as the Internet, for answers to their questions” (pp. 
402-403).  Among the commercially available options are checklists or standardized guidelines.  
According to Ernst & Young’s 2008 Global Information Security Survey, 70% of those 
organizations surveyed used standardized guidelines to create security policies and that number 
is expected to increase (GISS, 2008).  However, we know that checklists or guidelines have 
many shortcomings, including the lack of flexibility to changing business environments and lack 
of attention paid to social aspects of security (Baskerville & Siponen, 2002; Dhillon & 
Backhouse, 2001).  Managers that lack the knowledge to create socio-technical information 
security policies and end up creating security policies based on standardized checklists will 
inevitably fail to maximize information security by not including social aspects of security.  
1.3 Argument: 
The fundamental argument of this research argues that the nature and scope of information 
security training that managers’ receive impacts the nature and scope of the information security 
policies they create (figure 1.1).   
 
The nature and scope of training can be socio-technical, social only, or technical only. It is also 
possible that managers will receive no training at all.  Managers that create information security 
Information 
Security 
Training
Information 
Security 
Policy
Figure 1.1: Fundamental Argument 
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policies will be influenced differently depending on which type of training they receive, or if 
they receive no training at all.  That influence will affect the nature and scope of the security 
policies they create.  For example, managers receiving socio-technical information security 
training will create socio-technical information security policies.    
A more detailed argument involves the manager’s values and objectives toward information 
security, where the nature and scope of the information security training a manager receives 
shapes the manager’s values (see figure 1.2).  The training shapes their beliefs (values) about 
how to best protect information systems.  The manager’s values then impact their individual 
objectives toward securing information systems.  The manager’s objectives then impact the 
nature and scope of the information security policies they create.  Another way of thinking about 
it is that training affects a manager’s beliefs and those beliefs influence the manager’s goals and 
those goals influence the policies they create.  For example, managers that receive socio-
technical information security training will be influenced by the training to alter or reinforce their 
core beliefs about protecting information systems with socio-technical aspects of security.  These 
socio-technical oriented core beliefs about how to protect information systems will impact their 
objectives for doing so.  Their socio-technical oriented value-based objectives will then impact 
the nature and scope of the information security policies they create.  In this example, the 
policies thus created would be socio-technically oriented.   
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1.4 Research Questions: 
The focus of this research leads to the following two research questions: 
1. To what extent are manager’s values towards securing information systems influenced by 
the nature and scope of information security training they receive?  
2. To what extent do value-based objectives influence the nature and scope of information 
security policy?  
The first research question will address the relationship between the first and second boxes of the 
detailed argument (figure 1.2).  Will the training shape their core beliefs about how to protect 
information systems?  For example, will socio-technical training, technical only training, or 
social only training lead to predominately socio-technical values, predominately technical values, 
or predominately social values?  This first research question will also ascertain the values of 
managers that receive no information security training.  
The second research question will address the relationship between the third and fourth boxes of 
the detailed argument (figure 1.2).  Influenced by the manager’s value-based objectives for 
securing information systems, what will be the nature and scope of the security policies they 
Nature & 
Scope of 
Information 
Security 
Training
Shapes 
Values
Impacts 
Individual 
Objectives
Impacts 
Nature & 
Scope of 
Information 
Security 
Policies
Figure 1.2: Detailed Argument 
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create?  Will they create socio-technical policy, technical policy, social policy, or something 
else?    
1.5 Definitions:  
This section gives a more detailed definition of the terms and phrases already introduced and 
used throughout this research.  There are other terms or phrases that are not used throughout this 
research, but are particular to certain sections or chapters.  Those terms and phrases are defined 
and described in those sections or chapters, where they are more relevant.  
1.5.1 Information Systems:  
An information system, as described by Dhillon (2007), is the system that handles information at 
three levels – technical, formal, and informal.  Within an organization, the technical system is the 
organization’s information technology infrastructure and consists primarily of hardware, 
software, data and network components.  It is everything that supports the flow and processing of 
information.  The formal system consists of rules and procedures, such as security strategy, 
policies, and processes (Dhillon, 2007).  Acceptance of the formal system’s rules and procedures 
by the people is a social process, which is part of the informal system.  The informal system 
consists of social constructs, such as culture, norms, beliefs, attitudes and informal 
communication.  An information system is the system that handles information in and across 
these three systems.  
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1.5.2 Information Security:  
Information security, also known as information systems security, refers to the protection of an 
information system at three levels: technical, formal, and informal.  There must be coordination 
between the three systems for the effective management of information security.  At the 
technical level, information security is concerned with technological solutions to security, such 
as using firewalls, biometric scanners for authentication and anti-virus software.  At the formal 
level, information security is concerned with creating organizational structures and processes to 
ensure security and integrity (Dhillon, 2007).  This includes the creation of proper responsibility 
structures, maintaining integrity of roles, and creating and verifying proper business processes 
(Dhillon, 2007).  At the informal level, information security is concerned with the social aspects 
of security, such as creating and maintaining a security culture, integrity of employees, trust 
relationships, and ethicality.    
1.5.3 Information Security Policy: 
Karyda et. al (2005, p. 247) state that “an IS security policy includes the intentions and priorities 
with regard to the protection of the IS, usually referred to as security objectives, together with a 
general description of the means and methods to achieve these objectives.”  At a high level, 
corporate security policy describes the overall security vision in the form of security objectives.  
These objectives are abstract in nature and written in generalized terms, such as the statement of 
the need to ensure that sensitive data is protected from unauthorized access.  At a lower level, 
procedurally oriented policies are derived from the corporate level policies to reflect the means 
for achieving the higher level objectives.  To continue the previous example of protecting 
sensitive data from unauthorized access, a procedurally oriented policy might be to create a 
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password policy that protects such data.  Other procedurally oriented policies might be to require 
all employees to have passwords at least 8 characters long and to change their passwords every 
30 days.  There may be multiple procedurally oriented policies for each corporate level policy.    
1.5.4 Information Security Training: 
Information security training, also known as security awareness training, is a method of 
educating all employees on how best to protect an organization’s information systems.  Training 
most often reflects the procedure oriented security policies.  The most effective information 
security training will address threats posed by technically oriented aspects of security as well as 
socially oriented aspects of security.    
A goal of security awareness training is to create overall security awareness.  According to 
Rezgui & Marks (2008), the meaning of security awareness falls into two categories.  The first 
are those that consider security awareness to mean “attracting users’ attention to IS security 
issues” and the second considers security awareness to mean “the user’s understanding of IS 
security and optimally, committing to it” (p. 244).  Whether computer security awareness 
training makes employees only aware of security issues or makes them fully understand and 
committed to upholding this security can depend on many factors, such as the quality of the 
training and the employees themselves.  There is research that suggests using theories from 
psychology and sociology to create training in certain ways can lead to better absorption by 
employees and can increase the likelihood of employees following security policy (Siponen, 
2000; Thomson & Von Solms, 1998).  However, this research on the effect of information 
security training on information security policies is focused on the nature and scope of the 
training and not the delivery method or psychological acceptance of the training.   
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1.6 Thesis Structure: 
This thesis is structured as follows:  Chapter one of this research is the introduction, where the 
relationship between information security training and information security policy is introduced.  
This chapter includes the author’s argument and definitions of key terms used throughout this 
research.  Chapter two is a literature review that investigates information security training, 
information security policies, technical and social aspects of security, and how manager’s 
objectives lead to practice.  Chapter two concludes with a discussion of how the literature review 
is relevant to this research.  Chapter three discusses the methodology of this research, starting 
with the creation of the training videos and a description of the experimental design and 
participants.  The value focused research methodology is reviewed and discussed along with the 
ranking Delphi methodology.  Chapter four describes the execution and analysis of the value 
focused method data collection and discusses the relevant results.  Chapter five describes the 
execution and analysis of the ranking Delphi method and the relevant results.  Chapter six 
discusses the key findings and the relevance to information security research.  Chapter seven 
concludes this research by summarizing the study and the key findings, along with any research 
limitations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction: 
This dissertation investigates how the nature and scope of information security training affects 
the nature and scope of information security policies within a firm.  The central argument is that 
training affects policies, so it is important to review literature pertaining to information security 
training and information security policies.  But before reviewing training and policies, it is 
important to review the nature and scope of training and policies, which involve the social and 
technical aspects of security.  The argument believes that the particular type of training a 
manager receives will affect the policies he or she creates, so it is also important to establish a 
link between a manager’s security objectives and the security policies he or she creates.  These 
areas will be reviewed in the following sections, starting with a review of socio-technical 
security.  Information security policy and information security training will then be reviewed.  
The discussion will link these topics and discuss the connection with creating information 
security policies.  The final section is the conclusion that relates the overall literature review to 
this dissertation’s argument and research questions.  
 
2.2 Socio-technical Security: 
Social aspects of security refer to human related aspects of organizations that need to be taken 
into consideration in order to maximize information security.  This can include many concepts, 
such the responsibility, integrity, trust and ethicality (RITE) of individuals as described by 
Dhillon and Backhouse (2000).  Social aspects of security can also include norms, security 
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culture, beliefs, and attitudes within organizations (Dhillon, 2007).  The research below 
demonstrates the need for information security to go beyond merely focusing on technological 
solutions to security threats and highlights the need for the recognition of social aspects of 
security.    
But before reviewing research related to the social aspects of security, it is important to briefly 
describe the technical aspects of security.  Most organizations rely heavily on the technical 
solutions to security threats, as they are often the first line of defense.  Examples of technical 
solutions to security threats include hardware and software firewalls, antivirus software, 
password usage, smart cards and much more.  The goal of this section is to demonstrate the 
importance for information systems security research to go beyond the sole reliance on technical 
solutions to security threats and to incorporate the social aspects of security as well.  
Over 30 years ago, Bostrom and Heinen (1977) called for systems development to include the 
social aspects of organizations. The socio-technical system (STS) was introduced in a paper 
discussing the redesign of management of information system’s methodologies.  The authors 
argued that system designers created flawed systems because they failed to recognize the 
importance of the social aspects of organizations.  They describe a socio-technical system as 
“two jointly independent, but correlative interacting systems” (p. 17).  The technical system is 
concerned with processes, tasks, and technology, while the social system is concerned with the 
attributes of people (attitudes, skills, and values), the relationships of people, reward systems, 
and authority structures (Bostrom and Heinen, 1977).  The outputs of the system “are the result 
of joint interactions between these two systems” (p. 17).  The authors go on to discuss areas 
where designers fail to recognize social aspects of organizations.  The focus of this research may 
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have been on correcting failures in MIS development, but the recognition of the concept of there 
being a socio-technical system that must be considered in IS development is important for all 
subsequent information systems research.  
Siponen’s (2001) research analyzed three approaches to developing security for information 
systems.  The approaches are called information/database modeling approaches, responsibility 
approaches and security-modified information systems development approaches and are 
classified into four generations.  First and second generations focus on checklists and technical 
solutions. The third and fourth generations include modeling and socio-technical solutions 
respectively.  Information/database modeling approaches includes “research on the 
organizational and conceptual level, along with methods covering database security” (p. 9).  
There are very few studies using this approach.  Responsibility modeling refers to the use of 
responsibility as a basis for ensuring secure information systems development.  Security-
modified information system development approaches “refer to any approach that is modified 
from an information system or development approach” (p. 3).  The third and fourth generations, 
which include responsibility modeling and security-modified information system development 
approaches, have an intellectual origin in data modeling, information systems and computer 
science (p. 17).  The authors concluded that the most commonly held organizational role of 
information systems security was the technical view, which ignores the social aspects of 
security.  “There is a lack of aforementioned approaches which recognize the social aspects of 
information systems, i.e. socio-technical and social organizational roles of information systems 
security” (p. 22).  Social aspects of information systems security is part of the fourth and latest 
generation of secure information systems development.  
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In a (2001) paper by Dhillon and Backhouse, the authors map the current directions in 
information systems security research.  The authors did so by using the Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) framework and four paradigms: functionalist, interpretative, radical humanist, and radical 
structuralist.  Functionalists often derive their approaches from the natural sciences.  
Interpretivism “is concerned with the subjective understanding that individuals ascribe to their 
social situations” (p. 129).  The radical paradigms oppose the regulation view of society and 
advocate radical change.    
The authors concluded that there was a noticeable trend in information systems research which 
was moving away from the functionalist and technical view point, but not in information systems 
security research.  They write that much of the information systems security research up to this 
date had been “classified under the functionalist paradigm and the theorists have treated security 
as something tangible and concrete” (p. 147).  Information system security should not be 
considered in a mechanistic manner and doing so would relegate inter-organizational and intra-
organizational social relationships as incidental (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001).  The authors 
suggest that if security of information systems is to be achieved, then the socio-organizational 
perspective is the way forward.    
In other research, Trompeter and Eloff (2001) recommend that ethical aspects of security should 
be considered as important as the technical and functional aspects of security.  Information 
security ethical principles should be incorporated with the inception, development, and 
maintenance of an organization’s IT system and should govern security controls and measures 
(Trompeter & Eloff, 2001).  The guiding principles should “include the right of both the 
individual and the organization to privacy, to property of their information and to the obligation 
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to uphold this socio-ethical commitment” (pp. 286-387).  “The creation of a socio-ethical 
awareness of infosec (information security) that takes cognizance of the human dimension will 
help organizations and clients alike...” (p. 390).    
Developing a strong security culture has also been linked to more secure information systems.  A 
security culture “reflects the values and beliefs of information security shared by all members at 
all levels of the organization” (D’Arcy & Greene, 2009, p. 147).  In a study of 105 computer 
using professionals, D’Arcy and Greene (2009) investigated the relationship between security 
culture and security policy compliance and security extra-role behavior.  Compliant behavior 
refers to a user’s compliance with security policies and regulations.  Extra-role behavior refers to 
behaviors that go beyond the job description and are not part of the formal job duties.  Examples 
of extra-role behavior include attending voluntary security training, promoting safe computing 
practices, and speaking out about inefficient security controls.  The results of the survey provided 
strong evidence that security culture contributes to both compliant user behavior and extra-role 
behaviors.  The authors state that “developing a security culture that consists of top management 
commitment to security and ongoing security communication is extremely beneficial in 
promoting both a compliant and proactive security-conscious user population” (p. 154).    
In other security culture research, Vroom and von Solms (2004) stress the importance of a strong 
security culture and suggest ways of changing the culture.  The authors propose to address 
security culture through three aspects of organizational behavior- the individual, the group and 
the formal organization.  Individuals are unique and bring multiple characteristics into the 
organization.  Individual attitudes, motivation, job satisfaction, etc. is influenced by 
organizational forces and the behavior of an individual is important for developing a culture 
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(Vroom & von Solms, 2004).  Groups are made up of individuals and have their own values and 
norms.  Groups develop characteristics beyond those of the individual.  The formal organization 
can be compared according to characteristics common to them, such as the size of the 
organization (Vroom & von Solms, 2004).  The behavior of the individual, group, and formal 
organization influences each other and are not mutually exclusive.  In order to change culture, 
changes need to take place at all three levels.  The authors suggest the best way to change the 
security culture is to change the shared values and knowledge of the group.  Investigating the 
cultural influences on the group and changing them separately will slowly start to alter group 
behavior.  The altered group behavior will then influence individual behavior, which will have an 
eventual effect on the formal organization.  The authors suggest that changing one aspect “will 
filter through the organization at a formal and individual level and the culture will eventually 
change into a secure one” (p. 197).    
Security culture is important for ensuring appropriate behavior, according to von Solms and von 
Solms (2004).  The author’s research investigates the integration of security polices, education 
and security culture.  Management creates security polices and defines what they expect from 
group members within the organization.  Groups are defined as collections of individuals that 
have shared basic assumptions.  The group members must accept the policies created by 
management and agree that they benefit the organization.  Managers can dictate the behavior of 
employees by “expressing collective values, norms, and knowledge, by defining specific policies 
and procedures” (p. 277).  Security policies can be expressed in the group’s beliefs, which form 
the security culture.  Educating new group members then helps cultivate the security culture by 
teaching new members the group beliefs, which they will embrace as part of the group’s basic 
shared assumptions.  Aligning information security policies with the security culture and 
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educating employees on a continuous basis is one way of positively affecting employee 
behavior.  
In a paper about organizational culture and security culture, Ruighaver et al. (2007) suggest that 
information security is generally a management problem and an organization’s security culture 
reflects how management handles the problem.  The authors argue that “technical security 
measures and security policies will often need to be (re)designed to support an organization’s 
security culture” (p. 56).  Suggesting that security culture is influenced by organizational culture, 
the authors investigate security culture using an eight dimensional framework developed by 
Detert et al. (2000) to study organizational culture.  The framework was used to highlight aspects 
of security culture along the eight dimensions using empirical case study research from 
information systems.  Based on the relation of security culture to organizational culture within 
the framework, the authors highlighted several aspects of good security culture.  Below are some 
select findings (Ruighaver et al., 2007):  
1. “Organizations with a high-quality security culture should place an emphasis on long-
term commitment and strategic management” (p. 58);  
2. a degree of trust and accountability needs to be established with employees;  
3. employees with responsibility over particular aspects of security should be given a strong 
sense of ownership;  
4. responsibility and accountability for security decision making should be clearly defined 
in policies;  
5. educating employees about their roles and responsibilities is important; and  
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6. good security culture should find a balance between internal and external focus, where 
there is awareness of the external environment and its threats, as well as an awareness of 
the internal environment.  
Other aspects of security culture, such as attitudes, norms and shared expectations did not fit into 
the framework, but were also considered important by the authors.  
In research aiming to improve user security behavior, Leach (2003) discusses six factors that 
have strong influence over people’s security behavior and three steps organizations can take to 
improve behavior.  The threats include user errors and negligence, such as forgetting to apply 
security procedures, and deliberate acts, such as emailing sensitive data without protection.  The 
factors that influence security behavior come from an organization’s culture and practices and 
can be divided into two areas: (1) encompassing the users’ understanding of what behaviors the 
company expects of them, and (2) the factors which influence the user’s personal willingness to 
constrain their behavior to stay within accepted norms (Leach, 2003).  The user’s understanding 
of expectations are described by what they are told, what they see being practiced by others 
around them, and their experience built on decisions they made in the past.  Personal willingness 
to comply with expectations are described by people’s personal values and standards of conduct, 
sense of obligation towards their employer and the degree of difficulty they experience in 
complying with the company’s procedures.    
Not all of these factors which affect how people behave can be influenced by the organization, 
such as an employee’s personal values.  However, organizations can focus on the three key 
factors they can influence.  The author suggests organizations should focus on the behavior 
demonstrated by management, the user’s security common sense and decision-making skills, and 
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the user’s psychological contract with their employer.  Below is a summary of concepts related 
to these three factors (Leach, 2003):  
1. ensure senior management and junior staff have good security behavior;  
2. provide feedback on the correctness of security behavior;  
3. reward staff for good security;  
4. give additional training to staff that demonstrate bad security behavior;  
5. teach the user’s the principles they need to make good decisions;  
6. provide continuous feedback and support;  
7. create a strong security culture to motivate staff to behave consistently; and  
8. discuss security regularly with management and staff.  
The author suggests that leadership is the key to creating a more secure environment.  Top 
management must support the security goals and lead by example.    
In other research about socio-technical aspects of security, Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) move 
beyond the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of information with a paper that 
introduces a concept known as RITE.  The authors suggest that information system security 
needs to change to not only addressing the data, but the changing organizational context as well.  
Organizations have focused much of their attention on CIA, where the authors define 
confidentiality as restricting data access to those who are authorized, integrity as preventing 
unauthorized modification of data, and availability as preventing unauthorized withholding of 
data or resources.  If information systems are to be secure, there needs to be considerations 
beyond CIA.  The authors suggest “inculcating a subculture where responsibility, integrity, trust 
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and ethicality (RITE) are considered important and are the first steps towards securing the 
information assets” (p. 127.)    
Responsibility refers to individuals understanding their responsibilities and knowledge of roles 
within the organization, which also includes individual accountability.  Responsibility is 
important in situations where formal guidance and rules are absent.  Integrity refers to the 
integrity of the person employed by the organization.  Before employees are given access to 
sensitive information, they should be properly screened.  However, the integrity of an individual 
can change over time, such as when personal factors change.  An economic recession, 
foreclosure, bankruptcy, divorce or many other such factors can lead a once honest employee 
down the wrong path.  Organizations need to consider how they will continue to reassess the 
integrity of individuals as time passes.   
Trust refers to a mutual system of trust between the individual and the organization.  “Division 
of labor demands that your colleagues should be trusted to act in accordance with company 
norms and [the] accepted and agreed [upon] patterns of behavior” (p. 128).  Today’s 
organizations have less supervision, which gives employees more control.  Mutual trust plays an 
important role in such environments.  However, trust has a half life that needs to be reassured 
periodically.  Ethicality goes beyond company rules and policies and into an area where rules do 
not exist.  When a situation arises within an organization where a rule or policy stating how to 
handle the situation does not exist, individuals need to rely on some form of appropriate ethical 
norms.  Responsibility, integrity, trust and ethicality (RITE) of individuals and confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability (CIA) of information are important for this dissertation because they 
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are core socio-technical aspects of information security that will be used to support this 
dissertation’s argument.  
In a book describing socio-technical security by Dhillon (2007), the author writes about 
maintaining the integrity of three vital systems of information systems security: the formal, 
informal and technical systems.  The formal system within organizations represents the rules, 
regulations, governance, policies, procedures, or processes.  The informal system represents 
social norms, security culture, beliefs, and attitudes of people.  The technical system uses 
technology (computers) to automate parts of the formal system.    
There must be coordination between the three systems to effectively manage information 
systems security.  Dhillon describes the coordination among the three systems with an analogy of 
a fried egg.  The yolk represents the technical system, which is held in place by the rules and 
regulations of the formal system.  The formal system is the thin membrane holding the yolk.  The 
white of the egg represents the informal system.  The analogy “suggests the appropriate 
subservient role of the technical system within an organization” and “also cautions about the 
consequences of overbureaucratization of the formal systems and their relationship to the 
informal systems” (p. 5).    
Managing security involves using controls with all three systems, meaning the controls 
themselves can be formal, informal, or technical.  For example, a technical control might require 
a password or retinal scan to gain access to a computer.  Expanding or shortening the 
organizational hierarchy is an example of formal control and giving security awareness training 
to employees is an example of an informal control (Dhillon, 2007).   Controls must complement 
one another and Dhillon recommends “an overarching policy that determines the nature of 
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controls being implemented and therefore provides comprehensive security to the organization” 
(p. 6).  
In other research by Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006), the authors used the value-focused thinking 
method to interview 103 managers about their values in managing information systems security.  
This approach yielded 9 fundamental objectives for information systems security and 16 means 
objectives for achieving them within an organization.  Of the 9 fundamental objectives, 7 are 
social objectives and 2 are technical objectives.  The two technical objectives are to maximize 
access control and data integrity.  The seven social objectives are to enhance management 
development practices and the integrity of business process, maximize privacy and 
organizational integrity, provide adequate human resource management practices, develop and 
sustain an ethical environment, and promote individual work ethic.  The authors suggest that 
overall information security that primarily focuses on the technical aspects of confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability (CIA) of information is inadequate and that socio-organizational 
objectives must be taken into consideration.  This paper was included in the socio-technical 
section of this literature review because of the result’s socio-technical implications, but it is also 
important to this dissertation in that it used the value-focused thinking method in its 
methodology.  The value-focused thinking method by Keeney (1994) is the same method used in 
this dissertation and will be described further in the next chapter.  
In summary, the importance of social aspects in addition to technical aspects in information 
systems research is nothing new, as reported by Bostrom and Heinen in 1977.  However, it took 
over 20 years before Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) reported a trend toward social aspects in 
mainstream information systems research.  In the same paper, Dhillon and Backhouse state that 
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mainstream information systems security research had yet to make the transition and that socio-
organizational aspects of security must be acknowledged in order to maximize security.  Since 
that time, mainstream research has made that transition and social aspects of security are now 
considered an important part of overall security.  For example, Trompeter and Eloff (2001) 
called for ethical principles in the development of information systems and security standards.  
Ruighaver et al. (2007) discussed the importance of a security culture in relation to the 
organizational culture and listed several aspects of good security culture, such as having an 
emphasis on employee responsibility and accountability, trust and security education.  Also 
related to security culture was Leech’s (2003) paper that suggested multiple ways of positively 
influencing employee behavior, by actions like managers leading by example by displaying good 
security practices of their own.  D’Archy and Greene (2009) found that security culture 
contributes to compliant user behavior and extra-role behaviors.  Dhillon (2007) reported the 
necessity of considering the social aspects of the informal system along with the formal and 
technical systems for achieving maximum security.  Of particular importance to this research is 
the Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) paper describing the significance of responsibility, integrity, 
trust and ethicality (RITE) of individuals.  Also of interest to this research is the use of the value-
focused approach in demonstrating the importance of socio-organizational objectives in Dhillon 
and Torkzadeh’s (2006) paper.    
2.3 Information Security Policy: 
Baskerville and Siponen (2002)’s paper describes a three level division of security policy: high-
level policy, low-level policy, and meta-policy.  At the highest level, “security policy is a high-
level overall plan embracing the general security goals and acceptable procedures” (p. 338). 
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Policies at this level are generalized and more abstract than at the lower level. Lower level 
policies are derived from the high-level policies and are specific policies designed to support the 
objectives outlined at the highest level.  Where a high level policy might describe a particular 
resource that needs to be protected and those responsible for protecting it, a lower level policy 
would describe the particular processes to be used to protect the resource.  For instance, a high-
level policy might state that department “A” needs to protect asset “X.”  A low-level policy that 
reflects the high-level policy might state that password or retinal scan technology needs to be in 
place to protect asset “X.”    
In the third level of the division of security policies, the authors introduce meta-policy.  Meta-
policy is “policy about policies.”  These policies “declare the organization’s plan for creating and 
maintaining its information security policies” (p. 339).  Meta-policy describes who is responsible 
for making policies, when policy creation is to take place, how policies are made, and how and 
when are polices reviewed, modified, or eliminated.     
In support of the need for meta-policy, the authors point out that emergent organizations with 
changing business environments need meta-policy.  Unlike checklist security standards, meta-
policy can help organizations adapt their security policies to changes in the business 
environment.  Checklists are security guidelines that can be used to help create security policies.  
However, the authors point out several shortcomings of such guidelines: (1) they fail to 
adequately address the fact that organizations are different and require different security policies 
(as cited by Baskerville, 1993), (2) they do not consider social aspects of security (as cited by 
Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001), (3) they “are broadly written, necessitation ad hoc decision making 
and judgment” (as cited by Ferris, 1994, p. 338), and (4) they overlook normal business 
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requirements, which may result in conflict between business and security requirements 
(Baskerville & Siponen, 2002).    
In other security policy research, Karyda et al (2005) explore the processes of formulation, 
implementation and adoption of security policy in two different organizations.  In both cases, the 
companies enlisted external consultants to conduct a risk analysis and create guidelines and 
recommendations.  Management considered the recommendations and called upon their IT staff 
to implement the policies.  The authors revisited each firm later to gauge the level of adoption by 
the users.    In both cases, the consultants called for creating a security officer and establishing 
roles and responsibilities for that person.    
The adoption of the security policy had mixed results.  The first company had adopted the policy 
fairly well and the second company had not.  However, the second company did not conduct 
security awareness training for their employees.  Those employees had a negative attitude toward 
the security policies out of fear and lack of understanding.  This emphasizes the importance of 
having an information security training program to educate employees on security policies.  The 
first company already had an ethics policy in place and that policy worked well with the new 
security policies toward creating a security culture.  The authors mentioned the importance of 
creating a security culture.  In addition to the ethics policy in the first company, the authors did 
not report any other social aspects of security as being incorporated into the security policies.  
They mentioned roles and responsibilities, but only for the new security position and not for all 
the employees.  There appears to be little or no consideration for socio-technical aspects of 
security in the creation of security policy in this study.  
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In other research, Doherty & Fulford (2006) argue that information security policy should be 
aligned with the strategic information systems plan (SISP).  The “strategic information systems 
plan is a critical prerequisite for policy formulation, as it defines the business context in which 
information security will be managed and therefore the objectives of, and priorities for, security 
management” (p. 57). The strategic information systems plan is typically based on corporate 
objectives and the business plan.  Aligning the information security plan to the SISP would link 
the security plan to the business plan.  Mentioned below is how the authors summarized benefits 
of alignment- Doherty & Fulford (2006):  
1. security can be more proactive instead of reactive to security threats;  
2. security policy will have a stronger business orientation;  
3. security policy can be adjusted in advance of strategic information systems initiatives;  
4. strategic information systems plans can be viewed from a security perspective before 
implementation;  
5. new systems created by the SISP can incorporate security controls identified by related 
security policy; and  
6. this raises business manager’s awareness of security threats and countermeasures.  
 Information security policy risk analysis is the topic of a paper from Spinellis et al. (1999), 
where the authors suggest that any information systems security policy should start with a risk 
analysis.  “The objective of risk analysis is to identify and assess the risks to which the IS and its 
assets are exposed in order to select appropriate and justified security safeguards” (p. 122).  The 
authors list five stages of risk analysis: (1) asset identification and valuation; (2) threats 
assessment; (3) vulnerabilities assessment; (4) existing/planned safeguards assessment; and (5) 
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risk assessment.  A risk analysis methodology, CRAMM, was used to analyze a home-office and 
small enterprise scenario.  The authors conclude that both environments have security 
weaknesses which are common to large enterprises, but the current security infrastructure and 
business practices of the smaller firms hinder effective risk management.    
As mentioned earlier in research by Baskerville and Siponen (2002) and Dhillon and Backhouse 
(2001), checklists (standards) are often used by organizations to create information security 
policy.  The Ernst & Young’s 2008 Global Information Security Survey researched the use of 
security standards in developing security policy.  The survey covered nearly 1400 organizations 
in more than 50 countries across all major industries.  According to the survey, the use of 
information security standards has increased to 70% and the belief is that the use of international 
information security standards will continue to increase (GISS, 2008).  The international 
standards used by respondents were ISO/IEC 27001:2005, ISO/IEC 27002:2005, and 
Information Security Forum’s (ISF), the Standard of Good Practice for Information Security.  
ISO/IEC 27001:2005 is defined as a standard that “provides a model for establishing, 
implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving an information 
security management system” (p. 11).  ISO/IEC 27002:2005 “outlines the potential control 
mechanisms which may be implemented based on the guidance provided within ISO/IEC 
27001:2005” (p. 11).  The Standard of Good Practice for Information Security “addresses 
information security from a business perspective, providing a practical basis for assessing an 
organization’s information security arrangements” (p. 11).    
Undertaking research to discover the content of information security policy, Fulford & Doherty 
(2003) questioned managers representing 158 organizations from multiple industries and varying 
 
 
30 
 
organizational size.  The authors reported the top items and the percentage of inclusion in their 
security policy as: personal use of the information system (45%), disclosure of information 
(38%), physical security (37%), violations and breaches (36%), viruses, worms, and trojans 
(34%), system access (33%), mobile computing (32%), Internet access (30%), software (25%), 
encryption (25%), and contingency planning (17%).  Of the 158 organizations surveyed, 76% of 
them had a formal written security policy.  The authors statistically tested and verified that those 
without a security policy were not of the same organizational type.    
In summary, in this information security policy literature review, we have learned that 
management at the strategic level of the organization is involved in creating the high-level 
security policies (Baskerville & Siponen, (2002).  In order to create these policies, they gather 
information from various sources.  These may include standardized checklists, external 
consultants, current organizational culture, current security measures, risk analysis, business 
objectives and the strategic information systems plan (Baskerville & Siponen, 2002; Karyda, et 
al, 2005; Spinellis, et al, 1999; Doherty & Fulford, 2006).  High-level polices are used to create 
low level policies, known as corporate and procedure policies in this dissertation.  Procedure 
policies are more specific policies that are usually created with the input of content specific 
professionals and not upper management.  For example, technical policies at this level are often 
created by information technology professionals or legal considerations may involve lawyers 
(Karyda, et al, 2005).  The procedural policies are based on the corporate policies, which should 
reflect the business plan (Spinellis, et al., 1999).  Security policy is also primarily technical and 
lacks the social aspects of security.  According to Fulford & Doherty (2003), some of the top 
items that organizations include in security policy are breaches, viruses, worms, trojans, system 
access, software and encryption.  Checklists, which are often used as guidelines for security 
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policy are also technically oriented and lack social aspects of security (Baskerville & Siponen, 
2002; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001).  In order to maximize security, social aspects of security 
must be considered along with technical aspects (Dhillon, 2007). 
2.4 Information Security Training: 
Information security training, also called security awareness training in some research, is a 
relatively small topic within information systems research.  Only a few studies investigate 
information security training as the main focus of the research.  Like in the case of many topics 
within the discipline, there are multiple definitions.  Siponen (2000, p. 32) defines “information 
security awareness” as “a state where users in an organization are aware of – [and] ideally 
committed to – their security mission.”  Straub & Welke (1998, p. 450) define security 
awareness training as “the training of managers and other professionals in proper use of system 
assets.”  The authors state that training should review employee policies, such as system 
authorizations, conditionalities of use, password management, penalties for security breaches etc. 
(Straub & Welke, 1998).  “The training should also make participants aware of the general 
effectiveness of deterrent, preventive, detective, and remedial countermeasures in lowering 
systems risk” ( p. 451).  This dissertation defines information security training as a method of 
educating all employees on how best to protect an organization’s information systems.    
Information security training research primarily falls into two research streams, one researches 
the necessity of having a training program and the other researches how to make training more 
effective.  The necessity of training is important to this dissertation because this research 
forwards the suggestion that training of managers can help maximize information security.  
Making training more effective is also important to this dissertation because this research creates 
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training videos to support the central argument.  Very little research has investigated the content 
of information security training, but a few studies and surveys were found.  The content of 
current training is also important for this dissertation because this research argues that current 
training is technical in nature and is linked to the information security policies.  
In researching the importance of information security training, Rezgui and Marks (2008) 
conducted a case study to investigate factors that affect the information security awareness of 
staff at an institution of higher education.  Through questionnaires, interviews, observation and 
documents, the authors collected data and used various coding techniques for analysis.  The 
research discovered that factors such as conscientiousness, cultural assumptions and beliefs and 
social conditions affect university staff behavior and attitude towards work and information 
security awareness (Rezgui & Marks, 2008).  Of particular interest was the fact that the 
university did not have a computer security awareness training program and did not know how 
that affected employee security awareness.  Rezgui and Marks recommend the establishment of 
an information security training program.  The problems discovered with employee’s security 
awareness are listed below (Rezgui & Marks, 2008, p. 250): 
1. “many respondents were not acquainted with basic IS security practices, including how to 
change their passwords or how to back up their data;”  
2. “users shared passwords;”  
3. “operative, unlocked computers were left unattended;”  
4. “laptops were not locked and left out;”  
5. “users were confused about the existence of an IS policy and none had seen one;”  
6. “users did not know how to locate an IS staff member;”  
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7. “users could not identify the university IS goals and objectives;” and  
8. “users regarded university data as of no interest to them.”  
 In other research that supports the need for security awareness training, May (2008) developed a 
decision model that provides informed alternatives to decision makers who desire to maximize 
IS security within an organization.  The model is based on Dhillon & Torkzadeh’s (2006) nine 
fundamental and sixteen means objectives that are essential in maximizing information systems 
security.  This decision model consisted of 69 ranked value-driven tasks and associated security 
objectives they impact.  Of particular interest is that security awareness training was ranked #1 of 
the 69 tasks.  Therefore, security awareness training was found to be the most important task 
associated with maximizing information systems security.  According to May’s research, 
awareness training impacts 14 sub-objectives, such as ensuring sensitive data is adequately 
secured, emphasizing the importance of data privacy and maintaining personal accountability.  
The need for security awareness training is nothing new.  Straub and Welke (1998) stated that 
systems “risk can be managed or reduced when managers are aware of the full range of controls 
available and implement the most effective controls” (p. 441).  Lacking knowledge can lead to 
less effective security.   To cope with systems risk, the authors identify an approach that includes 
the use of a security risk planning model, security awareness training and countermeasure matrix 
analysis.  The awareness program involves educating managers and users.  The managers should 
be educated on the security action cycle, which involves deterrence, prevention, detection and 
remedies for computer abuse.  Managers should also be educated on “obvious vulnerabilities and 
resources which are required to secure systems at some minimal ‘acceptable’ level” (p. 460).  
Everyone, including managers and users should receive security awareness training covering 
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high level objectives, such as the security action cycle, as well as specific lower level 
vulnerabilities and responses.  This training should also cover security policies and be offered to 
new employees at orientation and veteran employees in refresher programs.  While this paper 
suggests that managers receive specific training that is in addition to the information security 
training, the paper fails to recognize the importance of socio-technical aspects of security.  
Instead the authors suggest the use of checklists, which have been shown to be technically 
oriented.    
In supporting the need for information security training, Von Solms and Von Solms (2004) 
create a list of the ten most deadly sins of information security management.  In the list is “not 
realizing the core importance of information security awareness amongst users” (p. 372).  The 
authors state that in some companies “no proper awareness programs exist, and users are 
unaware of the risks of using the company’s IT infrastructure and the potential damage they can 
cause” (p. 375).  The consequence of committing this sin, according to the authors, is that “many 
information security related intentions will fail to materialize” (p. 375).  
In other research demonstrating the importance of security awareness training, Lamour (2008) 
used the Solomon four group experimental design to investigate the effects of training on 
security practitioners and users.   The experimental design consisted of pre-tests and post-tests 
for groups that received training as well as control groups that did not receive training.  
Practitioners received training on how to secure Cisco routers.  Users received training on how to 
recognize phishing attacks.  The results showed that the practitioner group that received training 
nearly quadrupled their scores from pre-test to post-test, from about 25% to near 100%.  The 
practitioner control group that did not receive training remained at the low 25% level.  The user 
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treatment group also had a large increase in recognizing phishing attacks.   They increased from 
40% to over 90% from pre-test to post-test scores.  The control group that did not receive 
training remained at the low 40% level.  These results indicate that training can be useful for 
both practitioners and users.  
In calling for more research in the area of security awareness training, Schultz (2004) states that 
he fears too many security awareness training programs are subpar.  “Some simply present 
platitudes about security to their captive audiences instead of teaching things that could and 
should make a practical difference in each attendee’s daily job” (Schultz, 2004, p. 2).  Also, 
many programs are out of alignment with business goals and are taught by independent training 
organizations, resulting in a “one size fits all” approach (Schultz, 2004).  Schultz suggests that 
posters, coffee cups, pens, and slogans are overused and have become meaningless and 
“gimmicky” (Schultz, 2004).  Schultz suggests that research should work to address the 
following issues regarding security awareness training: (1) “How can we better measure and then 
maximize ROI for security training and awareness?” (p. 2); (2) “How can we better align 
security training and awareness efforts with business drivers?”  (p. 2); (3) “How to impart users, 
system administrators, managers and others the security-related knowledge and skills they really 
need?” (p. 2); (4) “How can we enable them to better retain and put into practice what they 
learn?” (p. 2); and (5) that there is a need for evidence of success stories.  
Another stream of information security training research attempts to make training more 
effective.  For instance, in researching how people internalize training, Siponen (2000) believes 
current methods are descriptive and lack theoretical foundations in motivation and behavior.  
From the viewpoint of behavioral theories, a laissez-faire style of leadership and lax management 
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attitude concerning security and passing around of circulars are inept and inapplicable in security 
procedures (Siponen, 2000).   “Successful organizational awareness or education requires more 
actions than merely the given of a set of rules” (Siponen, 2000, p. 36).  Security guidelines need 
to be justified and relevant, in a way that people’s cognitive states can be changed by justifying 
each guideline (Siponen, 2000).  “End users may change their attitude and motivation towards 
the guidelines in the intended way” (p. 36).  Siponen suggests a persuasion framework based on 
the theory of intrinsic motivation, the theory of planned behavior, and the technology acceptance 
model.  The practical approaches or principles derived from these theories are morals and ethics, 
well-being, a feeling of security, rationality, logic and emotions.  The goal is to create justifiable 
security guidelines based on these theoretically based principles.  Doing so gives management 
the best chances that their employees will internalize the guidelines and minimize errors.     
In other research about the psychological factors of security training, Thomson & von Solms 
(1998) suggest that techniques from social psychology can be applied to security awareness 
training to make training more effective.  In order to bring a positive change in an employee’s 
behavior, the authors suggest using social psychology principles such as changing behavior 
directly, using a change in behavior to influence a person’s attitude, and changing a person’s 
attitude through persuasion.  A security awareness program should teach measures that become 
subconsciously entrenched into the end-user, so that they do not have to think in order to 
promote security (Thomson & von Solms, 1998).  Examples include habitually signing off from 
the computer when leaving the office, making sure the screen is not visible to those not 
authorized to see it, and making regular backups of important data (Thomson & von Solms, 
1998).  Based on these principles, the authors make suggestions for conducting security 
awareness training.  A summary of these suggestions follows (Thomson & von Solms, 1998): 
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1. an awareness program should be geared toward groups of similar work levels (upper 
management, line employees, etc.);  
2. sessions should be divided into a number of short education sessions, to allow 
participants to be more relaxed and to retain their full attention;  
3. commitment from employees is required at the conclusion of each session;  
4. the material adherence should be evaluated, preferably without the participant’s 
knowledge.  The authors suggest this may be done through observation or each 
participant could report what they have done to implement what they have learned in 
previous sessions;  
5. visible tokens of appreciation should be given to those that adhered to the training 
techniques.  Tokens should be visible, but not of great monetary value;  
6. each session should cover more topics than actually required.  Getting commitment for all 
topics and then reducing down to what is necessary makes participants feel like the 
instructor has given them something and they may be more likely to adhere to the 
remaining topics; and  
7. the presenter should be an expert and well presented.  
How to make security training more effective was the topic of research from Cone et al. (2007), 
where the authors describe a video game, CyberCIEGE, that was developed to deliver security 
awareness training.  The game was designed to make security awareness training more effective, 
while holding the trainee’s attention long enough to get the message across.  The game uses 
adaptable virtual scenarios to allow players to make choices about security in a particular 
enterprise environment and see the consequences of their choices, when the environment is under 
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attack from hackers, vandals, and potentially well-motivated professionals (Cone et al. 2007).  
The authors conclude that the game can be an effective addition to awareness training programs.  
In investigating various formats of training, Shaw et al. (2009) reported on the impact of 
information richness on online information security awareness training effectiveness.  The 
authors identify three levels of security awareness: perception, comprehension and projection.  
Perception is “to achieve an understanding of the presence or awareness of a threat” (p. 93).  
Comprehension refers to the user’s ability to understand and assess the dangers posed by various 
security risks.  Projection is the ability of users to project or predict the future course of security 
attacks.    
The research investigates the impact of hypermedia, multimedia and hypertext to increase 
security awareness among the three awareness levels.  Hypermedia is the richest medium and is 
defined as “an interactive medium that can consist of graphics, audio, video, plain text and 
hyperlinks, intertwined to create a generally non-linear medium of information”  (p. 94).  
Multimedia has less richness than hypermedia and more than hypertext.  “Multimedia combines 
text, image, sound, music, animation, video and virtual reality, but must be accessed in a linear 
sequence” (p. 95).  Hypertext is the least rich medium and is described as “plain text with the 
hyperlink features that does not incorporate feedback capability, multiple cues, language variety 
and personal focus” (p. 95).    
The authors find positive correlations between the degree of media richness and the 
improvement of security awareness among the awareness levels.  Hypermedia was the most 
effective, followed by multimedia and hypertext.  However, there was a negative effect of too 
much richness on learning performance at the perception level.  The authors suggest media 
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richness is less important for learning at the perception level and most important for advancing to 
the comprehension and projection levels.  
Only a few studies or surveys were found that investigated information security training in 
context with the actual content of training.  One was Rotvold (2008), where the author attempted 
to discover the current state of security training within organizations by conducting a survey of 
144 organizations representing small to large organizations in many sectors.  Sixty percent of the 
organizations surveyed reported their organizations performed security awareness training, with 
44.7% of the 60% reporting it was mandatory.  In those 44.7%, attendance was tracked 72.8% of 
the time.  Given these reported numbers, the actual percentage of employees receiving security 
awareness training can be quite low.  Training was most frequently offered once a year (45%) 
and the training was conducted by IT staff 58% of the time, followed by management which 
conducted the training 28% of the time.  The top delivery methods for security awareness 
training were face-to-face sessions (54%), e-mail messages (53%), online training (47%), 
presentations (32%), newsletters (29%), and posters/flyers (28%).  The most common general 
topic in information security training was security policy.  Some of Rovold’s top policy training 
topics are ‘acceptable use (89%), e-mail (85%), passwords (78%), backup and recovery (71%), 
antivirus (70%), software installation and licensing (67%) and disaster recovery (58.2%).  Of the 
top 15 topics in information security training, where policies was number one, all were 
technically oriented.    
In a government sponsored survey, the 2006 CSI\FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey 
found that information security policies were the most important topic of information security 
training (CSI, 2006).  In the 2007 version of the survey, security policies were still a top topic for 
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security training (CSI, 2007).  The 2008 and 2009 versions of the survey no longer investigated 
the primary topics of training.   
In summary of current information security training research, this literature review demonstrates 
the need for information security training and shows how vulnerable security can be without a 
training program.  The literature review also demonstrates the characteristics of effective 
training, and also describes ways to make it more effective.  It does so in the form of theoretical 
models or frameworks, though none of these models are tested.  These theoretical concepts focus 
on learning and obeying through persuasion and motivation to get trainees to remember and obey 
the content of the training.  Very little research was found that investigated the actual content of 
information security training, with Rotvold’s (2008) paper being the only in-depth study.  
Rotvold’s study not only revealed to us that security policy was the content of training, but also 
listed the security policy topics.  The CSI (2006, 2007) surveys also stated that security policy 
was a top topic of training, but did not list the actual policy topics.    
2.5 Literature Review Discussion: 
The nature and scope of information security training and information security policy is 
important to this dissertation because research demonstrates that the socio-technical approach is 
the best way to maximize the security of information systems (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000, 
2001; Trompeter & Eloff, 2001; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Dhillon, 2007; Siponen, 2001).  
However, current information security training and information security policy is technically 
oriented, and lacking in the social aspects of security (Rotvold, 2008; CWS, 2010; Fulford & 
Doherty, 2003).  The social aspects of information security are important because they engage 
the human element of information systems.  While organizations rely heavily on computers and 
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other technology to compete, they still need people to use and maintain that technology.  
Focusing only on securing the technology and ignoring the people that use the technology is 
incomplete security.    
To consider the people side of organizations, Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) describe a concept 
called RITE, which stands for responsibility, integrity, trust and ethicality of individuals.  The 
authors state that organizations need to ensure that employees understand their roles and 
responsibilities within the organization.  The integrity of employees is also very important, as 
well as having a trusting relationship between employees and the employer.  Organizations 
should also consider the ethicality of employees.  Ethical aspects of security are just as important 
as technical aspects and companies with ethics programs suffer less economic crime (Trompeter 
& Eloff, 2001, ECS, 2007).  Another social aspect of information security that no organization 
should ignore is the creation of a strong security culture (Ruighaver et al., 2007; Dhillon, 2007; 
Karyda, et al., 2005; von Solms & von Solms, 2004; Leech, 2003; Vroom and von Solms, 
2004).  A strong security culture has been linked to such things as compliant user behavior and 
employees engaging in security enhancing conduct beyond their mandatory job descriptions 
(D’Arcy & Greene, 2009).  
If socio-technical security is the best way to protect information systems, then how does an 
organization create socio-technical security?  They do it through their information security 
policies.  Information security policy is broken down into corporate security policy and 
procedural security policy, which Baskerville and Siponen (2002) call high and low level 
security policy.  The creation of corporate security policy is the crucial beginning for overall 
information systems security because this level of policy affects lower level procedural policy 
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and information security training programs.  Corporate security policy describes general goals 
for information security, but not the actual means for accomplishing those goals.   Procedural 
security policy describes the means for carrying out the corporate security policy.  Corporate 
security policy is used as the template for procedure oriented security policy (Baskerville & 
Siponen, 2002).   A goal of any organization should be for managers to create socio-technical 
corporate security policy so that procedural security policies also become socio-technical.  
Once corporate and procedural information security policies are socio-technical, how will 
information security training be affected?  The connection between information security policy 
and information security training is that the topic of training is primarily the procedural security 
policies (Straub & Welke, 1998; Rotvold, 2006; CSI, 2006, 2007).  Recall that the procedural 
security policies are the means for implementing the corporate policies.  A part of the 
implementation process is to educate the employees about the policies.  It is difficult to have 
policies and expect employees to follow them if they are not educated about them adequately. 
This inadequacy leads to employees/users that lack the proper security knowledge (Rezgui & 
Marks, 2008).  This is why procedural policies are the primary subject of information security 
training.  Organizations currently use information security training as a primary way of 
protecting their information systems (CWS, 2010).  
We know that information systems should be protected with socio-technical solutions and that 
information security training is a primary method for protection.  We also know that information 
security training is based on procedural security policy and that procedural security policy is a 
means for achieving corporate security policy.  The last piece to the puzzle discusses the creation 
of the corporate security policy and possible reasons it is not created with socio-technical 
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solutions.  Corporate security policy is created at the strategic level of the organization by 
managers that have very little experience or knowledge of creating security policy (Hone & 
Eloff, 2002; von Solms & von Solms, 2004). Their expertise is usually in some other area, such 
as business planning, forecasting, finance, etc.  Hone and Eloff (2002) suggest that those creating 
the policy often lack the knowledge to do so.  Their “lack of skills and understanding” in 
developing a security policy often leads the authors to “turn to other organization’s policies, 
commercially available sources or templates available from public sources, such as the Internet, 
for answers to their questions”  (pp. 402-403).    
Among the commercially available options available to managers are checklists or standardized 
guidelines.  According to Ernst & Young’s 2008 Global Information Security Survey, 70% of 
those organizations surveyed used standardized guidelines to create security policies and that 
number is expected to increase (GISS, 2008).  However, we know that checklists or guidelines 
have many shortcomings, including the lack of flexibility to changing business environments and 
the lack of attention to social aspects of security (Baskerville & Siponen, 2002; Dhillon & 
Backhouse, 2001).  It is completely understandable why managers use checklists over 70% of the 
time to create security policies.  Checklists have become widely used by organizations and are 
generally accepted.    
In deciding what corporate security polices to create, a manager has many options to consider.  
They can use the above option, such as checklists, or they can also rely on their education, 
experience and knowledge.  Their decision is likely to be based on a combination of all of these, 
but should be aligned with what they truly believe will be the most effective way of protecting 
their information systems.  A manager’s belief system about what they think are the most 
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effective ways of protecting their information systems is known as their value system, as 
described by Keeney (1992).  Keeney’s work with value-based objectives and decision making is 
discussed in chapter three’s methodology.  Keeney’s research is getting introduced here to help 
make sense of the connection between the concepts reviewed in this chapter.  A manager’s 
internal values about how best to protect their information systems are expressed through their 
value-based objectives.  Keeney defines value-based objectives as “statements of something that 
one wants to strive towards” (p. 34).  It is these objectives that managers use to create corporate 
security policy.  If their beliefs (values) are that socio-technical solutions are the best way for 
protecting their information systems, then they will create socio-technical information security 
objectives.  As seen in figure 2.1, these socio-technical security objectives will influence the 
corporate security policy they create.  Corporate security policy will then inform procedural 
security policy and the information security training will then be socio-technical as well. 
 
2.6 Literature Review Conclusion: 
There is a downward flowing relationship between a manager’s individual objectives, corporate 
security policy, procedural security policy and information security training.  This relationship 
stresses the importance of the manager’s value-based security objectives on corporate security 
policy because of the effect on procedural policy and training.  If managers have socio-technical 
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Figure 2.1: Policy to Training Relationship 
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value-based security objectives, they will create socio-technical corporate security policies, thus 
leading to socio-technical procedural policies and training.  A socio-technical approach to 
information security is necessary to maximize security.  However, security policy and training is 
currently technical in most organizations, meaning manager’s value-based security objectives are 
currently technically oriented.  This research argues that manager’s value-based security 
objectives can be influenced to be socio-technical, thus impacting security policy and training in 
a positive way. 
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3.  Theory and Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction: 
The literature review demonstrated the importance of social and technical aspects in maximizing 
overall security (Backhouse & Dhillon, 1996; Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000, 2001; Trompeter & 
Eloff, 2001; Siponen, 2001; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Dhillon, 2007).  The review also 
outlined the relationship between corporate information security policy, procedural information 
security policy and information security training, as well as the importance of all three to overall 
information security (Rezgui and Marks, 2008; May, 2008; Rotvold, 2007, 2008; CSI, 2006, 
2007; Von Solms & Von Solms, 2004; Straub & Welke, 1998).  The problem is that managers 
creating information security policy are creating technically oriented policy and minimizing or 
ignoring the social aspects of security (Rotvold, 2008; CWS, 2010; Fulford & Doherty, 2003).  
This may be because managers often lack the knowledge to create proper information security 
policy (Hone & Eloff, 2002).  Therefore, this dissertation will attempt to train managers on the 
importance of socio-technical information security with the goal of encouraging them to 
implement it into their information security policy.    
But how do we know that what managers learn in training will be used in the security policy they 
create?  We know this from the theoretical foundation of value-focused thinking, described by 
Keeney (1992) and mentioned in the previous chapters.  A manager’s values and value-based 
objectives represent the manager’s core beliefs about the decision situation, in this case, about 
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what security policies to create to maximize information security.  By using the value-focused 
thinking approach, this dissertation will ascertain manager’s values about maximizing 
information security after watching an information security training video.   There will be four 
groups of managers and four types of training videos, with each video having a different nature 
and scope. Analyzing the group’s values and value-based objectives toward maximizing 
information security will help us answer this dissertation’s research questions.    
Another important part of this dissertation is determining how the groups will rank their lists of 
value-based objectives.  An output from the value-focused thinking method is an unranked list of 
value-based security objectives for maximizing information security.  Because information 
security training often receives less than 1% of the security budget and is often the first to get cut 
in budget reductions, this dissertation is interested in ascertaining how managers would rank 
their value-based security objectives (CSI, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, Rotvold, 2007, 2008).  If 
budget restrictions mean some value-based security objectives get implemented and some do not, 
which do managers feel are most and least important and what implications would their choices 
have on overall information security?  To determine a ranked list of value-based objectives from 
each group of managers, a ranking Delphi methodology is used.  The Delphi methodology has 
been around for over 50 years and the ranking Delphi methodology was formalized by Schmidt 
(1997) and is used to obtain group rankings of objectives that can then be used for decision 
making.    
The next two sections describe the value-focused thinking method and how it has been used in 
research.  The following two sections describe the ranking Delphi method and how it has been 
used in research, particularly information systems research.  The following section describes this 
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dissertation’s research method and the four groups of participants.  The last section concludes 
this chapter.  
3.2 Value-Focused Thinking: 
Managers creating information security policy are faced with a decision problem.  How do they 
decide what policies to create that will maximize information security?  When faced with a 
problem, a typical decision maker considers the alternatives for solving the problem, and then 
considers the objectives for evaluating the alternatives (Keeney, 1992).  This leads to the 
decision maker solving the decision problem by choosing among available alternatives.  Keeney 
(1994) refers to this type of decision making as alternative-focused thinking and describes it as 
reactive and not proactive.  “Solving decision problems is the sole aim of alternative focused 
thinking” (Keeney, 1992, p. 47).    
Values also solve decision problems, but go beyond that narrowed focus by identifying decision 
opportunities, also known as problem finding (Keeney, 1994).  Keeney introduced value-focused 
thinking in 1992 and described values as more fundamental than alternatives that define all a 
decision maker cares about in a given decision situation (Keeney, 1992).  The idea of 
considering values first, before alternatives, is known as value-focused thinking and can be used 
to make better decisions.   The reason a decision maker is concerned with a decision problem to 
begin with is because of consequences.  If the decision maker did nothing, there would be 
undesirable consequences, thus this is the reason alternatives were generated.  The alternatives 
presumably have more desirable consequences.  The desirability of various consequences is 
based on one’s values, so decision making should also be based on one’s values and not 
alternatives.  “Alternative-focused thinking is designed to solve decision problems,” where 
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“value-focused thinking is designed to identify desirable decision opportunities and create 
alternatives” (Keeney, 1996, p. 538).  Value focused thinking identifies the best possible 
outcome and assists in making it a reality versus other approaches which identify the best of 
what is available (Keeney, 1992).  Value-focused thinking was chosen for this dissertation 
because the method identifies values first, which represent how managers truly feel about 
maximizing information security.  Influencing manager’s core beliefs about how to best 
maximize information security is central to this dissertation’s argument.  The best way to gauge 
the influence of training given to managers is to ascertain their values.  
“Value-focused thinking is designed to focus the decision maker on the essential activities that 
must occur prior to solving a decision problem” (Keeney, 1994, p. 33).  Figure 3.1 shows how 
thinking about values is at the core of many decision making constructs.  According to Keeney 
(1994), value-focused thinking can help uncover hidden objectives, lead to more productive 
information collection, improve communication among concerned parties, facilitate involvement 
of multiple stakeholders, enhance the creation and evaluation of alternatives, guide strategic 
thinking, identify decision opportunities and enhance the coordination of interconnected 
decisions  (Keeney, 1994).  Thinking about values is at the core of all of these.  
Value-focused thinking is a process that identifies objectives, where objectives are defined as 
“statements of something that one wants to strive toward” (p. 34).  Objectives are characterized 
by three features: a decision context, an object and a direction of preference.  For example, a 
security manager might have an objective to “minimize phishing email.”  The decision context is 
information security.  The object is phishing email and the direction of preference is less 
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phishing email rather than more.  Objectives are further distinguished as either fundamental 
objectives or means objectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Thinking about Values:  
The Basis for Quality Decision Making (Keeney, 1994) 
 
Fundamental objectives are “the ends that decision makers value in a specific decision 
context” and means objectives are “methods to achieve ends” (p. 34).  This dissertation’s use of 
value-focused thinking yields a list of unranked security objectives for each of the four groups of 
participants.   
Keeney (1992, p. 57) describes 10 different, but overlapping, methods for identifying objectives 
through values, such as using alternatives, consequences, goals, constraints, guidelines and 
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various perspectives.  However, Keeney believes the best way to discover one’s values is to ask 
for them (Keeny, 1994).  If the goal is to obtain a list of objectives related to a decision problem 
from decision makers, start by asking them to develop a list of values, known as a wish list.  This 
is an unranked list of one’s values toward a given decision.  For example, a person buying a car 
might list low maintenance costs, comfortable ride and safety as some of their core values.  Some 
means for achieving these values might be good gas mileage, computerized suspension, leather 
seats, anti-lock brakes and air bags.  Keeney (1999, p. 534) describes three steps for obtaining a 
list of fundamental and means objectives: (1) develop a list of values; (2) express values in 
common form; and (3) organize the values and indicate relationships.  
The first step involves asking people to develop a wish list of values about a certain topic.  The 
second step involves the researcher converting the values to objectives by restating the values 
into a common form.  For example, the person purchasing the car might have written down that 
they wished for a car that did not cost a lot to maintain.  The researcher might restate this value 
into the objective “ensure low maintenance costs.”  The third step involves separating 
fundamental objectives from means objectives.  Using the same car example, there may be the 
means objectives “ensure car safety,” “ensure the use of anti-lock brakes,” “ensure the use of 
front air bags,” and “ensure the use of side air bags.”  These can be the means objectives for the 
fundamental objective “ensure car safety.”  
Value-focused thinking has been used in a wide variety of research, ranging from military to 
environmental applications.  Sample topics where value-focused thinking have been used include 
fighting terrorists (Bullock, et al, 2008), selecting automatic rifles for the Croatian Army 
(Peharda & Hunjak, 2008), locating community correction centers (Johnson, 2006), 
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understanding organizational safety (Merrick, et al, 2005), climate change (Keeney & 
McDaniels, 2001), Internet commerce (Keeney, 1999), mobile communications (Yoo, et al, 
2001), and business process modeling (Neiger & Churilov, 2004).  Because value-focused 
thinking is a decision making methodology, it can be used in almost any situation where 
decisions need to be made, whether a personal decision or an organizational decision.  This is 
why value-focused thinking has been used in such a wide variety of research topics.    
Value-focused thinking has not been widely used in information systems or information security 
research.  Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006) used value-focused thinking when they interviewed 103 
managers to assess their values on information security.  As discussed in chapter two, the authors 
described 9 fundamental objectives and 16 means objectives related to information security.  In 
the only other information systems research found that used value-focused thinking, Barclay and 
Osei-Bryson (2010) used value-focused thinking to evaluate the values of stakeholders of 
information systems projects.  The authors proposed a formal method to develop a 
comprehensive set of objectives grounded in the views of the project stakeholders (Barclay & 
Osei-Bryson, 2010).  
3.3 Ranking Delphi Method: 
The output of the value-focused thinking method in this dissertation is a robust list of security 
objectives for each of the four groups.  This list helps answer the research questions about the 
affect of training on the values of the participants and the affect of their value-based objectives 
on information security policy.  Next, we determine which objectives the groups feel are most 
important.  In a time of budget constraints or when it is just not possible to implement every 
security objective listed, which security objectives are important enough to implement and which 
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are expendable?  To determine the answer to this question, a ranking Delphi method was used to 
create a ranked list of security objectives.    
The Delphi method originated with the Rand Corporation in the 1950’s and was used to generate 
a consensus of opinion from an anonymous group of experts.  It was first used by the military to 
investigate nuclear arsenal levels.  However, the Delphi method can be used to achieve 
consensus on just about any non-complex topic, such as developing a list of criteria, forecasting 
trends, ranking and answering specific questions about a topic.  For complex topics that cannot 
be described in a short and precise research question, other methodologies, like scenarios, are 
better suited.  There are a series of rounds (iterations) with the group members about the topic 
that leads to a higher level of mutual agreement.  In each round, the participants are told the 
results of the previous round and given a chance to change their opinion.  Changing one’s 
opinion to reflect the group opinion leads to higher group consensus.  The anonymity of the 
group members eliminates group think and personality conflicts that may otherwise bias results.  
Anonymity also makes it easier for group members to change their mind about a topic without 
the knowledge of other group members.   
The ranking-type Delphi method is a group exercise and group size can vary dramatically 
depending on the nature of the topic and the availability of experts.  Some topics may only have 
a few people in the world considered to be knowledgeable enough to warrant a Delphi study.  
Okoli & Pawlowski (2004) suggest adequate group size for a Delphi study is 10-18 participants, 
but can be lower depending on group dynamics.  Loo (2002) suggests group sizes of 5-10 can be 
adequate.    
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Because the Delphi method can be applied to multiple forms of research questions, there are 
multiple variations of the methodology.  This dissertation is interested in ranking the list of 
security objectives produced by the groups, so a ranking methodology was chosen.  The ranking 
Delphi methodology is what is typically used in information systems research.  This variation 
uses group members to obtain a ranking of key objectives, which can then be used for decision 
making.  Prior to Schmidt (1997), a problem with the ranking-type Delphi method was the lack 
of a formal set of published rules.  Researchers followed inconsistent methodologies, lacked 
statistical support for many conclusions, and did not follow for a consistent means of reporting 
results (Schmidt, 1997).  Schmidt (1997) presented “a method based on nonparametric statistical 
techniques, to conduct ranking-type Delphi surveys, perform analysis and report 
results” (Schmidt, 1997, p. 763).  Schmidt’s technique allowed for statistical support of 
conclusions, outlined a clear method, and defined a definitive stopping point for the iterations.  
Since then, many Delphi studies wishing to employ ranking utilized the ranking-type Delphi 
method described by Schmidt.  This dissertation chose Schmidt’s technique because of the 
methodological improvements over previous techniques and for the rich supply of literature 
support for the Schmidt’s method.   
Schmidt’s techniques for conducting ranking-type Delphi research follow a three phase 
approach.  The first phase discovers the issues, the second determines the most important issues 
and the third phase ranks the issues.  Below are step by step guidelines for conducting ranking-
type Delphi Research, as presented by Schmidt (1997).  In this dissertation, phase one was 
conducted using the value-focused thinking approach, which yielded an unranked list of security 
objectives.  
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Phase 1:  Discovery of Issues 
1. Encourage respondents to submit as many issues as possible.  
2. Ask for a description of each issue.  
3. The researcher consolidates the list, including different terms that appear to mean the 
same thing.  Put similar terms together and give a consolidated description.  
4. Respondents now verify proper mapping and that their ideas are fairly represented.  
 Phase 2:  Determining the Most Important Issues 
1. Send each participant a randomly ordered consolidated list from phase 1 (this list was 
created with the value-focused thinking method).  
2. Participants select at least 10% (more if less than 100 items) of the issues they feel are 
most important.  Do not ask participants to limit their list to a particular number of 
issues.  Ask them to list the minimum number and go beyond if necessary.   
3. The researcher eliminates all issues not selected by a simple majority of respondents, 
which creates a new consolidated list.  Groups will have varying lengths of lists.  
4. If the list is still too long, conduct phase 2 again with the shortened list.  
 Phase 3:  Ranking the Issues 
1. Arrange the paired list in random order and ask respondents to rank all the issues.  
Statistics can be used to rank ties, but it’s easier to ask respondents to avoid ties.  
2. Apply Kendall’s Method to create a consensual ranking of the individual lists.  Kendall’s 
coefficient of concordance (W) (Kendall & Gibbons, 1990; Siegel & Castellan, 1988).  
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3. After each round in this phase, the researcher must ask the participants if another round 
should be conducted to obtain a better consensus.   
4. Monitor Kendall’s W (see table 3.1).  A leveling off of Kendall’s W indicates lack of 
progress from the previous round, so polling should stop.  This coupled with verbal group 
consensus strongly supports stopping.  Consider the actual value of W as the indication of 
consensus strength and not the statistical significance of W.  A high value indicates 
consensus in groups of 10 or less.  In groups of 10 or more, a smaller value of W can be 
significant.  Kendall’s W ranges from 0 (no agreement) to 1 (complete agreement).  A 
strong consensus is W = .7 and is a good indicator to stop polling.  
5. Information to monitor beyond mean ranks: (1) interpretation of Kendall’s W from the 
previous round; (2) percentage of respondents placing each item in the top half of their 
list; and (3) comments from the participants.  The first two convey the degree of 
consensus.  Do not consider standard deviation as a form of consensus because it cannot 
be applied to ordinal level data.  
Table 3.1: Interpretation of Kendall’s W. (Schmidt, 1997) 
W Interpretation Confidence in Ranks 
.1 Very weak agreement None 
.3 Weak agreement Low 
.5 Moderate agreement Fair 
.7 Strong agreement High 
.9 Unusually strong agreement Very high 
 
The Delphi method has been utilized in research for over 50 years, so hundreds of studies were 
found utilizing the method.  Many of the studies focused on forecasting or developing a 
framework and most identified some set of issues or factors pertaining to the topic under study.  
Since the Delphi method is used to get a consensus of opinion from an anonymous group, it can 
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be utilized in a large variety of disciplines and fields.  Recent examples were found in molecular 
genetics (Marsden, 2009), medical ethics (Vorm, 2009), psychotherapy (Opie, 2008), ecology 
(Prato, 2008), tourism (Lee, 2008), biological conservation (Patrick, 2008), engineering (Miura, 
2008) and accident analysis (Kim, 2008).    
There were dozens of studies found in information systems/information technology research that 
utilized the Delphi method.  Table 3.2 lists five of the studies found that utilized the Delphi 
method, but did not utilize the techniques for ranking described by Schmidt (1997).  Those 
studies will now be described in more detail to demonstrate their inconsistencies with Schmidt’s 
formal methodology.   
Table 3.2: Delphi Method in IS Research 
Author Purpose Group Size 
Doke & Swanson 
(1995) 
Identify decision variables for selecting prototyping in 
information systems development. 31, 29, 27 
Brancheau, et al. 
(1996) 
Identify critical issues facing information systems executives in 
the forthcoming 3-5 years. 78, 87, 83 
Hayne & Pollard 
(2000) 
Identify the critical issues in information systems for the 
forthcoming 5 years. 176, 157 
Mulligan (2002) Classify information technology within the financial services 
industry 25, 24, 23 
Nakatsu & 
Iacovou (2009) 
Identify risk factors for domestic and offshore outsourced 
projects (two groups) 
15, 15, 15 
14, 11, 12 
 
Doke and Swanson (1995) used a ranking Delphi method to identify decision variables for 
selecting prototyping in information systems development.  Thirty one MIS managers completed 
round one of the group iterations, which yielded nine decision variables for selecting 
prototyping.  Twenty nine participated in the second round, where a tenth decision variable was 
added.  Twenty seven participated in the third and final round.  This ranking method was one of 
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the older methodologies that did not utilize Schmidt’s (1997) techniques.  Schmidt’s techniques 
would not have allowed for the addition of new decision variables in the second round.    
In a paper published in MIS Quarterly, Brancheau et al. (1996) forecasted critical issues facing 
information systems executives in the forthcoming 3-5 years.  Participants were members of the 
Society for Information Management (SIM), where 78 participated in the first round, 87 in the 
second round, and 83 in the third round.  Not all of these participants were the same throughout 
the rounds and 108 overall participants were used.  Interchanging participants during the 
iterations is one of the inconsistencies of previous methodologies.  The results of this study 
yielded 21 critical issues, where business relationship issues declined and technology 
infrastructure issues increased in importance.    
In another paper forecasting the critical issues in information systems in the forthcoming five 
years, Hayne and Pollard (2000) used a modified Delphi technique.  The authors invited 920 
members from the Canadian Information Processing Society (CIPS) to join the study and 176 
participated in round one.  To boost participation, the authors sent out 536 additional requests to 
the non-respondents for a total of 712 invitations.   Of those 712, 157 participated in round two.  
However, the authors do not disclose how many of those that participated in round two did not 
participate in round one and how results may be affected by those participants not having had 
input in the previous round.  The authors reported results on the top 10 upcoming critical issues 
facing information systems.  
In other research, Mullican (2002) used a Delphi Study to help classify information technology 
within the financial services industry.  The group was made up of senior information technology 
managers from 11 organizations.  Round one had 25 participants, round two had 24, and round 
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three had 23 participants.  A positive point in the author’s methodology was that while 
participation decreased, each remaining participant did participate in the previous round.  Since 
each round builds on the previous, it is much better to lose participants than it is to add new ones 
in later rounds.  The results of the Delphi portion of this research produced the initial 
specification of a capability-based typology for information technology.  The authors used this 
specification for a follow-up case study.    
In the last study reviewed that did not use Schmidt’s Delphi techniques, Nakatsu and Iacovau 
(2009) used a Delphi study to identify risk factors for domestic and offshore outsourced 
projects.  Two Delphi panels were assembled, one for domestic risk factors and one for offshore 
risk factors.  The domestic panel started with 17 participants and the offshore panel started with 
15 participants.  The participants consisted of experienced information technology managers that 
engage in outsourcing.  In round one of the Delphi study, 15 domestic panelists and 14 offshore 
panelists participated.  In round two, the same 15 domestic panelists participated, but only 11 
offshore panelists participated.  In round three, the domestic panel again had 15 participants, and 
the offshore panel increased to 12, meaning the additional panelist did not participate in the 
previous round.  While the authors did calculate a Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W), 
they chose to quit the iterations because of their panelist’s busy schedules and not according to a 
consensus of the panelists, which is described in Schmidt’s techniques.  Neither panel reported 
strong consensus, as Kendall’s W was .51 for the domestic group and .53 for the offshore group 
after round 3.  Both are moderate consensus indicators.  In the final results, the authors reported 
20 domestic risk factors and 25 offshore risk factors.    
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All of the studies just discussed used the Delphi method in information systems research.  
However, there was no consistency in the methodology, particularly on when the study should 
end.  They all went for several rounds, whether it was necessary or not.  Only one reported a 
Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W) for measuring consensus, but did not use the 
measurement to determine if further iterations should be conducted.  The primary reason 
Schmidt’s Delphi techniques were chosen for this dissertation is because of the well defined 
methodology, versus the inconsistent methodologies just reviewed.    
Table 3.3 describes five studies that used Schmidt’s ranking techniques and reported the relevant 
information.  The Schmidt ranking Delphi method is what is used in this dissertation.  The 
studies will now be described in more detail.    
Table 3.3: Ranking Delphi Method in IS Research (Schmidt, 1997) 
Author Purpose Group Size Kendall’s W 
Schmidt et al. 
(2001) 
Develops a list of common risk factors of 
information technology project failure. 
Group 1: 9 
Group 2: 13 
Group 3: 19 
.19, .53, .51 
.17, .39, .46, .50 
.35, .60, .73 
Keil, et al. 
(2002) 
Compares the perceptions of information 
technology project risk factors between users 
and project managers. 
15, 10 .5, .24 
Mursu et al. 
(2003) 
Identify key software project risks in Nigeria. 11, 5 .142, .256 
Lee & Anderson 
(2006) 
Identify factors impacting the information 
technology project management capability. 33, 33, 32 .28 
Kasi, et al. 
(2008) 
Identify the most important barriers to 
conducting post mortem evaluations on failed 
information technology projects. 
23, 23, 23 .26, .33, .52 
 
Schmidt et al. (2001) used his own methodology to develop a list of common risk factors of 
information technology project failure.  The authors ran three separate ranking Delphi panels at 
the same time, one from the United States (19 panelists), one from Hong Kong (9 panelists), and 
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one from Finland (13 panelists).  This was done to include cultural differences and to compare 
the group’s results.  Participants were experienced project managers from each culture.  The 
initial list of 53 risk factors was created in combination with all 3 groups.  The master list was 
sent to all three groups to be reduced in size.  The United States group reduced the list to 17 
items, Hong Kong reduced their list to 15 items, and the Finnish group reduced their list to 23 
items.  Kendall’s W for the United States group for 3 rounds of ranking was .35, .60, and .73, 
ending with strong consensus.  Kendall’s W for the Hong Kong group through three rounds of 
ranking was .19, .53, and .51.  Ranking ended with moderate consensus because round three 
failed to significantly increase Kendall’s W, but instead decreased it.  The Finnish group needed 
four iterations to reach consensus.  Kendall’s W for the Finnish group’s four rounds was .17, .39, 
.46, and .50, ending with moderate consensus.  The iterations were stopped because the fourth 
iteration failed to significantly increase Kendall’s W.  The authors reported results of the final 
rankings from the three groups and compared the group’s rankings to one another.  They also 
compared rankings to other Delphi studies.  This study from Schmidt et al. (2001) is the closest 
study in relation to this dissertation.  This dissertation also has multiple groups requiring varying 
number of iterations to reach consensus.    
In research that compares the perceptions of information technology project risk factors between 
users and project managers, Keil, et al. (2002) used Schmidt’s Delphi techniques.  Fifteen 
participants started with an initial list of 53 project risk factors and the list was narrowed to 13 by 
majority.  The initial list was provided to the participants and they were asked to shorten it 
starting with phase two of Schmidt’s technique.  This dissertation also starts with Schmidt’s 
phase two, as phase one was accomplished by value-focused thinking.  The participants first 
round of ranking yielded a Kendall’s W of .5.  The second round of ranking lost 5 participants 
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and Kendall’s W dropped to .24.  After contacting participants, the authors concluded that 
participants no longer believed a better consensus could be achieved beyond the initial .5, which 
indicates moderate agreement.  The study was stopped and consensus results were reported at .5, 
after the first iteration.  
In another study about project risks, Mursu et al. (2003) identified key software project risks in 
Nigeria.  The 11 participants were project managers representing 11 different companies.  The 
panel initially created a list of 72 key software lists.  That list was then narrowed to 19 risk 
factors.  The first round of ranking yielded a Kendall’s W of .142, which is not unusual for the 
first round.  Like the Keil, et al. (2002) study, the second round dropped several participants, 
leaving only 5.  Kendall’s W increased to .256, which still indicates weak agreement.  Because 
there was little movement in Kendall’s W and both rounds resulted in weak agreement, the 
authors decided to stop the study with questionable results.    
Changing research topics to project management capabilities, Lee and Anderson (2006) used a 
Delphi method to identify factors that impact capability.  The participants consisted of 33 
information technology project managers.  The authors started with a predetermined list of 35 
factors that influence project effectiveness and the group narrowed the list to 13.  There were 
three iterations of ranking with a final Kendall’s W of .28.  This can be considered weak 
agreement, but smaller values of Kendall’s W can be considered significant for larger group 
sizes.  The values of Kendall’s W were not reported after the first two rounds.  The authors 
reported results as the final list of 13 factors impacting project management capabilities.  
The last Delphi study to be reviewed is research from Kasi et al. (2008), where the authors 
identify the most important barriers to conducting post mortem evaluations on failed information 
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technology projects.  The panelists consisted of 23 experienced practitioners.  Like the Keil et al. 
(2002) research, the authors started with a predetermined list of 31 barriers.  The group was 
asked to use that list to brainstorm additional barriers, from which they generated 7 more, 
forming a total of 38.  The panelists then reduced the list from 38 to 19.  There were then three 
rounds of ranking with Kendall’s W improving from .26 to .33 in the second iteration, and then 
to .52 in the third iteration.  The authors stated that they believed an additional round would not 
produce better results and that they were satisfied with .52, which indicates moderate consensus.  
This decision to stop should be a consensus of the group according to Schmidt, but the authors 
did not report if the group was consulted in the decision.  The authors also did not report if the 
number of participants changed in iterations two and three, and the assumption is that they did 
not.  The final results of 19 ranked barriers to conducting post mortem evaluations of failed 
information technology projects was reported.    
All of these Delphi studies followed Schmidt’s techniques and reported the step by step process, 
making the results easy to comprehend.  The studies also reported the relevant information, such 
as the size of the initial list, the size of the shortened list and Kendall’s W of the final ranking.  
There were other studies that stated they followed Schmidt’s techniques, but failed to report 
important data, such as Kendall’s W (Addison, 2003; Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004; Weimer & 
Seuring, 2008).    
3.4 Research Design: 
Value-focused thinking and Delphi studies can consist of any number of groups, with each group 
coming to its own conclusion about a topic of interest.  Typically, only one group is used to 
create objectives or make a decision about a particular topic and that group is usually a group of 
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experts, as evident in most studies in the review of research.  This dissertation instead assembled 
four groups of panelists, each of which developed their own list of security objectives using the 
value-focused thinking approach.  Each group then ranked those security objectives using 
Schmidt’s ranking Delphi method.      
The four groups were assembled and asked to watch a 35 minute video, followed by a value-
focused thinking exercise to ascertain the participant’s values about the topic of information 
security.  There was a socio-technical group, social group, technical group, and control group.  
The socio-technical group watched a video describing social and technical aspects of information 
security (see table 3.4).  The social group’s video covered only the social aspects of information 
security for half of the video and the second half was padded with sexual harassment training.  
The technical group’s video covered only technical aspects of information security for the first 
half of the video and the second half was padded with sexual harassment training.  The sexual 
harassment part of the videos was added to lengthen the video to 35 minutes to make all groups 
equal in video length.  Group four was the control group that watched a video about anger 
management and sexual harassment, which are topics believed to be unrelated to information 
security and would not affect the results.  More specific content for each video is discussed in 
chapter four.  
After watching the video, the participants were asked to write down what they valued as the most 
important topics to corporate information security and information security training.  Participants 
were told to act as if they were managers in charge of maximizing information security and the 
effectiveness of information security training program (see appendix A for a full description of 
the survey instrument).  
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Table 3.4: Experimental Design 
 
 
 
 
 
Following Keeney’s (1992) value-focused thinking methodology, the participant’s values were 
ascertained and converted to security objectives.  The objectives for each individual participant 
were then combined into a group master list to be ranked by the participant’s working as a 
group.  Similar objectives listed by different names were clustered into common form for the 
master list.  Participants were given an opportunity to review the master list to verify their 
original values were converted to objectives properly and described in the master list 
accordingly.  This process is explained in much more detail in the next chapter.    
Ranking the objectives was performed using Schmidt’s (1997) ranking-type Delphi 
methodology.  Several rounds of anonymous ranking were conducted with each group.  Analysis 
of the group consensus was measured with Kendall’s W, as determined by using PASW 
statistical software (formally SPSS).  The outcome of each group was a list of ranked objectives 
identifying what the group determined as the most important security objectives in creating an 
effective information security awareness program and maximizing overall information security.  
This process is explained in detail in chapter five.    
Group #1 
(Socio-Technical) 
Group #2 
(Social) 
Group #3 
(Technical) 
Group #4 
(Control) 
Gets Social 
Training 
Gets 
Technical 
Training 
No 
Technical 
Training 
No Social 
Training 
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3.5 Conclusion: 
Four groups of managers were used to determine the influence of training on security objectives 
and the ranking of those objectives.  To help panelists think about social and technical aspects of 
security before writing down their values about information security, a series of videos were 
produced.  One group watched a video explaining the importance of both social and technical 
aspects of information security.  Another group watched a video explaining the importance of 
only the social aspects of information security.  A third group watched a video of only the 
importance of the technical aspects of information security.  The fourth group was a control 
group to see how managers would perform with no education imparted from a training video.    
Keeney’s (1992) value-focused thinking methodology was used to determine the manager’s 
values about information security and to create security objectives.  Schmidt’s (1997) ranking-
type Delphi methodology was used to rank the security objectives to determine their importance.  
Both methodologies have a proven research record.  The procedure and analysis of these 
methodologies and the discussion of the results are in the next chapters.  Chapter four discusses 
the value-focused thinking analysis and chapter five discusses the ranking-type Delphi analysis.  
Chapter six discusses the results and overall implications to information systems research.  
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4.  Defining Objectives That Inform Security Policy 
The objective of this chapter is to illustrate the impact of different kinds of information security 
training on information security policy formulation.  This was a long process that involved 
creating four training videos, collecting data, and following Keeney’s method of converting 
values to objectives.  Each of these areas will be discussed in detail below.  
4.1 Training Video Creation: 
Four different training videos were produced that lasted a total of 35 minutes each.  One video 
covered social and technical topics, another covered only social topics, a third covered only 
technical topics and the fourth video was used as a control video and covered none of those 
topics.  More specific content of each video will be discussed in the following sections and a 
more detailed outline of each video can be found in appendix B.  The format of the videos 
involved a combination of a series of one-on-one interviews with an expert in social and 
technical aspects of information security and how-to video lectures.  In the expert interviews, the 
interviewer asked questions pertaining to socio-technical topics and the expert responded in a 
way that explained the topic, thus creating a learning environment for the viewer.  The how-to 
videos were an assortment of educational lectures on particular topics, such as how to backup 
computer data or how to create a secure password.  All of the how-to videos are free public 
interest videos available to anyone from companies such as Microsoft and Cisco.  A more 
detailed look at the content of each video is given next. 
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4.1.1 Socio-Technical Group Training Video: 
The socio-technical training video covered social and technical aspects of information security, 
as discussed in the literature review.  The overall theme of the video covered Dhillon and 
Backhouse’s (2000) confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of data as the starting point 
for the technical discussion and the responsibility, integrity, trust, and ethicality (RITE) of people 
as the starting point of the social discussion.  One question asked by the interviewer that opened 
the dialog with the subject matter expert was how to manage the insider threat.  The expert 
responded by discussing Dhillon’s (2007) formal, informal, and technical systems of information 
security, as well as policies, procedures, processes, guiding principles, security culture, legal 
systems and standards.  Further questioning led to examples of the formal, informal, and 
technical systems.  Norms and culture were discussed in detail as examples of the informal 
system.  Rules, regulations and processes were discussed as examples of the formal system.  
Access rights, encryption, and passwords were used as examples of the technical system, as 
mentioned by Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) and Rotvold (2008).  More examples of topics 
discussed in this video include responsibility and authority structures, leadership styles, 
management commitment, deterrents, resource allocation, user involvement and regulations.  
4.1.2 Social Group Training Video: 
The social group training video contains the social elements of information security and not the 
technical elements.  Therefore, to have the video last for 35 minutes to be equal to the length of 
the other videos, part of the social video contained filler.  This filler video was in the form of 
training on sexual harassment and was chosen because the topic is unrelated to securing 
information resources and poses the minimum risk of affecting the values of the participants. 
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Adding this filler was necessary to make up the time of the missing technical aspects of 
information security.    
The social aspects of security in this video primarily focused on the responsibility, integrity, trust 
and ethicality (RITE) of people from Dhillon and Backhouse (2000).  One question asked by the 
interviewer was how to manage people and culture.  The expert responded by explaining 
motivation through good leadership, power of groups, people relationships and positive and 
negative intentions.  Another interview question asked about tools or techniques that could be 
used to teach proper social systems.  The expert then explained how to understand silent 
messages from groups or organizations, group associations and interactions with others.  Other 
topics covered in this video include motivating and influencing people through leadership, power 
relationships, belief systems influencing attitudes, work situations, personal factors, 
opportunities for crime, privacy, social and emotional intelligence and empathy.    
4.1.3 Technical Group Training Video: 
The technical group training video contained technical aspects of information security and not 
the social aspects.  Like the social video, filler was needed to make up for the missing content so 
that the total video length would be 35 minutes.  Sexual harassment was the topic chosen for the 
filler video because it is a topic believed to have a minimal influence on the values of the 
participants.    
The technical part of this video consisted of a series of presentations on multiple technical 
security topics. The primary topics covered are those reported by Rotvold (2007) as those 
organizations currently include in security awareness training and what Fulford & Doherty 
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(2003) reported as those which organizations currently include in their information security 
policy.  A sample of topics include computer updates, viruses, malware, secure e-mail, data 
backup, physical security, encryption, passwords, firewalls and phishing.  This video represents 
what research suggests is the typical security awareness training video given by most 
corporations today.  
4.1.4 Control Group Training Video: 
The control group video was intended to last 35 minutes like the other videos, but with material 
that was believed to have a minimal affect on the participant’s values.  Since this video does not 
contain any social or technical aspects of security, it had to be filled with unrelated information.  
Like the filler used in the social and technical videos, sexual harassment was used as part of the 
filler.  However, more filler was needed to meet the time requirements.  Therefore, a video 
segment on anger management was added to extend the total time to 35 minutes.  Both topics are 
unrelated to social and technical aspects of information security.  
4.2 Data Collection: 
The four groups in this research were made up of current and future business managers that were 
enrolled in a Master’s of Business Administration degree program.  Forty-one participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the four groups, resulting in three groups of ten and one group of 
eleven (see table 4.1 for group dynamics).  The forty-one participants represented 31 different 
corporations.    
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Table 4.1: Group Dynamics 
Group Group 
Size 
Male Female Average 
Age 
Average 
Management 
Experience 
(years) 
Companies 
Represented 
Socio-
Technical 
10 7 3 32 1.7 7 
Social 10 8 2 27 1.3 8 
Technical 10 8 2 28 .8 9 
Control 11 9 2 30 1.2 7 
 
Before watching the training video, each group was told that their input was to help maximize 
information security and information security training and that they would get to help in 
choosing what security topics to include.  They were told that information security training is the 
method of educating all employees on how best to protect an organization’s information 
systems.  Each group was presented with one of the four training videos and participants were 
allowed to take notes if needed.  At the conclusion of the video, participants were asked to write 
down and briefly describe what topics they believed are most important if they were a manager 
in charge of maximizing information security and the effectiveness of the information security 
training program.  They were asked to format their answers as if they were creating a wish list 
with no constraints.    
4.3 Values to Objectives: 
According to Keeney (1994), the best way to learn someone’s values about a particular subject is 
to ask them to tell you in the form of a wish list.  Participants listed what they wished to be 
included in an information security program that maximized information security.  These wishes 
are the participant’s values toward information security.  However, the raw data from the 
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participants came in many forms.  Many included one value in a statement, such as “I think 
training should include password use,” but some included several values per statement, such as 
“I think training should include password use and virus protection.” Others wrote in paragraph 
form that contained even more values.  This raw data had to be converted to a common form that 
represented single values, which is described in section 4.3.1.  An example of a value would be 
“I wish training included a topic on passwords.” The values then needed to be converted to 
objectives and clustered.  An example of an objective could be converting the previous value to 
the objective “ensure password protection is fully utilized.” Clustering refers to grouping similar 
objectives into a single objective.  Many objectives may end up referring to utilizing password 
protection, but were stated using different words.  In this case, they can be clustered into a single 
objective.  This involved converting the values into objective statements and clustering similar 
objectives.  This process is described in section 4.3.2 and results in a final list of security 
objectives representative of each group of participants.  The socio-technical group was chosen to 
demonstrate this process.  The next few sections follow the process through to the completion of 
five objectives, out of the 72 the group finished with.  For a complete conversion process, see 
appendices D and E.  
4.3.1 Raw Data to Common Form 
Participant’s raw data input had to be broken down into a single common form, where only one 
value was represented at a time.  To simply the statements in the process of converting the raw 
data, participant statements were reworded and expressed as wishes.  Raw data that contained 
multiple wishes were broken down into individual statements.  For example, in table 4.2, ST1’s 
raw data stated “all computers must be password protected, something as easy as screen saver 
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passwords might deter an intruder.” The common form of this statement yields two wishes, “I 
wish computers were password protected,” and “I wish screen saver passwords were utilized.” If 
there was any confusion, any additional descriptions or elaboration given by the participants was 
used to better understand the participant’s intended value.  The letters ST is a code that 
represents the socio-technical group.  The codes S, T, and C were used to represent the social 
group, technical group, and control group respectively.  The number following the code 
represents the number assigned to each participant, 1-10 or 1-11 for the control group.  Adding 
codes to the original input for each participant makes it easier to trace the final objectives back to 
the participant or participants from which they originated.  See appendix D for the complete 
conversion of all raw data to common form.  
Table 4.2: Socio-technical Group Raw Data Conversion to Common Form Sample 
Raw data from participant Formatted in common form as wishes 
Issue passwords to all employees. ST1: I wish all employees were issued passwords 
In order to get access, an employee must enter his or her 
password. 
ST1: I wish passwords were required for access 
All computers must be password protected, something as 
easy as screen saver passwords might deter an intruder. 
ST1: I wish all computers were password protected 
ST1: I wish screen saver passwords were utilized 
Integrity of the people in the organization, trust between 
the organization and the employees are more important 
than everything.   
ST2: I wish employees had integrity 
ST2: I wish for trust between the organization and 
employees 
Emphasize individual integrity in the video as much as 
possible. 
ST8: I wish employees were taught about individual 
integrity 
Make sure people are familiar with the basic procedures, 
passwords, logging in, logging off, not sharing 
confidential data, and so forth. 
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with basic 
procedures 
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with password 
policy 
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with procedures of 
logging in and logging off 
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with the policy of 
not sharing confidential data  
Can you share information, for example, in many 
companies in “development and research department for 
new products?”  Are they allowed to email or share 
facts? 
ST7: I wish there were confidentiality policies 
Ethics – people need to be ethical and trusting. ST5: I wish employees were ethical 
ST5: I wish employees were trustworthy 
The training that would be given to the employee should 
involve mutual trust. 
ST2: I wish employees received training in mutual trust 
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Because success is going to come with employees.  
Employees need to trust the company. 
ST2: I wish employees knew that trusting the company 
leads to success 
Reinforce ethics. There is no need for any of this if 
people are not compelled to do unethical things. 
ST6: I wish ethics were stressed 
 
4.3.2 Clustering and Converting Values to Objectives 
The output of the previous section of converting the raw data to values is a list of single values 
expressed as wishes from each of the participants for each group.  However, many of these 
values expressed as wishes are similar to one another.  For example, two values from two 
different participants in the control group stated “I wish training included an Internet policy” and 
“I wish training included acceptable Internet usage.” These values are both about establishing 
rules that govern the use of the Internet.  Clustering them together and converting them into an 
actionable objective can be done in the same step.  Converting a value in the form of a wish to an 
objective that is actionable is a fairly straightforward process.  Just add a verb to the value and 
restate it as an objective.  In our example, the two Internet usage related values can be clustered 
and converted into the objective “ensure training includes an Internet usage policy.” This 
converts two values into one actionable objective.  Table 4.3 follows the values from the 
previous table for the socio-technical group through the clustering and conversion process into 
final objectives.  Again, for a complete list of this conversion process, see appendix E.    
Table 4.3: Socio-technical Group Objective conversion and Cluster Sample 
Values Objectives 
ST1: I wish all employees were issued passwords 
Ensure password protection is fully utilized ST1: I wish passwords were required for access ST1: I wish all computers were password protected 
ST1: I wish screen saver passwords were utilized 
ST2: I wish employees had integrity 
Ensure training covers employee integrity ST8: I wish employees were taught about individual 
integrity 
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with the policy of not 
sharing confidential data  Ensure data confidentiality policies are in place 
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ST7: I wish there were confidentiality policies 
ST5: I wish employees were trustworthy 
Ensure a trust relationship between employees and 
the company 
ST2: I wish for trust between the organization and 
employees 
ST2: I wish employees received training in mutual trust 
ST2: I wish employees knew that trusting the company 
leads to success 
ST5: I wish employees were ethical Ensure appropriate ethics training ST6: I wish ethics were stressed 
 
 
 4.3.3 Final Group Objectives 
The previous section clustered and converted values to objectives, yielding a final list of group 
objectives (see appendix F).  The socio-technical group finished with the most objectives at 72.  
The social group finished with 37, the technical group finished with 43, and the control group 
finished with 49 security objectives.  These lists of security objectives do not represent a ranked 
order, but instead are represented randomly.  In chapter five, the ranking Delphi method is used 
to shorten and rank the security objectives of each group.    
The significance of the final list of objectives is that it represents the security objectives that the 
group members feel are important for maximizing the effectiveness of information security and 
information security training.  Each objective was analyzed and placed into one of three 
categories for group analysis.  The technical category (T) represents all objectives there were 
technical in nature and require a technical implementation in order to satisfy the objective, such 
as “ensuring password protection is fully utilized.”  The social category (S) represents all 
objectives that are social in nature, such as “ensuring appropriate ethics training.”  The general 
category (G) represents objectives that are neither technical nor social.  General objectives are 
often related to how security training should be presented, such as “ensure examples are fully 
utilized in security training,” and “ensure training is simple and short.”  The pie charts in 
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appendix E represent the technical, social, or general orientation of each group’s objectives as 
percentages.  The next section discusses the group’s final objectives in much more detail and the 
significance of their relation to information security policy.     
4.4 Discussion: 
Taking a closer look at the final security objectives of the four groups, the first result that 
emerges is that the socio-technical group created a lot more objectives than did the other groups, 
almost 60% more than the average of the other groups.  More important than the total number of 
objectives created by each group, is the quality of those objectives and the mix of social, 
technical and general objectives.  Too few social objectives and many technical objectives mean 
that security policy will lack adequate social aspects and be technically dominant.  Too many 
general objectives means the participants were focused too much on aesthetics, such as having 
hands-on training and colorful presentations, and not focused enough on social and technical 
aspects of security.    
The socio-technical group not only had more objectives, but had an adequate representation of 
social and technical objectives.  Of the 72 total security objectives, 25% were social, 34.72% 
were technical, and 40.28% were general objectives.  This is a good percentage of social and 
technical objectives.  It is to be expected that there will be a higher percentage of technical 
objectives than social objectives, mainly because there are more technical solutions to 
information security than there are social solutions.  While there were too many general 
objectives from all groups, the socio-technical group was among the best at minimizing them.  
Most of the general objectives were appropriate for conducting awareness training, such as using 
examples in training, using stimulating videos and involving management in training.    
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The socio-technical group’s final list of social security objectives included many objectives that 
the literature review stated were most important.  In representing the responsibility, integrity, 
trust and ethicality of employees (RITE), the group listed multiple objectives.  For instance, they 
had a security objective to create an ethics training program.  Ethical aspects of security are just 
as important as technical aspects and companies with ethics programs suffer less economic crime 
(Trompeter & Eloff, 2001, ECS, 2007).  The group also had security objectives to ensure a 
trusting relationship between the employee and the employer and to clearly define the 
employee’s roles and responsibilities.  In current organizations where employees are empowered 
with more responsibility, building a trusting relationship between the employee and the employer 
is more important than ever (Dhillon, 2007).  In addition, employees need to understand their 
roles within the organization, which also includes individual accountability (Dhillon & 
Backhouse, 2000).  The group also had security objectives relating to the screening of 
employees, hiring responsible employees, and promoting the integrity of the individual. Dhillon 
and Backhouse (2000) warn about ensuring the integrity of the individual before giving them 
access to sensitive resources, so these objectives are also very important.   
The socio-technical group was the only group to completely represent all aspects of RITE.  Other 
important social objectives created by this group include the creation of a mix of formal, 
informal, and technical control systems, creating reward systems, acknowledging employee 
commitment and  employee motivation.  The only important social aspect that this group omitted 
was creating a security culture, which is a major oversight.    A strong security culture is very 
important for information security and  has been linked to such things as compliant user behavior 
and employees engaging in security measures beyond their mandatory job descriptions 
(Ruighaver et al., 2007; Dhillon, 2007; Karyda, et al., 2005; von Solms & von Solms, 2004; 
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Leech, 2003; Vroom and von Solms, 2004; D’Arcy & Greene, 2009).  While creating a security 
culture is very important and not creating a security objective to do so is a significant omission, 
the socio-technical group otherwise created a robust list of social security objectives.    
On the technical side, the socio-technical group created an adequate list of technical objectives 
and represented the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of information.  For instance 
they included technical objectives to ensure data confidentiality, appropriate access, intrusion 
detection, password management, biometric authentication, data monitoring, firewalls, proper 
infrastructure planning, and system reliability.  Restricting data access to those that are 
authorized is crucial to protecting the confidentiality of data (Dhillon, 2007).  This group’s 
objective for ensuring data confidentiality specifically addresses this task.  The integrity of data 
is important because it is concerned with the trustworthiness and correctness of the data (Dhillon, 
2007).  Data that cannot be trusted as correct is worthless data.  The socio-technical group’s 
objectives for intrusion detection and data monitoring help protect the integrity of data.  Beyond 
the confidentiality and integrity of data, making it available to those in need is equally 
important.  This can mean contingency planning, disaster recovery planning, or ensuring the 
reliability of data access (Dhillon, 2007).   The socio-technical group’s objectives for the use of 
firewalls, ensuring system reliability, and proper infrastructure planning relate to ensuring the 
reliability of data access.   The socio-technical group also listed technical objectives for 
protection from portable devices, physical access to systems, and securing Web servers.  Overall, 
the socio-technical group created a robust list of social and technical security objectives.  These 
socio-technical security objectives implemented as the organization’s information security 
policies and distributed through the information security training program would come close to 
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maximizing overall information security.  The only exception would be the lack of a security 
culture.    
The social group’s final list of security objectives consisted of 27.03% social, 24.32% technical, 
and 48.65% general objectives.  This is a large percentage of general objectives.  The true test is 
to evaluate the quality of social and technical objectives against RITE, CIA, and other important 
social and technical aspects.  It is good to recall here that the social group only received social 
training, so any technical security objectives listed were not influenced by the training.  
Therefore, it was anticipated that this group would have a robust list of social objectives and a 
moderate list of technical objectives.  However, the social security objectives listed by this group 
in regard to RITE were not as comprehensive as anticipated.  They listed objectives for 
considering employee integrity and employee ethics, but failed to create security objectives for 
defining roles and responsibilities and creating trusting relationships.  They also failed to list the 
creation of a positive security culture, as did the socio-technical group.  The above mentioned are 
three important social security objectives omitted by this group and all three were covered in 
their training video.  It is unclear why the group failed to list these objectives and is perhaps a 
topic to be addressed in future research.  The group did list other important social objectives, 
such as recognizing employee cultural differences, manager emotional intelligence, employee 
decision making, corporate values, morale, employee gender differences and the effects of 
employee dissatisfaction.     
On the technical side of security, the social group also left a few security holes.  In support of 
CIA, the social group created security objectives for confidentiality and integrity of information, 
but failed to create objectives to preserve the availability of data.  However, they did list other 
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important technical objectives, such as password protection, physical security, personal data 
protection, and identity theft.   
Overall, the social group’s list of social objectives was incomplete, which is a surprise 
considering they received social training.  They also created an incomplete list of technical 
security objectives, which is understandable considering they did not receive technical training.  
There was an overabundance of general objectives, with many relating to conducting awareness 
training and some completely unrelated.  For instance, how to handle the media is unrelated to 
information security and security awareness training, while hands-on training is relevant to 
conducting information security training.  These socio-technical security objectives when 
implemented as the organization’s information security policies and distributed through the 
information security training program would not maximize overall information security and 
would leave some security holes in both the social and technical areas.    
The technical group received technical training and no social training.  Therefore, they were 
expected to be strong in technical aspects of security, but relatively weak in social aspects.  This 
group listed 11.63% social objectives, 48.84% technical objectives, and 39.53% general 
objectives.   This is the largest percentage of technical objectives from all the groups.  In 
representing RITE, they created a security objective to address employee roles and 
responsibilities, but failed to list objectives in regard to employee integrity, trust, and ethicality.  
This was no surprise, but what was a surprise was that the technical group listed security culture, 
employee culture and corporate values.  This is the only group to create an objective for security 
culture and they did not receive training on the topic.  This shows that without social training, the 
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group still came up with several important social objectives.  However, the overall list of social 
objectives is poor and not nearly as comprehensive as the social or socio-technical group.    
Technical objectives were very strong for the technical group, as they had an abundance of 
objectives related to CIA.  For instance, they listed data protection, data recovery, data backups 
and data confidentiality as security objectives.  They also listed many other technical aspects of 
information security, such as password protection, physical security, the use of encryption, 
auditing, SPAM filtering, phishing, virus detection, worm detection, spyware detection and the 
use of virtual private networks.     
Overall, the technical group created an incomplete list of social objectives and a robust list of 
technical objectives.  They also had less general objectives than the other three groups, at 
34.9%.  Many of those objectives were about the aesthetics of training, such as using bright 
imagery, interactive training, hands-on exercises, and using humor in training.  These socio-
technical security objectives when implemented as the organization’s information security 
policies and distributed through the information security training program would not maximize 
overall information security and would leave many security holes in the social side of security.  
This type of security depicts the scenario in today’s organizations, as we learned from the 
literature review; organizations today have technically oriented information security policy and 
training (Rotvold, 2008; CWS, 2010; Fulford & Doherty, 2003).    
The control group represents managers that get no formal training on how to maximize 
information security, which is the status quo for most organizations (Hone & Eloff, 2002).  The 
training this group received had nothing to do with information security, so it is expected that the 
group will produce a weak list of social objectives and a moderate list of technical objectives.  In 
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regard to percentages, the control group’s final list of security objectives included only 6.12% 
social objectives, but had 44.9% technical and 48.98% general objectives.  This is a very low 
percentage of social objectives and large percentage of general objectives.  Out of 49 total 
objectives, only 3 were socially related.  Two of those social objectives related to RITE’s trust 
and ethics components and the third related to social engineering.  Only the control group 
included social engineering as a security objective, which was somewhat of a surprise.  Beyond 
those three objectives, which were very good, the control group was missing many other social 
aspects of information security and was by far the worst representation of social objectives of all 
the groups.    
The control group’s list of technical objectives was much more comprehensive.  All aspects of 
CIA were represented.  For instance, the group listed data confidentiality, data backup, and 
encryption as technical security objectives.  They also included physical security, wireless 
networking, intrusion detection, firewall configuration, virus detection, SPAM detection and 
domain naming service security.    
Overall, the control group had an incomplete representation of social objectives and a nice 
representation of technical objectives.  It was a surprise that their technical security objectives 
were well represented.  The social group also did not receive technical training, but was only 
able to produce a moderate list of technical objectives.  The control group listed far too many 
general objectives and had the largest percentage out of all the groups at 48.98%.  Like the other 
groups, many were related to information security training, like having interactive training, using 
examples and using qualified trainers.  These socio-technical security objectives when 
implemented as the organization’s information security policies and distributed through the 
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information security training program would not maximize overall information security and 
would leave many security holes in the social area of security.    
In regard to social objectives, the socio-technical group created 20 total social objectives, 
compared to 10 for the social group, 5 for the technical group, and 3 for the control group.  The 
socio-technical group was the only group to create a robust list of social objectives and to list 
satisfactory objectives for RITE, which is somewhat of a surprise that they were the only group 
to do it.  The social group received the same training on RITE as the socio-technical group, but 
failed to enlist trust, and roles and responsibilities.  However, the social group did have a 
moderate list of social objectives and performed better than the technical and control groups.  
Both the technical and control groups had insufficient lists of social security objectives.   
For the technical objectives, the socio-technical group created 25 total technical objectives, 
compared to 9 for the social group, 21 for the technical group, and 22 for the control group.  
Only the social group failed to have a comprehensive list of technical objectives, failing to 
satisfy the availability of data part of CIA.  All other groups satisfied CIA and listed plenty of 
additional technical objectives.    
The lists of security objectives from all four groups produced a few other interesting results.  For 
instance, the results of the control group are similar to the technical group, in that the social 
aspects of information security policy and training would be poor and the technical aspects of 
information security policy and training would be excellent.  It was not expected that the control 
group would have excellent technical representation.  This implies that training managers on the 
technical aspects of security only is no better than not training them at all.  With no training, 
managers are still aware of the technical aspects of security.  However, the results are mixed in 
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that the social group did not receive technical training either and produced only a moderate list of 
technical objectives.  The social group’s second surprise was that they only produced a moderate 
list of social objectives as well.  Since they received in depth social training, it was expected 
their social list of security objectives would be excellent.  Another unexpected result was that the 
technical group was the only group to list the creation of a security culture as a security 
objective.  They did not receive social training and the social and socio-technical groups did, but 
neither of the latter groups listed that objective.  That was the only surprise for the socio-
technical group. They otherwise produced an excellent list of social and technical security 
objectives.    
4.5 Conclusion: 
The objective of this chapter was to demonstrate the impact of different kinds of information 
security training on information security policy formulation.  The chapter started with the 
creation of four training videos, including a socio-technical video, a social only video, a 
technical only video, and a control video.  Groups of managers were formed and each group 
watched one of the videos.  Following the video, each group participant wrote down their values 
for maximizing the effectiveness of information security and information security training.  
Following Keeney’s value-focused thinking methodology, the values were converted and 
clustered into lists of value-based security objectives.  Each group’s security objectives were 
analyzed in regard to the nature and scope of the information security policy they would inform.  
  
Overall, the socio-technical group had the most comprehensive list of security objectives, 
satisfying both RITE and CIA.  They were the only group to have satisfied both and have many 
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other important social and technical objectives.  The social group failed to completely satisfy 
both RITE and CIA, but had moderate lists of social and technical objectives.  The technical and 
control groups both had excellent lists of technical security objectives, but weak lists of social 
security objectives. The output of this chapter is an unranked list of security objectives 
representative of each group’s values.  Chapter five uses the ranking Delphi method to narrow 
and rank the lists of security objectives to discover which objectives the groups feel are most and 
least important. 
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5.  Ranking Delphi Analysis 
5.1 Background: 
The last chapter used Keeney’s value-focused thinking methodology to create lists of value-
based security objectives from four groups of panelists.  The nature and scope of each list of 
security objectives was analyzed for their social and technical aspects as deemed important from 
the literature review.  For instance, the lists were analyzed for representation of the 
responsibility, integrity, trust and ethicality of individuals (RITE) and the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information (CIA) in addition to other important social and technical 
security objectives.  Also discussed in chapter four was the nature and scope of the information 
security policy informed by each list of security objectives.  What we do not know from chapter 
four is the degree of importance attached to each security objective. Which security objectives 
would get eliminated if the security budget was reduced?  Recall that the lists of value-based 
objectives are wish lists developed by the participants without other constraints such as budgets.  
In the real world, there may be money to do some things and not others.  The purpose of chapter 
five is to use a ranking Delphi method to shorten the lists and rank the remaining security 
objectives.  The shortened ranked lists will tell us which security objectives the participants feel 
are most and least important.     
According to Schmidt’s (1997) guidelines for conducting ranking-type Delphi research, three 
phases must be conducted.  The first phase involves discovering the issues pertaining to a 
particular topic.  This was accomplished with the value-focused method discussed in chapter 
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four, where each group produced an unranked list of objectives they thought were important for 
maximizing the effectiveness of information security and training.  The socio-technical group 
listed 72 objectives, the social group had 37 objectives, the technical group had 43 objectives, 
and the control group had 49 objectives.  This chapter starts with Schmidt’s phase two, which 
was to shorten the lists before they could be arranged in a ranked order.    
Phase two of Schmidt’s guidelines states that the panelists are to be asked to shorten the list to no 
less than 10% of the original number of objectives and no more than 100 objectives.  An ideal 
list would be somewhere around 20 objectives, according to Schmidt, but could certainly be 
more or less depending on the topic.  Since none of the groups had more than 100 objectives to 
begin with, the upper limit was not a constraint.  According to Schmidt’s guidelines, participants 
were told there was no correct number of final objectives, but to include what they believed were 
the most important objectives from the list.  Once each group member submitted a shortened list 
of what they believed were the most important objectives from the original list, a final list was 
created.  This was accomplished by retaining objectives that appeared on a majority of the 
participant’s shortened lists.  For example, if 60% of the participants thought a particular 
objective was important and they included that objective on their shortened list, then that 
objective would be included in the final list.  If a particular objective was only represented by 
40% of the participant’s shortened lists, then it did not get included in the final list.  Phase two 
could be repeated if necessary to shorten the list further. 
Phase three of Schmidt’s guidelines created a group ranking of the final list of objectives from 
most important to least important.  This phase involved asking the group members to rank the 
final list of objectives from what they believed were the most important objectives to the least 
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important objectives and each participant was given a randomly ordered list of objectives to 
start.  Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (Kendall’s W) was then determined by analyzing the 
ranked lists from the group members, which was used to determine group consensus.  The higher 
the coefficient, the better group consensus was.  There were multiple iterations of this process, 
with each iteration producing a newly ranked list of objectives based on the group mean rank of 
each objective.  The new group ranking was then sent back to each group member to be ranked 
again.  This process was repeated until one of two things happened.  The first is when Kendall’s 
coefficient of concordance is .7 or greater and the group agrees further iterations would not 
significantly improve consensus. A coefficient of .7 or greater indicates strong agreement on the 
ranked list of objectives.  The second stopping point could be if the group’s coefficient levels off 
at some point below .7 and does not significantly increase with further iterations.  This would 
mean the group failed to reach strong agreement on the final ranked list of objectives and they 
would never be in strong agreement.    
The next few sections of this chapter discuss phases two and three of Schmidt’s guidelines as 
they pertain to this research.  Section 5.2 narrows the long lists of objectives from the value-
focused thinking chapter down to manageable lists of final objectives.  Section 5.3 discusses the 
ranking process through multiple iterations and produces a final ranked list of objectives from 
each group.  Section 5.4 discusses the ranked lists and the affect on information security policy 
and section 5.5 concludes the chapter. 
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5.2 Determining the Most Important Objectives: 
Each group was given a randomly ordered list of objectives that their group produced in the 
value-focused thinking piece of this research.  They were asked to keep the objectives they 
believed were most important and discard the rest.  They were given no particular goal for a final 
number of objectives they should have.  This process was accomplished via e-mail with each of 
the participants.  Once the shortened list was received from each of the participants, a final list of 
objectives was produced.  This was accomplished by keeping objectives that appeared on the 
shortened lists of the majority of group members, according to Schmidt’s guidelines.  Since three 
of the groups had ten members and one of the groups had eleven members, it was decided that an 
objective would be kept for the final list if it was found on six of the participants shortened lists.  
Six participants agreeing to the objective as important would be in the majority for all groups, 
whereas five would not be the majority for any of the groups.  The shortened unranked lists of 
objectives for each group can be found in appendix G.  The socio-technical group shortened their 
list to 12 objectives they believed were most important.  The social group shortened their list to 
23, the technical group to 22, and the control group to 25 objectives.  The number of final 
objectives for each group falls within Schmidt’s goal of greater than 10% of the original list and 
less than 100 objectives.  Also included in the tables in appendix G is the percentage of 
participants from each group that included that objective in their shortened list.  The higher that 
percentage, the more group members that believed the objective was important enough to include 
on their final list of objectives.  The lists are sorted by percentage of inclusion from participants 
and should not to be confused with the ranking process discussed in the next section.  
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5.3 Ranking the Objectives: 
The previous step narrowed each group’s list of objectives down to what they believed were the 
most important objectives, which yielded a much shorter list of objectives for each group.  The 
next step was to rank the objectives from most important to least important.  A randomly ordered 
list was sent to each participant for ranking.   The participants were told the list is randomly 
ordered and to not imply any ranking. PASW-17, formally known as SPSS-17, was used to 
perform statistical analysis on the ranked lists.  In order to use PASW to determine the mean 
rank and group consensus, each objective was translated into an alphabetic letter.    The random 
list of objectives that was sent to each group participant was represented in PAWS as the letters 
of the alphabet as seen on tables 5.1 and 5.2 for the social group.  The participants only received 
a list of objectives without the letters, but the researcher uses the letters for the columns in 
PASW’s data view.  The social group had 23 objectives, so the columns in PASW were labeled 
A-W to represent the 23 objectives.  The rows in PASW were numbered 1-10 to represent the 10 
participants in the social group.  To explain this process as efficiently as possible, the social 
group was chosen for this example because that group had group consensus and stopped after 
two iterations and the others stopped after three.  
Table 5.1: Social Group Objective Conversion to Letters Iteration One 
A. Ensure hand’s on training 
B. Ensure managers are involved in providing training 
C. Ensure the importance of security is addressed with all employees 
D. Ensure training addresses corporate information theft 
E. Ensure training addresses data protection 
F. Ensure training addresses employee ethics 
G. Ensure training addresses employee integrity 
H. Ensure training addresses factors affecting employee decision making 
I. Ensure training addresses how employee dissatisfaction affects security 
J. Ensure training addresses strong passwords while minimizing the need to write them down 
K. Ensure training addresses the relationship between emotional intelligence and security 
L. Ensure training addresses the social interaction between companies and individuals 
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M. Ensure training considers employee cultural differences 
N. Ensure training covers legal aspects of security 
O. Ensure training covers personal data security 
P. Ensure training covers privacy rights 
Q. Ensure training covers the most common threats and how to prevent them 
R. Ensure training describes corporate values 
S. Ensure training includes confidentiality policy 
T. Ensure training includes continuing education as threats change 
U. Ensure training includes technical aspects 
V. Ensure training is up to date with current security issues 
W. Ensure training utilizes real world examples, including the corporate consequences of bad security 
 
Table 5.2 is the data view from PASW for the social group’s first iteration.  The letters A-W 
from table 5.1 that represent the objectives are the columns in PASW.  The ten participants are 
the rows.  The data that fills the cells are the actual rankings provided by each of the participants 
for iteration one.  For example, participant number one thought that “ensure training covers the 
most common threats and how to prevent them” was the most important objective.  This can be 
seen by looking at row “Part 1” for participant one and column “Q,” where that participant 
placed the number one.  Because the number one is in that column, this means that participant 
listed that objective as number one in their ranking.  All 23 of their rankings are listed in this 
manner.   Recall that the participants did not receive a list with the letters, but only the 
objectives.  This means that the researcher had to apply the letters back to each participant’s 
ranked list based on table 5.1.  Think of it as a conversion process from objectives to letters for 
easy entry into PASW.  Once PASW gives the results, they can be easily converted from letters 
back to objectives.  This process of using letters to represent the objectives in PASW was 
performed for all participants for each group and for each iteration.    
Table 5.2: Social Group PASW Input for Iteration One 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W 
Part. 1 6 18 7 19 8 10 9 11 22 12 21 20 23 13 5 14 1 15 16 2 4 3 17 
Part. 2 22 2 3 16 7 17 18 10 21 11 9 8 23 12 5 19 4 13 20 15 6 1 14 
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Part. 3 9 13 3 17 14 7 20 18 21 23 12 22 5 6 16 11 1 15 19 4 10 8 2 
Part. 4 23 8 2 10 11 3 4 15 16 17 18 19 21 9 12 13 6 1 14 20 22 5 7 
Part. 5 1 23 5 21 22 2 3 18 4 20 9 10 11 13 14 19 8 12 16 15 17 6 7 
Part. 6 19 8 17 2 6 15 7 21 9 12 3 10 11 18 1 13 4 16 14 5 23 22 20 
Part. 7 1 7 2 10 3 16 17 20 21 18 22 23 19 8 4 5 11 12 13 14 15 9 6 
Part. 8 8 7 6 17 18 9 5 19 2 22 3 4 20 10 16 15 11 12 21 13 23 14 1 
Part. 9 19 17 18 11 10 9 12 13 8 23 5 14 15 2 3 4 20 1 16 6 22 7 21 
Part. 10 22 5 10 17 4 6 11 19 21 20 18 12 7 13 1 14 15 23 8 16 3 2 9 
 
Analysis of the participant’s rankings using PASW yielded the following results for the first 
iteration of the social group (table 5.3).  Each objective has a mean rank and standard deviation.  
This table is sorted by the mean and then standard deviation to break ties.  The first column 
represents the alphabetic letter originally assigned to each objective, so it is easy to see how the 
original random list was moved around to form this ranked list.  Objective “C” comes in first, 
which is “ensure the importance of security is addressed with all employees.” It has the lowest 
mean of 7.3.  Several objectives have the same mean, such as “O” and “V,” which came in 
number 2 and 3 in the ranked list.  In such cases, the objective with the lower standard deviation 
earns the higher ranking, according to Schmidt’s guidelines.  This is why objective “O” comes in 
second with a standard deviation of 6.111 and objective “V” comes in third with a standard 
deviation of 6.29.    
Table 5.3: Social Group First Iteration Sorted by Mean 
 
Letter Mean Std. Deviation Objective 
C 7.3 5.926 Ensure the importance of security is addressed with all employees 
O 7.7 6.111 Ensure training covers personal data security 
V 7.7 6.29 Ensure training is up to date with current security issues 
Q 8.1 6.19 Ensure training covers the most common threats and how to prevent them 
F 9.4 5.232 Ensure training addresses employee ethics 
E 10.3 6.129 Ensure training addresses data protection 
N 10.4 4.452 Ensure training covers legal aspects of security 
W 10.4 7.183 Ensure training utilizes real world examples, including the corporate consequences of bad 
 G 10.6 6.096 Ensure training addresses employee integrity 
B 10.8 6.663 Ensure managers are involved in providing training 
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T 11 6.164 Ensure training includes continuing education as threats change 
R 12 6.65 Ensure training describes corporate values 
K 12 7.318 Ensure training addresses the relationship between emotional intelligence and security 
P 12.7 5.012 Ensure training covers privacy rights 
A 13 8.894 Ensure hand’s on training 
D 14 5.676 Ensure training addresses corporate information theft 
L 14.2 6.477 Ensure training addresses the social interaction between companies and individuals 
I 14.5 7.934 Ensure training addresses how employee dissatisfaction affects security 
U 14.5 8.155 Ensure training includes technical aspects 
M 15.5 6.654 Ensure training considers employee cultural differences 
S 15.7 3.802 Ensure training includes confidentiality policy 
H 16.4 3.893 Ensure training addresses factors affecting employee decision making 
J 17.8 4.662 Ensure training addresses strong passwords while minimizing the need to write them down 
Kendall’s W = .193 
 
In addition to the mean rank and standard deviation, PASW also yields Kendall’s Coefficient of 
Concordance, also known as Kendall’s W, which is reported at the bottom of the table.  Kendall's 
Coefficient of Concordance (W) is used to calculate consensus among three or more people.  
Kendall’s W ranges from 0-1, with zero indicating no agreement and one indicating full 
agreement.  For the first iteration, the social group’s consensus was .193, which is very weak 
agreement according to Schmidt’s scale (see chapter 3).  Another round must be done to see if 
the group is capable of achieving better agreement.    
The second round of ranking for the social group started with each participant receiving the 
group ranking results from the first round. The new list was created using the mean rank from 
round one, as seen in table 5.4. This is the first time each participant saw the ranked objectives as 
a group.  Again, letters are added to the ranked list for easy input into PASW, but the participants 
only receive the ranked objectives and not the letters.  Each participant was asked to make any 
changes they believed were necessary, such as moving objectives up and down the list to satisfy 
their individual values.  If they believed the list was satisfactory, they did not have to change 
anything.  Group consensus is expected to increase at this point because individuals usually only 
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move the objectives they feel strongly about and leave the others alone.  The more that get left 
alone, the greater the group consensus.    
Table 5.4 represents the social group’s first list of ranked objectives with letters assigned for 
representation in PASW.  This group of assigned letters A-W is different than the original list 
sent to participants, as the letters now represent the first ranking and not the randomly ordered 
list.  Just like in the first round, the researcher converts the participant’s newly ranked list for 
round two to the letters represented in table 5.4 and enters them into PASW.  The results from 
PASW are then converted from letters back to objectives.    
Table 5.4: Social Group Objective Conversion to Letters Iteration Two 
 
A. Ensure the importance of security is addressed with all employees 
B. Ensure training covers personal data security 
C. Ensure training is up to date with current security issues 
D. Ensure training covers the most common threats and how to prevent them 
E. Ensure training addresses employee ethics 
F. Ensure training addresses data protection 
G. Ensure training covers legal aspects of security 
H. Ensure training utilizes real world examples, including the corporate consequences of bad 
 
I. Ensure training addresses employee integrity 
J. Ensure managers are involved in providing training 
K. Ensure training includes continuing education as threats change 
L. Ensure training describes corporate values 
M. Ensure training addresses the relationship between emotional intelligence and security 
N. Ensure training covers privacy rights 
O. Ensure hand’s on training 
P. Ensure training addresses corporate information theft 
Q. Ensure training addresses the social interaction between companies and individuals 
R. Ensure training addresses how employee dissatisfaction affects security 
S. Ensure training includes technical aspects 
T. Ensure training considers employee cultural differences 
U. Ensure training includes confidentiality policy 
V. Ensure training addresses factors affecting employee decision making 
W. Ensure training addresses strong passwords while minimizing the need to write them down 
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Table 5.5 displays the results from PASW for the group’s second ranking iteration.  The letters in 
the left column represent the previous ranking, so you can see which items moved up and down 
the list.  As you can see, letter “A” remained in the top spot, which means the participants did not 
change the number one ranking for that objective.  Its standard deviation is also very low, 
indicating strong agreement on the number one ranking.  Kendall’s W increased dramatically to 
.744, which means the group now has strong consensus.  According to Schmidt, the researcher 
should ask the participants if they feel a third iteration will produce any better results.  If a 
majority of the group feels that a third iteration will strengthen consensus, then a third iteration 
should be performed.  In this case, the majority of the social group’s participants responded that 
an additional iteration would not improve consensus, so this was the final ranking for the social 
group.   
 
Table 5.5: Social Group Second Iteration (Sorted by Mean) 
Letter Mean Std. Deviation Objective 
A 1.10 0.32 Ensure the importance of security is addressed with all employees 
C 4.40 3.44 Ensure training is up to date with current security issues 
E 4.90 1.52 Ensure training addresses employee ethics 
D 5.10 2.23 Ensure training covers the most common threats and how to prevent them 
B 7.10 6.67 Ensure training covers personal data security 
H 7.50 2.84 Ensure training utilizes real world examples, including the corporate consequences of bad security 
F 7.70 4.14 Ensure training addresses data protection 
I 8.20 2.70 Ensure training addresses employee integrity 
G 8.50 1.35 Ensure training covers legal aspects of security 
J 10.00 1.89 Ensure managers are involved in providing training 
K 11.30 4.03 Ensure training includes continuing education as threats change 
L 11.80 4.10 Ensure training describes corporate values 
M 13.10 3.54 Ensure training addresses the relationship between emotional intelligence and 
 O 13.50 6.13 Ensure hand’s on training 
P 14.20 3.65 Ensure training addresses corporate information theft 
N 14.50 0.85 Ensure training covers privacy rights 
R 16.20 5.05 Ensure training addresses how employee dissatisfaction affects security 
Q 17.00 3.74 Ensure training addresses the social interaction between companies and 
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S 18.70 2.54 Ensure training includes technical aspects 
T 18.90 4.20 Ensure training considers employee cultural differences 
U 19.70 2.54 Ensure training includes confidentiality policy 
V 20.20 3.91 Ensure training addresses factors affecting employee decision making 
W 22.40 1.90 Ensure training addresses strong passwords while minimizing the need to 
   Kendall’s W = .744 
 
The process described above was for the social group, but the same process was used with the 
socio-technical, technical, and control groups.  The final ranked list of objectives for each group 
with Kendall’s W results can be found in appendix G.  The social group had consensus after the 
second round and so did the socio-technical group when they had a Kendall’s W of .734 after the 
second iteration, but the socio-technical group decided to go another round and improved their 
consensus to .825, while the social group agreed to stop after the second round.  For the socio-
technical group, one hundred percent of the group felt they could do better with the additional 
round.  
The technical group was the only group to not reach a strong consensus.  A Kendall’s W of .627 
falls between moderate and strong agreement- according to Schmidt’s guidelines, which is 
perfectly fine.  A Kendall’s W of .7 is desirable, but not mandatory.  When a group appears to 
stall or makes little progress with successive iterations according to Kendall’s W, as this group 
did with a score of .582 advancing to .627, the researcher may stop if the group agrees they can 
no longer make progress.  In this case, the majority of the technical group agreed that no further 
progress could be made with an additional iteration.  One interesting point should be made about 
this group.  One of the ten participants believed very strongly about their rankings and those 
rankings were dramatically different than the rest of the group.  While nine of the ten participants 
were coming to a consensus, this one individual was standing out in disagreement.  If that one 
individual were excluded from the group, the group consensus would have been .890.  The 
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difference between .890 that could have been and the .627 that the group stopped with can be 
explained by one individual participant who strongly disagreed with the others.    
The control group finished with a very strong consensus of .992.  However, it should be noted 
that only four of the eleven participants made any changes to the final ranking.  This means they 
were satisfied with the results of second round.  The four that did make changes only made 
minor changes, thus resulting in an almost perfect group consensus.    
5.4 Discussion: 
Chapter four concluded with a long list of security objectives for each group.  The percentages of 
social, technical, and general objectives were noted for each group.  More importantly, the 
objectives chosen by each group were compared against the social objectives for RITE, the 
technical objectives of CIA, and other important socio-technical objectives.  Chapter five’s goal 
was to have the groups rank what they thought were the most important objectives to information 
security.  The ranking process makes the group narrow the list by eliminating some objectives 
and keeping others.  The objectives that remain are then ranked from most important to least 
important.  To analyze the results of the final rankings, it is important to ask some of the same 
questions we did with the full objective lists from chapter four.  What are the social, technical, 
and general objective percentages from the final rankings?  How do the final rankings compare 
to RITE, CIA, and other important socio-technical objectives?  In addition, what important 
objectives were in the original list of objectives, but did not make it to the final rankings list?  
Eliminating important objectives would mean the group did not feel they were important enough 
to keep on the final ranked list.  Another question to answer is what objectives did the groups 
feel were worthy of a top ten ranking?   The most important question to answer is how 
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information security policies are affected by the now shortened list of security objectives.  All of 
these questions will be answered for each group next. 
The final percentages of social, technical, and general objectives are displayed in figure 5.1.  All 
of the groups maintained percentages similar to what they had with the complete list in chapter 
four.  The socio-technical and social groups both reduced the percentage of general objectives 
and increased technical objectives, which is a positive note. The social group also increased their 
percentage of social objectives.  The technical group reduced their general objectives by 3%, 
adding that percentage to their social objectives.  The control group is the only group that 
deteriorated by increasing the general objective percentage by 18% at the expense of lowering 
technical and social objective percentages.    
 
 
Figure 5.1: Group Percentages 
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As was discussed in chapter four, the percentages of social, technical, and general objectives are 
not as important as the quality of the chosen objectives.  The socio-technical group started with 
the most robust list of 72 objectives and narrowed it down to 12, by far the shortest ranked list of 
all the groups.  In doing so, the group failed to include many important objectives they had in the 
initial list.  Significant objectives they included relating to RITE are “ensure clearly defined roles 
and responsibilities,” and “ensure potential employees are screened before being hired,” which 
can relate to the integrity of the employee.  However, the group eliminated the two other 
important RITE objectives relating to trust and ethics.  Other social objectives dropped by this 
group include the creation of a mix of formal, informal, and technical control systems, creating 
reward systems, acknowledging employee commitment and employee motivation.  
From CIA, the group included “ensure data confidentiality policies are in place,” which of course 
relates to the confidentiality of data.  They also included “ensure computers are updated 
regularly,” which can relate to availability of data.  Maintaining computers and networks is 
essential for ensuring data is accessible by those that need it when they need it.  However, the 
group eliminated their objectives relating to the integrity of data, which leaves some security 
holes related to CIA.  The group also eliminated the technical objectives for implementing 
firewalls, protection from portable devices, physical access to systems and securing Web 
servers.    
The socio-technical group eliminated many important objectives when they narrowed their 72 
objectives to 12.  For instance, ethics training did not make the final list because it was only 
chosen by 30% of the respondents for inclusion in the final list.  Others that did not make the 
final list include employee integrity (20%), protecting databases from intrusion (30%), and 
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building a trust relationship between employee and employer (50%).  It was a surprise that 
ethics, employee integrity, and building trust relationships scored so low and the first two were 
not even close to making the final list.  Those topics were stressed as very important in the video 
training the group received.  Overall, the socio-technical group left some holes in security by 
eliminating important objectives.  They also included too many general objectives, though the 
percentage decreased when compared to the larger list.  Overall, the socio-technical group ended 
with an incomplete list of social and technical security objectives, which is definitely a setback 
from the excellent socio-technical objectives they did have.  These socio-technical security 
objectives implemented as the organization’s information security policies and distributed 
through the information security training program would not maximize overall information 
security and would leave some security holes in both the social and technical areas.    
The social group was able to keep most of the important objectives that they had originally 
listed.  Though this group did not fully represent RITE and CIA to begin with, they did keep 
what objectives they did have relating to those concepts.  They ranked employee ethics and 
employee integrity both in the top ten, which is great for social aspects that often get ignored.  
Other important social objectives that made the list relate to employees, such as understanding 
social interactions between individuals (employees) and their employers, factors affecting 
employee decision making and employee cultural differences.  Social objectives that were 
dropped from the ranked list include employee morale, which only 30% of the participants 
thought was important, and employee gender (10%).  
The technical objectives listed by the social group were sparse to begin with.  Beyond 
confidentiality and data protection, their ranked list included the use of strong passwords and 
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personal data protection.  Technical objectives dropped from the longer list related to physical 
security and identity theft.  Also making the final list was an overabundance of general 
objectives.  Overall, the social group kept most of the important socio-technical objectives they 
originally had, but they started with an incomplete list of social and technical objectives.    These 
socio-technical security objectives when implemented as the organization’s information security 
policies and distributed through the information security training program would not maximize 
overall information security and would leave some security holes in both the social and technical 
areas.    
The technical group started with a list strong in technical objectives and weak in social 
objectives, but they had listed a few surprise social objectives.  The good news is that almost 
every social objective originally listed was included on the final ranked list of objectives.  They 
maintained their surprise social objectives relating to roles and responsibilities and developing a 
security culture.  The only important social objective that was eliminated related to employee 
cultural differences.  This group also did well maintaining their technical objectives in the final 
list.  All objectives relating to CIA were maintained and the only important objective eliminated 
related to physical security, which only 20% of the participants thought was important.  Overall, 
the technical group maintained the important socio-technical objectives and maintained their 
weak showing for social objectives and excellent showing of technical objectives.  These socio-
technical security objectives when implemented as the organization’s information security 
policies and distributed through the information security training program would not maximize 
overall information security and would leave some security holes in the social side of 
information security.    
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The control group started with a strong technical list of objectives and a very weak social list of 
objectives.  They only had three social objectives out of forty-nine to start.  Unfortunately, only 
one of those was included in the final list, which was the need for ethics training.  Only 20% of 
the group believed employee trust was important and 10% thought social engineering was 
important.  The group maintained many of the original technical objectives, but eliminated some 
important ones, including some related to CIA.  The most notable technical objectives eliminated 
were encryption, which only 20% of the participants found important, firewalls (50%), SPAM 
(40%), virus scanning (30%), and intrusion detection (20%).  While the group started with an 
adequate list of technical objectives, they finished with an incomplete list by eliminating too 
many important objectives.  These socio-technical security objectives when implemented as the 
organization’s information security policies and distributed through the information security 
training program would not maximize overall information security and would leave some 
security holes in both the social and technical areas.    
Analyzing the top 10 objectives from each of the groups is a little more revealing as to what the 
groups believed were important objectives.  In times of budget constraints, the top 10 have the 
best chance of getting implemented.  As in the original list of objectives, the socio-technical 
group outperformed the others.  This group had the least number of general objectives in the top 
ten, with 30%, and only one general objective in the top five.  They had 40% technical 
objectives, which was better than all the other groups, and 30% social objectives, which was 
equal to the best from the other groups.  The top three objectives were social objectives and 
included two from RITE, relating to responsibilities and integrity.  Several of the technical 
objectives related to confidentiality and availability of information from CIA.  This is the best 
top 10 of all the groups, but still leaves many security holes.  
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The social group had the second best outcome, but overall was not very good.  The group had a 
lot of general objectives in the top ten, at 60%, including the top two ranked objectives.  The 
other four included two social and two technical objectives.  The two social objectives included 
two pieces from RITE, ethics and employee integrity.  One of the technical objectives related to 
the integrity of information from CIA.    
The technical group had poor socio-technical representation from the top 10 objectives, with 
60% general objectives, 10% technical, and 30% social.  The top four objectives were general 
objectives.  It is surprising that the group that received technical training would only have one 
technical objective in the top ten, which was ranked number ten, and three times as many social 
objectives.  That one technical objective related to the confidentiality of information from CIA.  
Building a security culture was ranked number seven.    
The control group was by far the worst performer with the top ten objectives.  Ninety percent of 
the top ten were general objectives.  There were no social objectives and one technical objective, 
which related to data confidentiality of information from CIA.  Overall, the top 10 security 
objectives for the control group would provide little or no security.    
 5.5 Conclusion: 
This chapter asked the groups to narrow down their long lists of security objectives by keeping 
the objectives the group believed were most important.  They were then asked to rank the 
objectives from most important to least important.  Overall, the socio-technical group dropped 
some important socio-technical objectives, such as objectives relating to employee ethics and 
employee integrity.  While they started off well with a robust list, they narrowed it too much, 
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leaving out important objectives and compromising security.  The social group started with a 
moderate list of socio-technical objectives and maintained most of them in the final ranked list.  
The technical group started with strong technical objectives and weak social objectives and 
decided to keep many of those for the final ranked list.  On the other hand, the control group also 
started with a strong list of technical objectives and a weak list of social objectives, but made it 
weaker by eliminating all but one social objective from the final ranked list.  On the technical 
side, the control group eliminated several important objectives, such as encryption, which is 
important for ensuring the integrity of data in CIA.    
Analyzing the final ranked list of objectives and the top ten objectives from each group makes it 
clear that the socio-technical group produced the best list of objectives, even though they 
narrowed their list too much and eliminated some important objectives.  The socio-technical 
group still had the strongest showing, especially if we only analyze the top ten objectives.  The 
social group had the second best performance, ranking ethics and integrity in the top ten.  
Analysis also makes it clear that the technical and control groups had the worst lists of 
objectives.  The technical group did a good job of keeping important objectives in the final 
ranked list, but failed to include them in the top ten.  The control group performed poorly from 
the beginning and got worse as they eliminated important objectives from the final ranking and 
filled 90% of the top ten with general objectives.  
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6.  Discussion 
6.1 General Discussion: 
The purpose of this research was to investigate how different kinds of information security 
training affect the nature and scope of information security policies within a firm.  Previous 
research had not investigated this connection and it was not known if such a relationship existed.  
Four groups of current or potential managers were shown different types of information security 
training; (1) socio-technical training, (2) social training, (3) technical training, and (4) control 
group training.  Each group then listed their values toward information security and those values 
were clustered and converted into security objectives using Keeney’s (1992) value-focused 
thinking methodology.  A manager’s value-based security objectives are what managers use to 
make security decisions.  Their value-based security objectives toward maximizing information 
security indicate the nature and scope of the information security policies they will create.  This 
research found that the nature and scope of information security training given to managers does 
influence the nature and scope of information security policies.  Making this connection changes 
our understanding of the relationship between managers, information security policy and 
information security training.  
Prior to this research, the connection between these constructs was fuzzy at best.  According to 
information systems security research, managers create the information security policies and 
information security training is based on those policies (Hone & Eloff, 2002; Rotvold, 2007; 
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CSI, 2006, 2007; Straub & Welke, 1998).  The training teaches employees about the policies 
with the intent of them using and following what they learned to better protect information 
systems.  The connection between managers, policies, and training is the extent to which 
information systems security literature previously understood the relationship (figure 6.1).    
What this dissertation’s findings suggest is that the relationship is not flat and does not flow in 
one direction from the manager to the training, but in fact comes full circle back to the manager.  
Security awareness training is intended for all employees, including management.  This means 
that the managers that create information security policy influence the nature and scope of 
information security training that they themselves will get as part of their regular security 
training.  A significant finding of this research is that training affects policy, which creates the 
loopback seen in figure 6.2.   
Managers are affected by the nature and scope of the information security training they receive.  
The training influences or reinforces their way of thinking about security and thus the 
information security policy they create or modify, which leads to the creation or modification of 
future information security training.   
 
 
Manager's 
Individual 
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Information 
Security 
Policy
Information 
Security 
Training
Figure 6.1: Prior Policy to Training Relationship Understanding 
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A more detailed understanding of this relationship suggests that the nature and scope of 
information security training that a manager receives shapes the manager’s values toward 
information security (figure 6.3).   A manager’s values impact the manager’s objectives toward 
information security, which influences the nature and scope of corporate security policies they 
create.  The corporate security policies are high level security policies that are the basis for lower 
level procedural security policies, which in turn is the basis for information security training.  
The loop back to the managers is through the training.   The information security training is 
intended for all employees, including the managers that created the security policy in the first 
place.  More importantly, middle managers that will someday create corporate information 
security policy are also influenced by the training, thus helping to maintain the cyclic nature and 
scope of security policy and training.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Policy to Training Relationship 
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The problem with this cycle is that current information security policy and information security 
training is technical in nature (Rotvold, 2008; CWS, 2010; Fulford & Doherty, 2003).  
Therefore, manager’s values and objectives toward information security must be technically 
oriented, so security policy and training become technically oriented.  This technically oriented 
information security training then reinforces current manager’s technical thinking and influences 
new manager’s values and objectives into technical thinking.  This represents the state of 
information security policy and information security training in organizations today, which is a 
major problem.  
There has to be a break in the cycle to introduce socio-technical aspects of security.  The 
literature review strongly indicates that socio-technical aspects of security are necessary for 
maximizing information security (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000, 2001; Trompeter & Eloff, 2001; 
Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Dhillon, 2007; Siponen, 2001).  This dissertation suggests that 
giving managers’ socio-technical information security training will impact their values and 
objectives toward information security, thus impacting the information security policy they 
create.  The security policy then created will be influenced by the manager’s value-based 
objectives for securing information systems.  According to the cycle, creating socio-technical 
security policy will lead to socio-technical information security training, which in turn will start 
a new cycle of socio-technical security policy and training, thus maximizing information 
security.  This process is defined in more detail later in this chapter under the emergent issues 
section 6.3.1.  
Another reason there needs to be a break in the cycle is because of the heavy dependence on 
checklists.  We know that 70% of companies use checklists, which are technically oriented 
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(GISS, 2008; Baskerville & Siponen, 2002; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001).  Checklists seem like a 
great idea for managers that are unaware of what should be included in security policies and have 
only been exposed to technically oriented training.  Both their basis for security thinking and 
their value-based objectives for securing information systems are technically oriented.  Since 
industry standard security guidelines are technically oriented, using them as the basis for security 
policies seems like the proper course of action.  However, doing so leads to technically oriented 
corporate and procedural security polices, which leads to technically oriented information 
security training.  The result is less than optimal information security.  Also, the technically 
oriented information security training leads to the next generation of managers that have 
technically oriented value-based security objectives.    
To demonstrate the relationship between information security training and information security 
policy created by managers, four groups of current or potential managers were given various 
kinds of training.  The control and technical groups will be discussed first.  The control group 
received no relevant training and was used to compare the other three groups.  This means that 
participants were asked to list their objectives for securing information systems based on their 
current values without any influence from the training video.  They had to rely on their own 
feelings, experiences, and education about how they wished to maximize information security.  
The technical group received relevant technical training and represents companies that offer 
technically oriented information security training currently.  Neither group received training on 
the social aspects of security.    
Results indicate that both groups did an excellent job representing technical objectives and both 
represented social objectives poorly.  The technical group did slightly better in both areas, but 
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not significantly.  The control group’s results indicate that no training at all satisfies a great deal 
of the technical aspects of security, as they fared very well with listing technical objectives.  The 
control group did satisfy all aspects of CIA and included several other important objectives.  CIA 
strands for the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information.     
The major problem with both of these groups is the lack of social aspects of security, which 
research has stated as important for maximizing information security (Dhillon and Backhouse, 
2000, 2001; Trompeter & Eloff, 2001; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Dhillon, 2007; Siponen, 
2001).  Both groups had major deficiencies and did not come close to satisfying the requirements 
of RITE and were missing many other important social objectives.  RITE stands for the 
responsibility, integrity, trust and ethicality of individuals.  However, the technical group did list 
a couple of important social objectives, including the creation of a security culture.  They were 
the only group of the four to list this objective, which is very important for information security.  
  
The significant difference between the control group and the technical group was the ranking of 
the security objectives.  This tells us what objectives each group feels are the most important.  
The original list of objectives was reduced in size by keeping the objectives that the majority of 
the group believed were more important and the rest were eliminated.  The shortened list was 
then ranked.   The technical group’s final list of objectives kept many of the important technical 
objectives and the most important social objectives.  Creating a security culture was introduced 
by only one of the ten participants, yet 90% of the group agreed creating a security culture was 
important enough to keep in the final list and the objective finished ranked 7th out of all 
objectives.    
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In contrast to the technical group that maintained most of the best objectives in their final 
ranking, the control group eliminated many of their important objectives, including many that 
related to CIA.  The control group only had 3 social objects out of 49 total objectives to begin 
with and then eliminated two of them from the final rankings.  The only positive point is that the 
one they kept was creating an ethics program, but the objective barely made the list.  Two 
participants suggested ethics in the initial list and 55% of the group agreed to keep it on the final 
list and it finished outside the top 10 in the final ranking.  It is clear from the results of the 
technical and control groups that companies with technically oriented training and companies 
with no training leave large gaps in information security.  Both groups supported technical 
aspects of security but mostly ignored the social aspects.    
The socio-technical and the social groups had different outcomes than did the technical and 
control groups.  The social group did not have as strong a result for social objectives as was 
anticipated, though the result was better than the technical and control groups.  Overall, the 
social group had an inadequate list of social objectives. They failed to fully represent RITE, but 
did include several other important social objectives.  On the technical side, the social group’s 
final list of objectives was not as robust as the technical and control groups. But the group did 
produce a moderate list of technical objectives.  A positive point for the social group is their 
realization of the important social and technical objectives.  In their shortened list of ranked 
objectives, they kept most of their important social and technical objectives and kept all of their 
objectives relating to CIA and RITE.  Employee ethics and employee integrity were both ranked 
in the top ten objectives.    
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The socio-technical group received social and technical information security training and 
produced the best mix of socio-technical objectives out of all the groups.  The socio-technical 
group produced a robust list of social objectives and was the only group to include all of the 
objectives relating to RITE.  The major social aspect omission from the socio-technical group, 
and the social group, was the creation of a security culture.  Only the technical group included 
that objective.  The surprise is not so much that the technical group listed it when they did not 
receive training about security culture, but that the social and socio-technical groups did receive 
security culture training and failed to include it in their objective lists.  The socio-technical group 
also produced a robust list of technical objectives, representing all aspects of CIA and beyond.    
While the socio-technical group started with an excellent list of social and technical objectives, 
the ranking Delphi study indicates they did not realize the importance of some of those 
objectives.  The complete representation of RITE was stripped down in the final ranking to only 
two of those constructs.  They also dropped some important technical objectives, including the 
integrity of data component of CIA.  Examples of important objectives dropped by the socio-
technical group include employee ethics and integrity, motivation, commitment, and intrusion 
detection.  
Overall, the socio-technical group produced the best list of security objectives and was the only 
group to fully represent RITE and CIA and include many other important security objectives.  
This demonstrates that training did affect their values toward securing information systems.  The 
disappointing result from this group is that they eliminated many of those important security 
objectives in their ranked list.  The social group’s results were also a little disappointing because 
they failed to fully represent RITE.  However, they did include several other important social 
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security objectives.  The technical and control groups did not have many surprises.  Both created 
a robust list of technical objectives and a poor list of social objectives, but the technical group 
was a little better in both areas.    
6.2 Research Questions: 
This research had two primary research questions related to the effect of training given to 
managers on their values toward security of information systems and the security policy they 
create.  Value-focused thinking research was used to ascertain individual values toward securing 
information systems from four groups of managers that completed four different training 
programs.  The security values of each group were converted into security objectives and 
clustered into similar objectives.  Each group’s list of security objectives were then reduced and 
ranked according to importance.  The first research question discusses the group’s values toward 
securing information systems in relation to the nature and scope of the training they received.  
Did the training affect the way managers think and feel about securing information systems?  
The second research question discusses the security policy implications in relation to each 
group’s value-based objectives.  Managers will create security policy based on their value-based 
objectives, so will that security policy maximize information security?    
 6.2.1 Influence of Training on Values: 
The first research question asked to what extent manager’s values toward securing information 
systems are influenced by the nature and scope of information security training they receive.  
Each group listed their values toward securing information systems after watching one of four 
different training videos.  One’s values define all a decision maker cares about in a given 
 
 
114 
 
decision situation (Keeney, 1994).  The values listed by the participants from each group 
describe how they feel and care about securing information systems at a personal level.  Based 
on the responses of the technical, social, and socio-technical groups compared to the responses of 
the control group, one can see that the nature and scope of information security training has 
influence on manager’s values toward securing information systems, though the results are 
mixed.  
The control group represents a company that does not train managers on the importance of socio-
technical security.  Their values would be molded by their education, personal experiences, and 
beliefs.  The resultant values of the control group were technically dominant and very weak 
socially.  This means that with no training, manager’s basic beliefs toward securing information 
systems would be to primarily use technical solutions and little or no social solutions.  In the 
control group’s original list of security objectives, only 3 socially oriented value-based security 
objectives were represented.  However, the group listed 22 technically oriented value-based 
security objectives, such as data confidentiality, data backup, and passwords.  The complete list 
of technically oriented value-based security objectives was very good for securing information 
systems and represented all components of CIA.  Overall, the control group, with no training, 
had an adequate representation of technically oriented value-based security objectives and a poor 
representation of socially oriented value-based security objectives.  The difference between the 
results from the control group and the results of the other three groups is attributed to the training 
those other groups received.    
The technical group’s training represents training that occurs in most companies today.  It is 
technical in nature and does not include social aspects of security.  The values of the group’s 
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participants following the training were also technical in nature and were weak in representing 
the social aspects of security.  However the technical group’s value-base objectives were a little 
more robust than were the control group’s technically oriented value-based security objectives.  
Among the technical group’s 25 technical values were additional concepts, like encryption, 
malware, and phishing.  The technical group’s superior technical values are attributed to the 
technical training they received.  As with the control group, the poor social representation is 
attributed to the lack of social training imparted in both groups.    
The social group received only social training and no technical training.  Therefore, if their 
values were affected by the training, then it would be expected that their technically oriented 
value-based security objectives would be similar to the control group’s values. However, the 
results indicate that the social group’s value-based objectives toward technical solutions for 
information security would provide only moderate information security, which is not as strong as 
the control group’s technical objectives. The social group produced only 9 technically oriented 
security objectives, compared to 22 for the control group.  It appears that social-only training 
affected the manager’s values in a negative way, leading them to produce far few technical 
objectives than the control group.   
The social group’s socially oriented value-based objectives were expected to be better than the 
control group and the technical group’s objectives.  The control group and the technical group 
did not receive social training, so the social group’s socially oriented value-based objectives can 
be compared to both.  The social group’s socially oriented value-based objectives were better 
than the control group and the technical group.  The social group had 10 total socially oriented 
value-based objectives, compared to 3 from the control group and 5 for the technical group.  The 
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social group also listed many socially oriented value-based objectives that the control and 
technical groups did not, like, employee integrity, employee dissatisfaction, emotional 
intelligence, social interactions between companies and employees, and cultural differences.  
These additional values were topics discussed in their training video and the inclusion of these 
topics in the group’s value-based security objectives is attributed to the training.    
The socio-technical group is the only group that received both social and technical training, so 
the expectation would be that this group’s values toward social and technical aspects of security 
would be stronger than the control group.  Since the control group and the social group did not 
receive technical training, the technical values of the socio-technical group can be compared to 
both.  The results show that the socio-technical group created 25 technically oriented value-based 
security objectives, compared to 22 for the control group and 9 for the social group.  This is 
comparable to the control group and far better than the social group.  The social values of the 
socio-technical group were also well represented, with 20 in all, and better than the other groups, 
even the social group that also received social training.    
Overall, the nature and scope of information security training does affect the manager’s values 
toward securing information systems, but more so for social values than technical values.  
Groups that received technical training had similar representation of technical values than did 
groups that did not receive technical training.  This is attributed to people already having 
technically oriented values going in.  Groups that received social training had a much better 
social value representation than did groups that did not receive social training.  An unexpected 
result is the negative impact on technical values from receiving only social training and no 
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technical training, where the social group’s technically oriented value-based objectives were far 
less than the other groups.  These results indicate that training has an effect on values.    
6.2.2 Implications for Information Security Policy: 
The second research question asked to what extent value-based objectives influence the nature 
and scope of information security policy.  To answer this question, categories were created to 
represent the quality of the information security policy that would be created from the manager’s 
value-based objectives.  For the social aspects of information security, five components were 
identified from the literature review as most important.  Those are the responsibility, integrity, 
trust, and ethicality (RITE) of individuals and the creation of a security culture.  Five categories 
used to rate the inclusion of the five social components are very good, good, moderate, poor, and 
very poor (see table 6.1).  All five of these components must be represented in the information 
security policy in order to maximize information security and receive a very good rating.  For the 
technical components, the three components found to be most important from the literature 
review were confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of information.  The three categories 
used to rate the inclusion of these components were very good, moderate and very poor (see 
table 6.1).    
Table 6.1: Security Policy Categorization Criteria 
Categories Social Technical 
Very Good Full support of RITE and a security culture (5 components) 
Full support of CIA 
(3 components) 
Good 4 of 5 components  
Moderate 3 of 5 components 2 of 3 components 
Poor 2 of 5 components  
Very Poor 1 or less component 1 or less component 
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This dissertation used the value-focused thinking methodology to produce a list of value-based 
security objectives for each of the four groups.  That list was then reduced and ranked using a 
ranking Delphi methodology, producing a shorter list of security objectives.  Both lists are 
analyzed in this section in regard to the information security policy they would inform.  The 
quality of that policy is based on the categories described in table 6.1.  The security policy based 
on the longer unranked lists of security objectives will be discussed first, followed by a 
discussion of the shorter, ranked lists (see table 6.2).    
Information security policy informed by the value-based security objectives created by the socio-
technical group came the closest to maximizing information security.  The social policy was 
categorized as good and not very good only because the group failed to include the creation of a 
security culture.  Information security policy that does not provide for the creation of a strong 
security culture is not maximizing information security.  On the technical side, the information 
security policy was very good and supports all aspects of CIA.  By far, the socio-technical 
group’s information security policy produced the strongest overall information security of all the 
groups.  
The social group’s information security policy informed by their value-based security objectives 
was a disappointment.  It was anticipated that their social security policy would be good or very 
good, but instead it was poor.  They failed to create policy for instituting a security culture as 
well as two of the four components of RITE.  On the technical side, security policy from the 
social group was also less than adequate.  They were the only group to have moderate technical 
security policy and not fully represent CIA, while all the other groups produced very good 
technical policy.    
 
 
119 
 
The technical group and the control group both produced poor social security policy.  This fit 
into expectations because both groups did not receive training on the social aspects of security 
and they both produced a poor list of socially oriented value-based objectives, thus leading to 
poor social security policy.  On the technical side, both the technical group and the control group 
produced very good technical security policy.  Of course this is no surprise for the technical 
group since they received technical training and produced an excellent list of technically oriented 
value-based objectives.  The control group also produced an excellent list of technically oriented 
value-based objectives and their very good technical security policy was a minor surprise.   
Employees are predominately exposed to technically oriented policies and these get reinforced 
through technically oriented information security training.  It was therefore expected that all 
participants from all groups would have a technically oriented view for protecting information 
systems, not from the training given in this dissertation, but from their own education and 
personal experiences.  The training in this dissertation would only enhance that technical view if 
they received technical training.  It was expected that the control group would have moderate 
technical information security policy, but not very good policy.  Very good technical security 
policy required the representation of all aspects of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
(CIA) of information.  The expectation was that the control group would represent most, but not 
all aspects of CIA. 
Table 6.2: Socio-technical Security Policy (all objectives) 
Group Social Policy Technical Policy 
Socio-Technical Good Very Good 
Social Poor Moderate 
Technical Poor Very Good 
Control Poor Very Good 
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Table 6.3 represents the information security policy created with the value-based security 
objectives from the shortened and ranked list of security objectives from chapter five.  The 
ranking Delphi method called for the original list to be shortened before it was ranked.  Doing so 
eliminated many objectives from each group’s list, some of which were important for 
maximizing information security.  If constraints, such as budgets, meant that managers could not 
implement all value-based security objectives in security policy- which would they choose to 
implement and which would they chose to eliminate.  The ranking Delphi method gave us this 
answer by keeping only what the managers considered the most important value-based security 
objectives and discarding the rest.  The security policy implemented based on these value-based 
security objectives is the biggest surprise of this dissertation.  
The socio-technical, social, and technical groups all produced poor social security policy and the 
control group produced very poor social security policy.  The surprise here is that the socio-
technical group did not consider the trust and ethicality pieces of RITE important enough to keep 
in their final list of ranked objectives.   This prevented the group from producing good social 
security policy and made them present poor social security policy.  In a time of budget 
constraints the socio-technical group would consider eliminating ethics training as a means of 
security.  The social, technical, and control groups all had poor social policy in the original list, 
so it was no surprise that the social and technical groups remained poor and the control group 
sank a little lower to very poor.    
The technical aspects of information security policy also produced some unexpected results with 
the socio-technical group.  The group eliminated value based security objectives relating to the 
integrity of data, so the quality of their technical security policy decreased from very good in the 
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initial list to moderate in the ranked list.  The social group started with moderate technical 
security policy and continued with moderate technical security policy in the ranked list.  The 
technical group started with very good technical security policy and continued with very good 
technical security policy in the ranked list.  The control group decreased from very good 
technical security policy to moderate technical security policy in the ranked list because they 
eliminated one of their important CIA objectives.   
Table 6.3: Socio-technical Security Policy (ranked objectives) 
Group Social Policy Technical Policy 
Socio-Technical Poor Moderate 
Social Poor Moderate 
Technical Poor Very Good 
Control Very Poor Moderate 
 
Overall, the social and technical groups maintained their important value-based security 
objectives from the original list to the ranked list, so the quality of their information security 
policy remained the same.  The socio-technical and control groups both eliminated important 
value-based security objectives relating to RITE and CIA, so the quality of their information 
security policy diminished.    
If constraints did not exist and the organization could create security policy based on the original 
list of value-based security objectives, the socio-technical group by far would produce the 
highest quality information security policy.  The social group would produce the worst.  Both the 
technical and control groups would produce poor social policy and very good technical policy. 
The technical group represents how organizations are handling things today.  The literature 
review showed that organizations predominately had technically oriented security policy.   
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If constraints are a problem, such as budget cuts, the information security policy produced from 
the ranked list of value-based security objectives leaves a lot of security holes.  The technical 
group produced the highest quality information security policy, which comprised poor social 
policy and very good technical policy.  The socio-technical and social groups tied for second 
with poor social policy and moderate technical policy.  The control group came in last with very 
poor social policy and moderate technical policy.   
6.3 Emergent Issues: 
This dissertation has shown that specialized information security training given to managers can 
influence their values for protecting information systems and the information security policy they 
create.  The emerging issues stemming from such findings are in the area of information security 
training, policy planning and policy creation.  The next section discusses the information security 
training giving to all employees and the specialized information security training that should be 
given to management.  The following section discusses the implications of such training on 
policy planning and creation.  
6.3.1 Information Security Training: 
Information security training is a method of educating all employees on how best to protect an 
organization’s information systems.  Rotvold (2008) reported that it is imparted to employees 
most often once a year by IT staff.  The literature review also told us that the nature and scope of 
information security training is based on information security policies and that both were 
technically oriented in today’s organizations (Rotvold, 2008; CWS, 2010; Fulford & Doherty, 
2003; Straub & Welke, 1998).  In order to change the nature and scope of information security 
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training to socio-technical, information security policy must change its nature and scope to socio-
technical.  This can be accomplished by creating another type of information security training 
that is to be given to managers, and not just the managers that create and modify information 
security policies, but to all managers.  This training needs to be in addition to the training given 
to all employees and specifically given to management (figure 6.4).  Like the training given to 
the socio-technical group in this dissertation, the training needs to teach both social and technical 
aspects of information security.  There are several reasons it should be given to all managers and 
not just those that create or modify information security policy.  One is that some of those middle 
managers will eventually work their way up to be the ones creating and modifying policy and the 
earlier they understand the socio-technical perspective, the better.  Another reason to include all 
managers is because all managers will need to be involved to implement some socio-technical 
aspects of security, such as creating a strong security culture.  
Figure 6.4 represents managers receiving two types of training, one being the regular training 
giving to all employees that is based on the procedural security policy.  The second training is a 
socio-technical training that teaches managers about the importance of socio-technical security 
and how to create and modify information security policy.  Like the socio-technical group in this 
dissertation, the goal of this training is to produce socio-technical security policy by influencing 
manager’s values and individual objectives toward securing information systems.  Once the 
managers implement socio-technical security policy, the regular information security training 
given to all employees will then become socio-technical.  This will not happen overnight, but 
instead will take some time for the new socio-technical security policies to be implemented and 
for the previously technically oriented information security training to be modified to become 
socio-technical to reflect the new policies.  The loopback depicted in the diagram reflects the 
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new socio-technical procedural security policy’s influence on information security training given 
to all employees.  Once the cycle is complete and policies and training become socio-technical, 
managers will then receive socio-technical security training as a part of the regular training 
program that all employees receive as well as socio-technical training on how to create and 
modify socio-technical information security policies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the least, the special training given to managers should cover the concepts of RITE, CIA, and 
the creation of a security culture (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000; Dhillon, 2007). The concepts of 
RITE are the responsibility, integrity, trust, and ethicality of individuals.  Examples include 
creating proper responsibility and authority structures, background checks, building a trusting 
culture and ensuring good ethical principles.  The concepts of CIA are the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information.  Examples include ensuring appropriate access to data, 
backing up data, encrypting data, data integrity checks, and maintaining a functioning network 
and equipment.  The creation of a security culture is also very important for maximizing 
information security (Ruighaver et al., 2007; Dhillon, 2007; Karyda, et al., 2005; von Solms & 
von Solms, 2004; Leech, 2003; Vroom and von Solms, 2004).  A strong security culture has been 
linked to such things as compliant user behavior and employees engaging in security practices 
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beyond their mandatory job descriptions (D’Arcy & Greene, 2009).  Beyond those already 
mentioned, other socio-technical aspects of security that should be discussed include describing 
the formal, informal and technical systems (Dhillon, 2007), leadership styles, management 
commitment, user involvement, reward systems, motivation, group association and interpreting 
and dealing with negative silent messages.   
The goal of this training is to influence the values of the managers that receive it in regard to 
what they believe are the best ways of maximizing information security.  If the nature and scope 
of their values are influenced to be socio-technical, then their value-based security objectives for 
protecting information systems will also be socio-technical.  Like this dissertation’s socio-
technical group’s original list of security objectives, the managers receiving this training will 
also have strong value-based security objectives.  Those value-based objectives will in turn 
inform the information security policy they create or modify and that information security policy 
will then become socio-technical.  This would mean security policies would support the creation 
of a security culture and would include policies supporting RITE and CIA.  As these policies 
trickle down and inform the creation of new information security training, employees will start 
learning about their roles and responsibilities, accountability and about good ethical principles.  
Reward systems will be created, users will be more involved, management will be more 
committed, and trusting relationships between employees and the employer will be established.  
These among others mentioned earlier will strengthen the organization’s security culture, all of 
which leads to maximized information security.    
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6.3.2 Policy Planning and Creation: 
The development of information security policies does not just start with a to-do list that can be 
checked off as completed.  Managers have to know what assets need to be protected and 
determine what policies are best for protecting those assets.  This usually involves some form of 
risk analysis and SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis.  Before 
creating policies, it just makes sense to understand what it is you have that needs protection, the 
level of importance the assets have for the organization, what the cost would be if protection 
fails, what the threats to the assets are, where the threats come from, what policies are currently 
in place to protect the assets, and anything else that will help determine the best policies to 
create, modify or eliminate.    
Baskerville and Siponen (2002) state that organizations should first have a meta-policy about 
how to create, modify, and implement information security policy.  A meta-policy is a policy 
about how to handle the creation, modification, and elimination of security policies.  Meta-policy 
details who is responsible for making policies, when policy creation is to take place, how 
policies are made, and how and when policies are reviewed, modified or eliminated.  This 
dissertation research believes that meta-policy should include training for all managers, and 
especially those involved in policy creation and modification.  Meta-policy dictates everything 
from who makes the policies to how and when they are created, modified and eliminated.  It 
should also include the training for those involved in this process.    
Once managers have received training, completed the analysis of the assets, and determined the 
strengths and weaknesses of the current security policy, they are ready to create, modify, or 
eliminate information security policies.  We know from the literature review that checklists are 
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used by 70% of organizations (CWS, 2010).  However, we also know that checklists are 
technical by nature and lack flexibility to changing business environments (Baskerville & 
Siponen, 2002; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001).  Managers should understand that they can use 
checklists, but only as references for the technical aspects of security and only if they fit the 
organizations business requirements and processes.  The technical aspects of security have never 
been the problem; the problem has been the lack of social aspects.  In addition to the technical 
solutions to information security as informed by checklists, managers must still ensure the 
creation of the social aspects of security they learned about in their training.    
One social aspect that should never be overlooked is the creation of a strong security culture.    
To create a strong security culture, it needs to be tied to the information security policies.  
Managers can dictate the behavior of employees by “expressing collective values, norms, and 
knowledge, through defining specific policies” (Solms & von Solms, 2004, p. 277).  In research 
from Ruighaver et al. (2007), the authors highlight several factors of good security culture.  One 
of them is developing a degree of trust and accountability between employees and employers, 
which is a part of Dhillon and Backhouse (2000)’s RITE and should be included in the security 
policies.  Another factor of good security culture identified by Ruighaver et al. (2007) was that 
employees should be educated on their roles and responsibilities.  This was another part of RITE 
and should also be included in the information security policies.  The two other parts of RITE 
that should also be part of the information security policy and support the security culture are the 
integrity and ethicality of individuals.  Integrity can start with a background check.  Ethicality 
can be positively influenced through a formal ethics training program.  Companies with ethics 
programs suffer less economic crime (Trompeter & Eloff, 2001, ECS, 2007).  Beyond creating 
policies that support a strong security culture and represent the social aspects of RITE and the 
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technical aspects of CIA, policies should also incorporate some of the social concepts described 
in the training section, such as involving users, creating reward systems and motivating 
employees.  
 6.4 Conclusion: 
This chapter reported the findings of this research, answered the primary research questions and 
discussed emergent issues.  A significant finding of this research was that the nature and scope of 
information security training giving to managers affects the nature and scope of their values.  
Another significant finding was that the quality of information security policy was affected by 
manager’s value-based security objectives.  The group of managers receiving socio-technical 
training would produce the highest quality information security policies based on their original 
list of value-based security objectives.  The group that received no training would produce the 
worst information security policies.    The implications of these findings lead us to believe that 
specialized socio-technical training should be given to managers and that this training should be 
part of a meta-policy within the organization.  If managers were to receive socio-technical 
training, the security policies they create or modify would be socio-technical.  Socio-technical 
policies would lead to socio-technical information security policy given to all employees, thus 
maximizing information security.    
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7.  Conclusion 
7.1 Overview of the Research: 
This dissertation argues that the nature and scope of information security training that managers’ 
receive impacts the nature and scope of the information security policies they create.  It is argued 
that the training affects manager’s values toward maximizing information security and that their 
value-based objectives influence the nature and scope of the information security policy they 
create.  The motivation for this research stems from a recent trend in information systems 
security research; that the best way to maximize information security is a socio-technical 
approach (Backhouse & Dhillon, 1996; Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000, 2001; Trompeter & Eloff, 
2001; Siponen, 2001; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Dhillon, 2007).  While the research trend has 
come to this conclusion, the means for achieving socio-technical security is mostly unanswered.  
  
This research attempts to achieve socio-technical security through the heart of the information 
security program, the information security policies and the information security training 
program.  Information security policies are the guiding principles for securing information 
systems and information security training is the education given to employees to teach them how 
to best protect information systems using the methods described in the policies.  Information 
security training is primarily based on the information security policies (Rotvold, 2007; CSI, 
2006, 2007).   
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A major problem discussed in the literature review is that current information security policies 
and information security training is predominately technical in nature, ignoring the social aspects 
of security (Rotvold, 2008; CWS, 2010; Fulford & Doherty, 2003).  This may be because 70% of 
organizations use standardized guidelines (checklists) to create security policies and the reliance 
on checklists is expected to rise (GISS, 2008).  However, checklists have many shortcomings, 
including the lack of flexibility to changing business environments and the lack of attention to 
social aspects of security (Baskerville & Siponen, 2002; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001).  
Organizations that rely on checklists to create their security policies will no doubt have 
technically oriented security policies and training.  Another reason that policies and training may 
be technical in nature and the use of checklists is high is that managers that create information 
security policies lack the skills and knowledge to do so (Hone & Eloff, 2002).  This lack of 
knowledge leads managers to turn to other sources for help, such as standardized checklists 
(Hone & Eloff, 2002).    
To potentially solve these problems, this dissertation created four types of information security 
training and used four groups of managers to see if there was an effect on the information 
security policy they would create.  The four types of training were socio-technical training, social 
only training, technical only training, and control group non-related training.  The experimental 
design called for the groups to watch their respective videos and then write down what topics 
they believed were most important if they were a manager in charge of maximizing information 
security and the effectiveness of the information security training program.  This exercise is part 
of Keeney’s (1992) value-focused thinking methodology where each group produces a list of 
values.  The values represent how managers truly feel about maximizing information security.  
Following the methodology, the values were converted and clustered into lists of value-based 
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security objectives for each group.  The value-based security objectives represent what the 
managers wish to strive toward in order to maximize information security.  When faced with the 
decisions involved with creating the organizations information security policy that maximizes 
information security, the managers will use their value-based security objectives.  The lists of 
values and value-based objectives created by each group were used to answer two research 
questions.    
This dissertations first research question asked as to what extent manager’s values toward 
securing information systems are influenced by the nature and scope of information security 
training they receive.  The findings indicate that values are affected by training, but the results 
are mixed.  The control group with no relevant training produced an excellent list of technical 
values and a poor list of social values.  The technical group that received only technical training 
also produced an excellent list of technical values and a poor list of social values, which was 
expected.  The socio-technical group that received both technical and social training produced an 
excellent list of technical values and an adequate list of social values.  This confirmed that the 
social training affected the values of the socio-technical group.  The social group was the group 
that produced the mixed results.  They received only social training, yet produced a poor list of 
social values.  However, they did have many more social values than the control or technical 
groups.  This indicates that their values were affected by the training, but not as significantly as 
with the socio-technical group.  The social group’s technical values were also not as good as the 
other groups.  While the other three groups had excellent lists of technical values, the social 
group had a moderate list.  This indicates that social only training may have had a negative 
impact on producing technical values.   
 
 
132 
 
This dissertations second research question asked to what extent value-based objectives 
influence the nature and scope of information security policy.  This question was answered in 
two parts.  The first part used the full lists of value-based security objectives to determine the 
quality of information security policy they would inform.  The second part answered the same 
question, but with a shortened and ranked list of security objectives.  The second list was 
produced using a ranking Delphi methodology developed by Schmidt (1997).  Following the 
ranking Delphi method, the groups were asked to reduce their original lists of value-based 
objectives by keeping only those objectives they believed were most important and discarding 
the rest.  This process produced a shortened list of security objectives that the groups then ranked 
from most important to least important.  The ranking process took several iterations.    
Information security policy informed by the value-based objectives from the original lists 
represented the highest quality for the socio-technical group.  Their value-based security 
objectives would have created good social policy and very good technical policy.  They were the 
only group that would have produced good social policy, as the other groups all would have 
created poor social policy.  For technical security policy, the technical and control group’s would 
have produced very good policy and the social group would have produced moderate policy.  
The socio-technical group would have produced the best overall security policy of the four 
groups.  
The shortened lists that resulted from using the ranking Delphi methodology produced different 
results.  Because the original lists of security objectives were shortened, some groups eliminated 
important security objectives.  In particular, the socio-technical group eliminated many important 
value-based security objectives and the effect on information security policy was dramatic.  
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Information security policy based on the shortened ranked list would have produced poor social 
policy and moderate technical policy.  This indicates that managers from this group did not 
believe many of the important security objectives were actually important, so they were 
eliminated from the list.  If security policy were created based on the shortened list of objectives, 
overall security would be dramatically weaker.  The social and technical groups both maintained 
their quality of information security policy with the shortened lists.  However, the control 
group’s potential security policy got weaker as they also discarded some important security 
objectives.  Their potential social security policy dropped from being poor to very poor and their 
potential technical security policy dropped from being very good to moderate.    
Overall results of this dissertation indicate that information security training given to managers 
does affect their values toward securing information systems.  The quality of information 
security policy informed by the manager’s value based security objectives is also affected by 
training.  In order to maximize information security with socio-technical aspects of security, 
managers should receive socio-technical information security training.  The results indicate that 
managers receiving socio-technical training would produce socio-technical security policies.    
7.2 Contributions: 
The most important part of a dissertation is the contribution the research makes to knowledge.  
There are several contributions this research makes that cross the practical, methodological, and 
theoretical realms.  The first two subsections describe the practical and theoretical contributions 
this research makes to information systems security.  The last subsection describes the 
methodological contribution that can be applied not only to the information systems discipline, 
but beyond.    
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7.2.1 Practical:  
The practical contribution this research makes explains how organizations should go about 
creating, and modifying information security policies to maximize overall information security.  
Done properly, organizations will no longer have such a strong dependence on security 
checklists and will have socio-technical information security policies.  To accomplish this, this 
dissertation calls for all organizations to have a specialized information security training program 
for managers that teaches them the importance of socio-technical security.  The socio-technical 
training should cover the important technical aspects of security as well as the important social 
aspects of security, such as the concepts of RITE, CIA, and the creation of a security culture.  If 
done properly, manager’s values toward securing information systems will be affected by the 
training and result in socio-technical security policies.  The security policies will inform socio-
technical versions of information security training that is given to all employees.  The result is 
maximized information security through socio-technical information security policies and a 
socio-technical information security training program.    
7.2.2 Theoretical:   
The theoretical contribution of this dissertation is through a model that describes information 
security policy and information security training as affecting one another (figure 7.1).  The prior 
understanding of this relationship was that it was a one way relationship where information 
security policy affected information security training, where the training is based on the policies.  
  
 
 
135 
 
 
However, this model suggests that the makeup of information security training also affects 
information security policies.  The primary reason managers create technically oriented 
information security policies is that they do not know any better.  This could be because the only 
training they have seen is the information security training given to them each year.  The control 
group in this dissertation demonstrates what the literature review told us in that organizations 
currently have technically oriented information security policies and training.  Managers 
receiving technically oriented training over the years become technically oriented toward 
securing information systems, as we saw in the control group’s excellent technical security 
policy.  Adding a specialized training for managers to the existing information security training 
program can break this cycle of technically oriented policies and training and lead to a new 
socio-technical cycle.  
7.2.3 Methodological:  
The methodological contribution of this dissertation was the use of the value-focused thinking 
approach as the input to the ranking Delphi study.  No other study has been found that combined 
these methodologies.  The ranking Delphi methodology consists of three phases, the first of 
which is the discovery of issues.  This is where panelists brainstorm for an initial list of issues 
Information 
Security 
Training
Information 
Security Policy
Figure 7.1: Policy to Training Relationship 
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pertaining to the topic under study.  The second and third phases are to shorten the list and rank 
the issues.  Some researchers choose to alter the first phase by introducing the panelists to a 
predetermined list of issues (Keil, et al., 2002; Lee & Anderson, 2006; Kasi et al., 2008).  The 
panelists do not have any input as to the makeup of this predetermined list of issues.  They only 
get to shorten the list and rank the remaining issues.  This dissertation instead chose to use the 
value-focused thinking approach to determine the initial list of issues, called objectives in this 
research.  The value-focused thinking approach is superior to phase one’s brainstorming activity 
in that the panelist’s values are determined.  The output of phase one is still a list of issues 
(objectives), but obtained through the participants’ values.   In addition, there is no 
predetermined list and the same panelists are used for all three phases of the ranking Delphi 
methodology.  
7.3 Limitations: 
There are two major limitations to this research, including generalizability and thoroughness of 
training.  The non-random selection of MBA students to represent managers is a limitation on 
several fronts.  The first is that while over 90% of them were managers, not all of them were 
managers.  Those that were not managers were studying to become managers, but were not 
currently employed as managers.  The second limitation with using students was that they were 
junior managers and not managers that created or modified information security policies.  Their 
average number of years as managers was relatively low.  The last limitation with using MBA 
students is generalizing results to all managers.  While the non-random selection represented 31 
different companies, the results are only generalizable to other non-random selections of MBA 
students.    
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The second major limitation of this research is the training given to the participants.  Each 
training video was 35 minutes in length, which is a short period of time to adequately teach the 
complicated concepts of socio-technical security.  In order to cover all the topics necessary, each 
topic was discussed quickly and efficiently.  This may have led to an under emphasis on certain 
topics.  
7.4 Future Research Directions: 
Given the limitation, this research still produced significant results.  However, future research 
directions should attempt to minimize the limitations.  The next logical step should be to conduct 
this study with a random selection of managers and not MBA students.  Another research 
direction could be an action research study involving managers that create or modify information 
security policy.  Those manager’s values could be ascertained before and after training as a pre 
and post test.  The training should be socio-technical training and the video should be lengthened 
to at least an hour to give more time to adequately address all the topics.  The video could also be 
replaced with a one hour lecture.  The information security policies should be analyzed before 
the training and at some point after the training to see if the training affected the creation or 
modification of security policies.  Information security training given to all employees should 
also be analyzed before and after the training given to managers to see if it too was affected by 
the management training.    
If follow-up studies demonstrate that training managers affects information security policy and 
information security training by making them both more socio-technical in nature, then another 
study should try to determine if socio-technical security affects security incidents.  The number 
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of security incidents by insiders and outsiders could be monitored for a time period before and 
after the implementation of socio-technical security.   
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Appendix A: Data Collection Form 
 
 
 
1. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Name: ____________________________          Place of Employment (optional): __________________ 
 
Email: ____________________________          Years Employed at Above Employer: ______________ 
 
Alt. Email: _________________________        Years Employed in Similar Work:   ________________ 
 
Phone: ____________________________         Years of Management Experience: _________________ 
 
Sex: (circle one): Male; Female                           Age (circle one): 18-24; 25-29; 30-34; 35-39 
                                     40-44; 45-49; 50-54; >54 
 
 
Study Description:  The purpose of this study is to maximize information security and the effectiveness 
of the information security training program.   
 
Information Security Training:  the method of educating all employees on how best to protect an 
organization’s information systems. 
 
Please write down and briefly describe what topics you believe are most important if you were a manager 
in charge of maximizing information security and the effectiveness of the information security training 
program.  Think about what topics should be considered to most effectively secure information systems.  
Draw more lines and write on the back if necessary. 
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Appendix B: Video Content 
 
 
Socio-Technical Video Outline: 
 
What are the major issues and challenges of managing corporate information security? 
 
• Subverting the controls 
• Insider threat 
 
How do we manage the insider threat? 
 
• Formal, informal, technical systems 
• Policies 
• Procedures 
• Processes 
• Guiding principles 
• Security culture  
• Legal systems, international systems, standards, regulatory aspects 
 
Can you give examples of the technical, formal, and informal systems? 
 
• Communication example 
o Email (technical communication) 
o Rules and procedures for email (formal communication) 
o System of obligations (informal communication) 
 
How do these systems relate to corporate information security? 
 
• Security is when one of the systems fails 
• Controls need to be in place for all three systems 
• Informal controls 
o Norms 
o Security Culture 
o Supports the technical and formal systems 
• Formal controls 
o Checks and balances are in place  
o Processes are clear 
o Rules and procedures communicated properly 
• Technical controls 
o Access rights 
• Need a mix of control systems 
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• Managerial training educates managers on how to balance these systems. 
 
Can you elaborate on these systems more? 
 
• Access control and password control 
o Organizational fit of the employee 
o Access is a function of the role within the organization 
o Integrity of the person 
o Responsibility and authority structures must be defined first 
o Passwords assess depends on them 
o Formal structures must be addressed first 
 
How can you assure proper resources are allocated to create authority and responsibility 
structures? 
 
• High resources and high authority = good situation 
o Sufficient resources allocated properly 
• Limited resources and limited authority = problem situation 
o No resources allocated to security or allocated incorrectly 
• Limited resources and high authority = innovation 
o Look for creative ways to ensure good security 
• High resources and limited authority = wastage 
o Hard to get security executed 
 
Do you think authority and resource allocation come into play because of the unique 
characteristics of the organization? 
 
• Yes, it’s a function of organizational culture, management style, and leadership styles 
• Leadership styles 
o Authoritative 
o Consultative 
o Delegate 
 
There have been a lot of advances in encryption and secure communication.  How do you 
ensure that these advances get inculturated into the corporation? 
 
• Encryption algorithms 
• Deterrents 
o Consequences of non-compliance 
• Leadership commitment is needed 
• Good governance 
• High management commitment and high deterrence 
o High compliance 
• Low management commitment and low deterrence 
o High vulnerability 
• High management commitment and low deterrence 
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o Sloppy management 
• Low management commitment and high deterrence 
o Fear 
o Unhappy working  
• Some reasons for subverting controls 
o Unhappy working conditions 
o Personal factors 
o Opportunity is there (broken process) 
 
What are the three most important things for ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of data? 
  
• User involvement 
o Creating controls 
o Nuances of technical and formal controls 
• Process integrity 
• Resources and good resource allocation 
• Low user involvement and bad process integrity 
o Bad security governance 
• High user involvement and high process integrity 
o Good security governance 
• High user involvement and low process integrity 
o Average security governance 
o Need to improve process integrity 
• Low user involvement and high process integrity 
o Average security governance 
o Need to improve user involvement 
 
How do you ensure you are complying with regulations? 
 
• High user involvement and high process integrity =  compliance 
• Regulations are afterthoughts 
o Something went wrong in the past 
 
How do you ensure total security?  What are the takeaways from this conversation? 
 
• Technical measures 
o Passwords 
o User access to data resources 
o Confidentiality 
o Integrity of data 
o Availability of data 
• Proper responsibility and authority structures 
• Integrity of people 
o Background checks 
• Trust of people 
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o Verify the trust 
o Ensure a trusting culture 
• Ethics 
o Ensure good ethics 
o Follow ethical principles 
• CIA and RITE 
 
 
Social Video Outline: 
 
What do you think is the most important element for managing security? 
 
• People 
o take care of the needs of the people 
• Good security culture 
• RITE: responsibility, integrity, trust, ethicality of people 
 
How do you mange the people and culture? 
 
• Motivating and influencing people through good leadership 
• Power of groups and management of security 
• People relationships 
• Positive and negative intentions 
 
How does all of that relate to how security gets managed? 
 
• Belief systems influence attitudes 
• Security culture aspects 
• Hospital example 
o Tracking nursing care time with patients 
o Resulted in disgruntled employees, which is bad for security 
• Security problems can occur for several reasons 
o Work situation (disgruntled people) 
o Personal factors (divorce, addiction, etc.) 
o Opportunity (broken processes) 
 
Are there any tools or techniques that can used to teach these kinds of social systems? 
 
• Understand incoming silent messages from groups or organizations 
o Interpret and deal with negative messages 
o Group associations 
o How do you learn, defend yourself, interact with others, hobbies, etc? 
o There is a message emendating from the work situation 
 Understanding negative messages is critical to security 
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Dhillon Privacy Interview: 
 
• Privacy 
• Identity theft 
 
Social and Emotional Intelligence Video Segment: 
 
• Awareness of feelings 
• Management of emotions 
• Empathy 
• Leader’s emotional and social intelligence 
• Enhancing leadership and culture 
 
 
Technical Video Outline: 
 
• Computer updates 
• Viruses 
• Secure email 
• Malware 
• Data backup 
• Physical Security 
• Encryption 
• Passwords 
• Firewalls 
• Phishing 
• Acceptable Internet Usage 
• Acceptable Email Usage 
 
 
Control Video Outline: 
 
• Sexual harassment 
• Anger Management 
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Appendix C: Information Security Training Videos 
 
The training videos are large files and are available upon request from the author. 
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Appendix D: Raw Values to Common Form 
 
Table D1: Socio-technical Group Common Form 
 
Raw Data from Participant Formatted in common form as wishes 
Issue passwords to all employees. ST1: I wish all employees were issued passwords 
In order to get access, an employee must enter his or her 
password. 
ST1: I wish passwords were required for access 
Create your own network and upload all company 
computers with only needed for work software 
programs. 
ST1: I wish the company would create its own network 
ST1: I wish company computers only had necessary 
software installed 
Limit Internet access, remove unneeded software and 
hardware, such as USB ports. 
ST1: I wish Internet access was limited 
ST1: I wish unnecessary software was removed 
ST1: I wish unnecessary hardware was removed 
ST1: I wish unnecessary USB ports were removed 
All computers must be password protected, something as 
easy as screen saver passwords might deter an intruder. 
ST1: I wish all computers were password protected 
ST1: I wish screen saver passwords were utilized 
More data and overall executive powers should be 
available as employees get promoted. 
ST1: I wish more data was available to promoted 
employees 
ST1: I wish more executive power was given to 
promoted employees 
At the same time, the simple data available let’s say to 
clerks should not be available to executives.  Each 
person should deal and have access to the data needed 
for his or her job performance. 
ST1: I wish data only be available to those that need it 
I wish the company should have the right employee in 
the right place in the company.   
ST2: I wish companies would correctly place employees 
Integrity of the people in the organization, trust between 
the organization and the employees are more important 
than everything.   
ST2: I wish employees had integrity 
ST2: I wish for trust between the organization and 
employees 
The company should know that the employee is doing 
the right thing for the company.   
ST2: I wish companies knew if employees were right for 
the company 
Lack of commitment of the employee and lack of 
responsibility would make lower the success of the 
organization and also security of the system. 
ST2: I wish companies would hire employees with high 
commitment and responsibility 
Every organization should have technical, formal, and 
informal control systems.   
ST2: I wish organizations had technical, formal, and 
informal control systems 
Processes, procedures, rules should be clearly 
understood by the employees. 
ST2: I wish processes, procedures, and rules were 
clearly understood by employees 
One of the control systems cannot work alone so you 
need the mix of systems. 
ST2: I wish organizations had a mix of control systems 
The training that would be given to the employee should 
involve mutual trust. 
ST2: I wish employees received training in mutual trust 
Because success is going to come with employees.  
Employees need to trust the company. 
ST2: I wish employees knew that trusting the company 
leads to success 
Higher motivation with good incentives may help the 
company to gain good user involvement. 
ST2: I wish companies used incentives and motivation 
to gain good user involvement 
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The company structure and good risk assessment would 
help the company to keep the balance of security. 
ST2: I wish companies had good company structure and 
risk assessment 
Educate employees about the importance of security.  
Make sure that they know that it will have a direct affect 
on their salaries and careers. 
ST3: I wish employees were trained in the importance of 
security 
ST3: I wish employees were told security was related to 
their salaries and careers 
Make sure people are familiar with the basic procedures, 
passwords, logging in, logging off, not sharing 
confidential data, and so forth. 
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with basic 
procedures 
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with password 
policy 
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with procedures of 
logging in and logging off 
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with the policy of 
not sharing confidential data  
Reward employees for notifying about any kind of lack 
of integrity in data and security systems. 
ST3: I wish employees were rewarded for notifying 
management about data integrity breaches 
ST3: I wish employees were rewarded for notifying 
management about security breaches 
Make sure that employees know that security is a serious 
issue and any kind of bad behavior will be punished. 
ST3: I wish employees were notified about the 
seriousness of security 
ST3: I wish employees were punished for bad behavior 
Make sure that employees well understand their level of 
access. 
ST3: I wish employees understood their level of access 
Good infrastructure, IDS, firewall. ST4: I wish companies had a good infrastructure 
ST4: I wish companies had IDS 
ST4: I wish companies had firewalls 
Good policy allowing people to do what they need to do 
and still be secure and have integrity. 
ST4: I wish companies had policies that allowed people 
to effectively work while maintaining security and 
integrity 
Integrity of database/protection against intrusion through 
database (like SQL injection). 
ST4: I wish companies protected the integrity of 
databases from intrusion 
Secure web server. ST4: I wish companies secured their web servers 
Get good people through screening. ST4: I wish companies hired good people by screening 
them 
Set up controls = corporate policies and standards ST4: I wish companies used policies and standards to set 
up controls 
People awareness about security and how it affects its 
surroundings. 
ST4: I wish employees were aware of security 
Ethics – people need to be ethical and trusting. ST5: I wish employees were ethical 
ST5: I wish employees were trustworthy 
Consequences of non-compliance (fear). ST5: I wish there were consequences for non-
compliance 
Situations outside of the obvious, for example 
blackberry security. 
ST5: I wish companies were aware of less obvious 
threats, such as blackberries 
Roles and responsibilities (formal). For example, 
supervisor approves refunds in excess of $2500. 
ST5: I wish companies set up proper roles and 
responsibilities 
Resources – structure of compliance team. Let people 
know that corporate security is more than one person in 
a cubicle. 
ST5: I wish employees were notified that security was 
more than just one person 
Why? – Reasons for security. Explain to end users who 
do not always see the benefit or consequence. 
ST5: I wish employees were taught the benefits and 
consequences of security 
Make computer settings so that no information is 
remembered or can be. 
ST6: I wish computers were set to not remember 
information 
Use fingerprints or iris scanning for actual access to 
localities with sensitive data. 
ST6: I wish fingerprints or retinal scans were used to 
access sensitive data 
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Employee audits, activity tracking, monitor suspicious 
activities without instilling distrust. 
ST6: I wish employees were audited, activity tracked, 
and monitored without instilling distrust 
Background checks for crimes or dishonesty ST6: I wish background checks were utilized 
Make sure users are informed.   ST6: I wish employees were informed 
Single design so that employees are aware of when 
something is awry. 
ST6: I wish single design was utilized so employees 
would recognize when something is wrong 
Make clear provisions as to who is allowed in what. ST6: I wish employees were clear as to who had access 
to what 
Constantly checking for system glitches, have friendly 
hacking identify potential weaknesses and hesitations to 
system entry. 
ST6: I wish there was constant checking for system 
glitches 
ST6: I wish “friendly hacking” was used to identify 
weaknesses 
Make security tight but not to the point of compromising 
work quality. 
ST6: I wish security could be strong without 
compromising work quality 
Reinforce ethics. There is no need for any of this if 
people are not compelled to do unethical things. 
ST6: I wish ethics were stressed 
Assign proper knowledge outlets who should know what 
and why. 
ST6: I wish there were knowledge outlets identifying 
who should know what and why 
Keep automated systems limited.  People get very use to 
the way things ought to be. 
ST6: I wish automated systems were limited 
Who is allowed to view certain types of information – is 
it getting to the right place? 
ST7: I wish data was only viewable to the appropriate 
people 
Who can modify this information – like personal records 
in case of, for example, hospital and patient 
information? 
ST7: I wish there were rules in place to identify those 
allowed to modify data 
Who can read or go into personal computers. ST7: I wish there were rules identifying who had access 
to computers 
Can you share information, for example, in many 
companies in “development and research department for 
new products?”  Are they allowed to email or share 
facts? 
ST7: I wish there were confidentiality policies 
What information is expected of me to know and I am 
responsible for. 
ST7: I wish there were clearly defined roles of 
responsibilities 
I wish there were a clear set of rules or guidelines to 
follow in the case of security information.  What does 
the organization expect? 
ST7: I wish employee expectations were clearly defined. 
ST7: I wish there were clearly defined rules 
ST7: I wish there were defined expectations regarding 
the security of information 
The video should stay away from abstractions.  Clear, 
concise, colorful examples demonstrating IT security 
issues. 
ST8: I wish employees were trained with clear, concise, 
colorful examples of IS security 
Make the video as visually stimulation as possible. 
 
ST8: I wish employees were trained with visually 
stimulating videos 
Force the viewer to answer questions at the conclusion 
of each example case or scenario. 
ST8: I wish trainees were asked questions regarding 
topics demonstrated in the training video 
Emphasize individual integrity in the video as much as 
possible. 
ST8: I wish employees were taught about individual 
integrity 
Incorporate existing management in the video, which 
may resonate more with the viewer. 
ST8: I wish management was used in training videos 
Make a series of videos demonstrating basic advanced 
cases on security for the various roles in the 
organization. 
ST8: I wish there were training for the various roles in 
the organization 
Don’t speak overly technical, keep it simple and short. ST8: I wish training were not too technical 
ST8: I wish training were kept simple and short 
Put the viewer in the shoes of the actor in the video. ST8: I wish training put the viewer in the shoes of the 
actor in the video 
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Understand what data will be monitored by IT and how 
it will be used. 
ST9: I wish there were rules for what data are monitored 
ST9: I wish there were rules for how data is used 
Understand corrective actions that will be taken for 
violation of policies (suspension, termination, etc.). 
ST9: I wish punishment were clearly defined for 
violations 
Understand what constitutes inappropriate use of 
computers and how it can be used personally. 
ST9: I wish there were computer usage policies 
Understand that there is a “need to know” for data and 
by being an employee you do not necessarily have full 
access to everything. 
ST9: I wish there were data access policies limiting 
access to those that need the data 
Understand that business is not to be conducted on non-
company (i.e. personal) computers or cell phones. 
ST9: I wish there were a policy prohibiting company 
business on personal computers or cell phones 
Understand that updated software will be pushed to your 
company machine and software will not be installed 
without permission. 
ST9: I wish computers were updated regularly  
ST9: I wish there were a policy limiting the installation 
of software without permission 
Understand where policies and procedures are posted, 
who owns them, and how to make or suggest changes. 
ST9: I wish employees were notified as to where 
policies and procedures were posted 
ST9: I wish employees were notified as to how to 
suggest changes to policies and procedures 
Employees should be well trained in high security areas. ST10: I wish employees in high security areas are well 
trained 
There should be limited access to secure areas. ST10: I wish there were limited access to secure areas 
The organizational structure should be formed in a way 
that designates proper access to appropriate people. 
ST10: I wish organizational structure designated proper 
access to the appropriate people 
The company should demonstrate ways to eliminate 
opportunities for broken processes. 
ST10: I wish companies worked to eliminate broken 
processes 
The change process should be so that employees know 
exactly what to expect and embrace it accordingly. 
ST10: I wish employees knew what to expect with a 
change process and embraced it 
A demonstration of regulatory compliance should be 
covered. 
ST10: I wish regulation compliance was covered with 
employees 
Total security process should include a very thorough 
pre-employment process to eliminate any potential risks. 
ST10: I wish employees were screened before hiring 
Communication should be formal and streamlined so 
that there is no confusion coming if the communication 
from that person is not clear.  That person would be the 
one to correct any misunderstandings. 
ST10: I wish corporate communication were clear and 
concise, eliminating confusion 
 
 
Table D2: Social Group Common Form 
 
Raw Data from Participant Formatted in common form as wishes 
Importance of customer privacy. S1: I wish security training included the importance of 
customer privacy 
How to handle correspondence (e-mail) appropriately. S1: I wish security training included how to handle 
email appropriately 
What information to release and what information to 
withhold from 3rd parties. 
S1: I wish security training included confidentiality of 
information from outside parties 
How to secure your own data, lock your systems. S1: I wish security training included personal data 
security 
While you are away from your computer, do not leave 
private information out and unattended. 
S1: I wish security training included physical security of 
data around employee computers 
How to handle the media when applicable. S1: I wish security training included how to handle the 
media 
I would like to see less online tutorial based training. S2: I wish security training were not online training 
I would like to see more hands on or actual interaction S2: I wish security training were hands on 
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with real security issues. S2: I wish security training included interaction with real 
security issues 
I would like to see more education given to protecting 
home personal computer users or the “average” 
computer user. 
S2: I wish security training included how to protect 
home computers 
I would like to see password security strengthened.  
Current organizations require too many, so people write 
them down. 
S2: I wish security training included password 
strengthening that minimized writing down passwords 
I would like to see more average and novice computer 
training given to employees.  I think general computer 
knowledge would have a positive impact on overall 
security. 
S2: I wish security training included novice and 
beginner training 
Continuing education as trends change. S2: I wish security training included continuing 
education as threats change 
Needs to be current, like bleeding edge current, or else 
something will get the upper hand. 
S3: I wish security training should be current and cutting 
edge 
Needs to make good points that seem relevant to 
employees. 
S3: I wish security training included points relevant to 
employees 
Go over the most common security threats and train how 
to prevent them. 
S3: I wish security training included the most common 
threats and how to prevent them 
Clearly explain rights, especially corporate e-mail, 
privacy, etc.  Leave no loophole. 
S3: I wish security training included corporate email 
privacy rights 
I wish they would actually demonstrate the 
consequences of a security breach. 
S4: I wish security training included the consequences to 
the company of security breaches 
I wish the training was not so technically specific.  Not 
everyone is computer minded. 
S4: I wish security training was not too technical 
I wish they would actually explain why it was necessary 
to have a security policy. 
S4: I wish it were explained why a security policy were 
necessary 
I wish they would convey that a person’s “mood” 
actually affects their decision making ability. 
S4: I wish it were explained that a person’s mood affects 
decision making 
Contrary to previous statements, I wish they would put 
the “fear of God,” or express the importance of proper 
information security decisions on a personal level. 
S4: I wish the importance of security were stressed to 
employees 
Above all, convey that people do make mistakes and let 
them know it is not the end of the world. 
S4: I wish employees were told that people do make 
mistakes and it is not the end of the world 
I believe security awareness training should include a 
description of the corporation’s values and what it 
expects of its employees regarding ethical and moral 
issues. 
S5: I wish security training included a description of 
corporate values 
S5: I wish security training included expectations of 
employee moral values 
S5: I wish security training included expectations of 
employee ethical values 
In addition to the technical and legal aspects of security 
training, it should include some of the factors that 
contribute or facilitate security incidents, such as 
employee dissatisfaction, and other relevant factors that 
could affect an employee’s decision. 
S5: I wish security training included technical aspects 
S5: I wish security training included legal aspects 
S5: I wish employee dissatisfaction related to security 
were addressed 
S5: I wish factors affecting employee decision making 
were addressed 
The thought process of the individual from different 
cultural backgrounds. 
S6: I wish cultural backgrounds were taken into 
consideration 
How peer pressure can affect one’s perceptions. S6: I wish peer pressure were considered 
How managers can help in providing the awareness. S6: I wish managers were involved in providing 
awareness 
Values include greater privacy and privacy protection 
training.  Greater understanding of how user actions 
affect overall security within an organization needs to be 
S7: I wish security training included privacy training 
S7: I wish security training included consequences to 
corporations for and individuals inappropriate actions 
 
 
161 
 
better knowledge to know the consequence or reaction 
of your actions. 
Also, security awareness training in a format that the 
less technical user can comprehend and is interested in.   
S7: I wish security training interested the less technical 
user 
I believe the emotional intelligence dimension should be 
used.  In the book, there are four competencies, two deal 
with personal, 2 deal with social.  A person needs to 
understand how people view them and also understand 
their personal background.   
S8: I wish security training included emotional 
intelligence 
I believe in order to prevent security issues, one must be 
taught values of high integrity and they must know the 
importance of them. 
S8: I wish security training included values of high 
integrity 
Give examples of how firms that suffered security issues 
or incidents and show how it damaged the firm and 
people.  This may scar or create a sensitive feeling for 
the trainee. 
S8: I wish security training included real examples of 
incidents and the damage caused 
Highlight the importance of security within the firm and 
show how it is top importance.  This may veer potential 
threats away. 
S8: I wish security training stressed the importance of 
security 
I would like to see more information based concepts 
included in security awareness programs.  Identity theft 
and more importantly secure company information theft 
is a large problem faced by many corporations.  This 
topic should be the main focus of the training and also 
should include: Social interactions between companies 
and individuals (how that can negatively affect security), 
cultural differences in security technology data 
protection, levels of sophistication differences, employee 
interactions and use of system applications. 
S9: I wish security training included identity theft 
S9: I wish security training included corporate 
information theft 
S9: I wish security training included social interaction 
between companies and individuals 
S9: I wish security training included cultural differences 
S9: I wish security training acknowledged the various 
levels of sophistication 
S9: I wish security training included data protection 
S9: I wish security training included appropriate 
employee usage of applications 
The security awareness is different in my life and the 
workplace.  My value in my life is basically the political 
and economic environments.   As a Taiwanese, the 
political issue of China and Taiwan is the big issue.  The 
economic environment also puts the stress into the daily 
life.  In the workplace, in traditional Taiwan culture, the 
female position always has been un-balanced with 
males. The security training I wish that it would focus on 
the value of the culture transition and the female value in 
employee value. 
S10: I wish security training considered culture (not 
corporate culture) 
S10: I wish security training considered sex 
(male\female) 
  
 
Table D3: Technical Group Common Form 
 
Raw Data from Participant Formatted in common form as wishes 
The suggestions for passwords were very helpful.  We 
are required to change our password every 60 days, but 
there are very few requirements. 
T1: I wish there were stricter requirements for 
passwords 
The phishing piece was good.  Well known (the scams) 
but good to see it frequently.  
T1: I wish there was phishing training available to 
employees 
Storing data backups: it never occurred to me to keep 
backups in a separate location. 
T1: I wish there was backup training available to 
employees 
Virus scan part was good too.  I didn’t know that weekly 
patches were available. 
T1: I wish there was virus training available to 
employees 
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T1: I wish virus updates were known to employees 
Security awareness should be interactive rather than just 
plain video presentation to help answer any questions or 
concerns the viewers may have regarding the topic. 
T2: I wish security awareness training were interactive 
with someone to answer questions 
Little more awareness could be given on viruses, worms, 
spam, etc. which will help the tech support maintenance 
efforts. 
T2: I wish virus training were more in depth 
T2: I with worm training were more in depth 
T2: I wish spam training were more in depth 
Email security should also include topics like avoiding 
“reply all” whenever possible, threats from “pharming,” 
just like “phishing.” 
T2: I wish email security was included in training 
T2: I wish pharming training were available (like 
phishing) 
Employees should be made aware of protecting 
passwords in a safe place and not sharing company 
information with outside people. 
T2: I wish password protection were included in training 
T2: I wish there were policies about confidentiality of 
information 
Email and web surfing monitoring policies should be 
explained in detail. 
T2: I wish email policies were adequately explained to 
employees 
T2: I wish Internet policies were adequately explained to 
employees 
As for email communication, I think the security 
awareness training should also mention those attachment 
files which are highly possible to have viruses, such as 
.exe, website links, and compressed files. 
T3: I wish security training included the risk of e-mail 
attachments 
T3: I wish security training included the risk of web 
links 
T3: I wish security training included the risk of e-mail 
compressed files 
Users should be taught to delete any other email 
addresses displayed in the specific email when users are 
forwarding it. 
T3: I wish security training included deleting previous 
recipients email addresses on forwarded emails 
I wish security awareness training was simplistic. T4: I wish security training were simplistic 
I wish it entailed actual examples of past events and the 
consequences as a result of negligent actions. 
T4: I wish training included past examples and 
consequences to the company 
I wish employees could see the real harm and financial 
recovery and protection cost for security awareness. 
T4: I wish training informed employees of the cost of 
security awareness 
Perhaps it would help them to adopt a mindset of “this is 
a critical issue.” 
T4: I wish training could change the mindset of 
employees to make them aware of “critical issues” 
I wish the training would provide the basic abc’s of data 
protection and the greatest threats against such data. 
T4: I wish training taught the basics of data protection 
T4: I wish training taught the greatest threats to data 
I wish that security awareness training was more concise 
and gave clear reference points for employees to access 
help after training. 
T4: I wish training were concise 
T4: I wish training provided employees with ways to get 
help after the training (reference points) 
Stress management. T5: I wish security training included stress management 
Corporate values. T5: I wish security training included corporate values 
Security policies and procedures. T5: I wish security training included security policies 
T5: I wish security training included security procedures 
Filters/audits. T5: I wish security training included filters  
T5: I wish security training included audits 
Email security. T5: I wish security training included email security 
Antiviral software. T5: I wish security training included antivirus software 
Encryption. T5: I wish security training included encryption 
Internet navigation – spyware. T5: I wish security training included Internet navigation 
T5: I wish security training included spyware 
Password training. T5: I wish security training included password training 
Device hardware security. T5: I wish security training included device hardware 
security 
Backup databases. T5: I wish security training included database backup 
Appropriate storage facilities. T5: I wish security training included appropriate storage 
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facilities 
Adverse affects financial etc. T5: I wish security training included the adverse affects 
of bad security 
I believe there could be more hands-on workshops, such 
as how to use the TrueCrypt software to encrypt 
confidential files.  It would be much more effective to 
show employees the importance of IT security through a 
hands-on approach. 
T6: I wish security training included hands on 
workshops 
I wish training should have more in depth training so I 
can understand all issues and I also wish it showed how 
to avoid it means how I practically do it at work, or 
home to be a victim of security breach. 
T7: I wish security training were more in-depth 
T7: I wish security training demonstrated all issues and 
ways to avoid them 
I also wish that before starting IT security training, they 
should consider audience level of knowledge about 
security. 
T7: I wish trainee knowledge level were taken into 
consideration before training 
First thing that should be included in such a video is the 
physical security that is provided at the workplace. 
T8: I wish security training included physical security 
There should be a detailed explanation of what needs to 
be done in case of different types of emergencies. 
T8: I wish security training included appropriate 
responses to various emergencies 
The different aspects of the online security.  Things that 
need to be included are what are the different online 
threats and how to effectively deal with those. 
T8: I wish security training included online threats and 
how to deal with them. 
Full hard disk encryption. T9: I wish security training included full hard disk 
encryption 
Exercise every year to make sure that data from backup 
devices can be retrieved. 
T9: I wish security training stressed the importance of 
annual backup recovery practice to make sure it works 
Keep 2 backups in physically separated places, far away, 
east coast vs. west coast. 
T9: I wish security training included the need to keep 
more than one backup separated physically 
Email encryption always. T9: I wish security training included email encryption 
Use of VPN while out from secured network. T9: I wish security training included the usage of VPN’s 
when out of the office 
Create security culture. T9: I wish security training included creating a security 
culture 
Define roles and responsibilities. T9: I wish security training defined roles and 
responsibilities 
Handle cultural issues which may impact security 
standards. 
T9: I wish security training included how to handle 
cultural issues that may affect security 
Security awareness training needs to be based on details 
specific to the company and utilize company specific 
examples.  If this is not possible industry specific 
training should be used.  People tend to tune out when 
shown generic videos. 
T10: I wish security training included company or 
industry specific examples 
Also, strictly showing a video is a poor way to get across 
any type of training.  Training should be as interactive as 
possible. 
T10: I wish security training included were interactive 
Another important factor is humor.  Humor if properly 
used can leave a lasting impression on an audience 
without losing the point your making. 
T10: I wish security training included humor for a 
lasting impression 
Using bright imagery also helps. T10: I wish security training included bright imagery 
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Table D4: Control Group Common Form 
 
Raw Data from Participant Formatted in common form as wishes 
It is important to have some sort of interaction with the 
audience ala the first session, not just to be lectured to as 
in the second session or with an interview don by a 
perhaps celebrity DJ. 
C1: I wish security training included interaction with 
trainees 
It is also important for the person giving the training to 
have some legit credentials and to look the part. 
C1: I wish trainers had appropriate credentials and 
looked the part 
It is not as important to emphasize the negatives or 
punishments of breaking or lax security.  It is much 
more important to stress the benefits achieved. 
C1: I wish training emphasized the benefits of following 
security policy, instead of emphasizing the punishment 
or negatives of not following security policy 
I wish they would be informative on past security 
breaches. 
C2: I wish security training included examples of past 
security breaches 
I wish they would say what to do when security is 
breached (guidelines on reporting). 
C2: I wish security training included guidelines for 
reporting security breaches 
I wish they would train on how to handle incidents. C2: I wish security training included how to handle 
incidents 
What happens/consequences? C2: I wish security training included consequences of 
security breaches 
If it is confidential. C2: I wish security training included confidentiality 
I think that there needs to first be a demonstration on 
what computer security awareness is. 
C3: I wish security training included demonstrations 
I feel that computer security awareness training should 
show breaches of security. 
C3: I wish security training included examples of 
breaches 
I feel it should show how security is performed properly. C3: I wish security training demonstrated how to 
properly perform security 
To end the training, there should be a shorts segment to 
summarize what was learned. 
C3: I wish security training included a summary of what 
was taught 
Role of security and security awareness.  Aspects of 
security awareness. 
C4: I wish security training included the role of security 
Benefits and challenges of security awareness. C4: I wish security training included the benefits and 
challenges of security 
Consequences of poor security awareness. C4: I wish security training included corporate 
consequences of bad security 
Personalize the issues to me role in the workplace. C4: I wish security training included personalization to a 
particular role in the company 
Speeches of security at my workplace. C4: I wish security training included lectures at the 
workplace 
Training must be strong and interactive. C4: I wish security training were strong 
C4: I wish security training were interactive 
Past examples of security issues at my workplace. C4: I wish security training included examples from the 
trainee’s workplace 
Punishments of noncompliance.  C4: I wish security training included punishments for 
non-compliance 
Common security holes, downloading of files from 
company computers, taking home company files via 
email, flash drive, CD, etc. 
C5: I wish security training included common security 
vulnerabilities 
C5: I wish security training included Internet policy 
C5: I wish security training included policy taking home 
corporate information via email attachment 
C5:  I wish security training included policy taking home 
corporate information via portable media 
Physical access to the building.  C5: I wish security training included physical security 
Do not hand out your ID. C5: I wish security training included policy on corporate 
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ID’s 
Security is everyone’s job, not just IT.  Be realistic in 
your assumptions. 
C5: I wish security training stressed the importance of 
everyone being involved 
Do not dumb it down to the point of being insulting, but 
don’t talk over their heads either.   
C5: I wish security training taught at the level of the 
trainee 
Don’t make policies so strict that employees feel 
distrusted.   
C5: I wish security was not so strict that employees felt 
distrusted 
Recognize that they will use the Internet for personal 
business and plan for that. 
C5: I wish it was recognized that employees were going 
to use the Internet for personal use 
Keep it interesting and keep the employees involved, 
short and to the point. 
C5: I wish security training were interesting 
Maintaining secure email account enables a sexually 
harassed employee to know there is verification and 
evidence of the harassment they suffered. 
C6: I wish security training included email policy 
People need to be aware of their actions and 
consequences thereof. 
C7: I wish security training included employee 
consequences 
I wish people respected privacy of others at the office as 
this seems to lead to problems. 
C7: I wish security training included personal privacy of 
others at the office 
I wish people would do less inappropriate things on the 
Internet during business hours; it is distracting and could 
get us in trouble. 
C7: I wish security training included and Internet policy 
People do not do a good job of protecting company 
information when they leave the office (i.e. leave their 
computer logged on).  Others could damage the 
company and us wind up in a lawsuit. 
C7: I wish security training included physical security of 
their workstations 
Anti-virus software. C8: I wish training covered anti-virus software 
Password identification. C8: I wish training included password protection 
Firewall software. C8: I wish training included firewall configuration 
Information and data backup. C8: I wish training included data backup 
Consistent security policy. C8: I wish training included consistent security policy 
Published formal standard. C8: I wish there was a published formal standard 
Host network intrusion detection. C8: I wish training included host network intrusion 
detection 
Ethics Training. C8: I wish training included ethics training 
Control of workstation. C8: I wish training included workstation control 
Encourage violations reporting. C8: I wish training included violation reporting 
Knowledge basics of computers and networking.  
Discuss Internet Protocol, routing, Domain Name 
Service, access points, firewalls, and other network 
devices. 
C9: I wish training included firewalls 
C9: I wish training included Internet Protocols 
C9: I wish training included Domain Name Service 
C9: I wish training included Access Points 
Cover the basics of cryptography, security management, 
and wireless networking. 
C9: I wish training included encryption 
C9: I wish training included security management 
C9: I wish training included wireless networking 
Give managers and other employees “how to develop 
security policies,” like ethical code of conduct, 
employee’s disciplines, basic activities to keep computer 
network safe (passwords secrecy). 
C9: I wish training included ethical conduct 
C9: I wish training included passwords 
Give knowledge about threats and problems that a 
network may face, such as hacking, social engineering, 
virus attack, network failure, etc. 
C9: I wish training included hacking threats 
C9: I wish training included social engineering 
C9: I wish training included virus attacks 
C9: I wish training included network failures 
Now the tools to tackle them such as antivirus, good 
configuration, contingency planning, etc.  Good idea 
would be to give students some topics of security of 
C9: I wish training included contingency planning 
C9: I wish training included special training, such as 
CCNA, CCNP, MCSC, and Linux 
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courses like, CCNA, CCNP, MCSC (window’s server) 
and Linux.  This will help students how to configure 
secured network and tools to tackle when failure occurs. 
Virus – use of genuine antivirus (no pirated versions).  
Keep the anti-virus updated.   
C10: I wish training included virus training 
Do not ask and store information from the customers 
that you do not require.  For example, if your industry 
type does not need the social security number of the 
customers, don’t ask for it. 
C10: I wish training included customer data 
confidentiality 
C10: I wish training included a policy to only keep 
necessary customer information 
Do not download random files from the Internet, 
especially movies or videos. 
C10: I wish training included acceptable Internet usage 
Password training – use a strong password (no date of 
birth, name, etc.) instead a mix of numbers and 
alphabets.  Keep changing the password frequently.  Do 
not share your passwords with others. 
C10: I wish training included strong password training 
All company information should be discussed via 
company emails and equipment only. 
C10: I wish training included a policy about not using 
personal emails or devices for company data 
When someone sends a reply it would be better if they 
sent it without the attachment which has been previously 
snet so that mail boxes don’t get clogged. 
C11: I wish training discusses email attachments 
C11: I wish training taught employees to not send 
attachments back to the original sender when replying to 
emails 
Setting up and updating of proper antivirus systems. C11: I wish training included antivirus training and 
scanning 
Set screen saver passwords when leaving the desk.  Set 
up automatic configuration of screen saver passwords. 
C11: I wish training taught employees to use screen 
saver passwords 
Password change periodically, including bios passwords. C11: I wish training included a policy about changing 
BIOS passwords frequently 
Protection from SPAM. C11: I wish training included protection from SPAM 
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Appendix E: Group Clustering 
 
 
Table E1: Socio-Technical Group Clustering 
 
ST3: I wish employees were rewarded for notifying 
management about data integrity breaches Ensure a reward system for disclosing security 
breaches ST3: I wish employees were rewarded for notifying 
management about security breaches 
ST5: I wish employees were ethical Ensure appropriate ethics training ST6: I wish ethics were stressed 
ST5: I wish employees were trustworthy 
Ensure a trust relationship between employees and 
the company 
ST2: I wish for trust between the organization and 
employees 
ST2: I wish employees received training in mutual trust 
ST2: I wish employees knew that trusting the company leads 
to success 
ST2: I wish employees had integrity 
Ensure training covers employee integrity ST8: I wish employees were taught about individual 
integrity 
ST2: I wish companies would correctly place employees  Ensure employees are a good fit for the position 
before they are hired ST2: I wish companies knew if employees were right for the company 
ST2: I wish companies would hire employees with high 
commitment Ensure the hiring of committed employees 
I wish companies would hire responsible employees  Ensure the hiring of responsible employees 
ST4: I wish companies hired good people by screening them Ensure potential employees are screened before 
hiring ST6: I wish background checks were utilized ST10: I wish employees were screened before hiring 
 ST3: I wish employees were punished for bad behavior Ensure employees are aware of consequences of 
non-compliance ST5: I wish there were consequences for non-compliance ST9: I wish punishment were clearly defined for violations 
ST7: I wish data was only viewable to the appropriate 
people 
Ensure data access is limited to appropriate 
individuals 
ST9: I wish there were data access policies limiting access to 
those that need the data 
ST1: I wish data only be available to those that need it 
ST3: I wish employees understood their level of access 
ST6: I wish employees were clear as to who had access to 
what 
ST7: I wish there were rules in place to identify those 
allowed to modify data 
ST7: I wish there were rules identifying who had access to 
computers 
Ensure rules to identify who has appropriate access 
to computers 
ST10: I wish organizational structure designated proper 
access to the appropriate people 
Ensure organizational structure designates proper 
access to the appropriate people 
ST1: I wish more data was available to promoted employees Ensure promoted employees have more access to 
data 
ST8: I wish employees were trained with clear, concise, 
colorful examples of IS security 
Ensure examples are fully utilized in security 
training 
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ST8: I wish employees were trained with visually 
stimulating videos Ensure training with visually stimulating videos 
ST8: I wish trainees were asked questions regarding topics 
demonstrated in the training video 
Ensure trainees are asked questions to verify 
understanding of training concepts 
ST8: I wish management was used in training videos Ensure management appears in training videos 
ST8: I wish there were training for the various roles in the 
organization 
Ensure training is appropriate for the various roles 
within the organization 
ST8: I wish training were not too technical Ensure training is not too technical 
ST8: I wish training were kept simple and short Ensure training is simple and short 
ST8: I wish training put the viewer in the shoes of the actor 
in the video 
Ensure video training attempts to put the trainee in 
the shoes of the actor 
ST1: I wish company computers only had necessary 
software installed Ensure only appropriate software is installed on corporate computers ST1: I wish unnecessary software was removed 
ST9: I wish there were a policy limiting the installation of 
software without permission 
Ensure there are software installation polices in 
place 
ST2: I wish organizations had technical, formal, and 
informal control systems Ensure a mix of the technical, formal, and informal control systems ST2: I wish organizations had a mix of control systems 
ST6: I wish security could be strong without compromising 
work quality 
Ensure the highest security while minimizing effects 
on employee’s ability to work effectively 
ST4: I wish companies had policies that allowed people to 
effectively work while maintaining security and integrity 
ST6: I wish employees were audited, activity tracked, and 
monitored without instilling distrust 
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with basic procedures 
Ensure clearly defined roles and responsibilities 
ST7: I wish there were clearly defined roles of responsibility 
ST5: I wish companies set up proper roles and 
responsibilities 
ST7: I wish employee expectations were clearly defined. 
ST7: I wish there were defined expectations regarding the 
security of information 
ST7: I wish there were clearly defined rules 
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with the policy of not 
sharing confidential data  Ensure data confidentiality policies are in place 
ST7: I wish there were confidentiality policies 
ST9: I wish there were a policy prohibiting company 
business on personal computers or cell phones 
Ensure there is a policy concerning company 
business on personal computers 
ST9: I wish there were a policy prohibiting company 
business on personal cell phones 
Ensure there is a policy concerning company 
business on personal cell phones 
ST1: I wish the company would create its own network Ensure companies create their own networks 
ST1: I wish Internet access was limited Ensure there is an Internet usage policy 
ST1: I wish unnecessary hardware was removed Ensure unnecessary hardware, including USB ports, 
are removed from computers ST1: I wish unnecessary USB ports were removed 
ST1: I wish more executive power was given to promoted 
employees 
Ensure promoted employees are given more 
executive powers 
ST2: I wish processes, procedures, and rules were clearly 
understood by employees 
Ensure employees clearly understand processes, 
procedures, and rules 
ST2: I wish employees received training in motivation Ensure employees receive motivation training 
ST2: I wish employees received training in commitment 
Ensure employees receive commitment training ST2: I wish employees knew that and end user commitment 
leads to success 
ST2: I wish companies used incentives and motivation to 
gain good user involvement 
Ensure user involvement through incentives and 
motivation 
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ST2: I wish companies had good company structure  Ensure companies have proper structure 
ST2: I wish companies had good risk assessment Ensure companies have proper risk assessment 
ST3: I wish employees were trained in the importance of 
security 
Ensure employees understand the importance of 
security 
ST3: I wish employees were notified about the seriousness 
of security 
ST4: I wish employees were aware of security 
ST5: I wish employees were taught the benefits of security 
ST3: I wish employees were told security was related to 
their salaries and careers 
Ensure employees are told security is related to their 
salaries and careers 
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with procedures of 
logging in and logging off 
Ensure employees are trained on logging on and off 
computers 
ST4: I wish companies had a good infrastructure Ensure companies have a good infrastructure 
ST4: I wish companies had IDS Ensure companies properly use intrusion detection 
systems (IDS) 
ST4: I wish companies had firewalls Ensure companies properly use firewalls 
ST4: I wish companies secured their web servers Ensure companies have secure web servers 
ST4: I wish companies used policies and standards to set up 
controls 
Ensure companies use policies and standards to set 
up controls 
ST4: I wish companies protected the integrity of databases 
from intrusion Ensure companies protect databases from intrusion 
ST5: I wish companies were aware of less obvious threats, 
such as blackberries 
Ensure companies are aware of less obvious threats, 
such as personal portable devices 
ST5: I wish employees were notified that security was more 
than just one person 
Ensure employees are aware that security is 
everyone’s responsibility and not just an individual 
ST5: I wish employees were taught the corporate 
consequences of bad security 
Ensure employees are given examples of corporate 
consequences of bad security 
ST6: I wish computers were set to not remember information Ensure computers are set to not remember 
information 
ST6: I wish fingerprints or retinal scans were used to access 
sensitive data 
Ensure the use of fingerprints or retinal scans to 
protect sensitive data 
ST10: I wish there were limited access to secure areas Ensure limited physical access to secure areas 
ST6: I wish employees were informed Ensure employees are informed 
ST6: I wish single design was utilized so employees would 
recognize when something is wrong Ensure the utilization of single design 
ST6: I wish there was constant checking for system glitches Ensure constant checking for system glitches 
ST6: I wish “friendly hacking” was used to identify 
weaknesses 
Use “friendly hacking” to identify security 
weaknesses 
ST6: I wish there were knowledge outlets identifying who 
should know what and why 
Create knowledge outlets identifying who should 
know what and why 
ST6: I wish automated systems were limited Limit the use of automated systems 
ST9: I wish there were rules for what data are monitored Define what data is to be monitored 
ST9: I wish there were rules for how data is used Define rules as to how data is used 
ST9: I wish there were computer usage policies Create acceptable computer usage policies 
ST9: I wish computers were updated regularly  Ensure computers are updated regularly 
ST9: I wish employees were notified as to where policies 
and procedures were posted 
Ensure employees are aware of where they can 
access policies and procedures 
ST9: I wish employees were notified as to how to suggest 
changes to policies and procedures 
Ensure employees know how to suggest changes to 
policies and procedures 
ST10: I wish employees in high security areas are well 
trained 
Ensure employees in high security areas are well 
trained 
ST10: I wish companies worked to eliminate broken 
processes 
Ensure companies work to eliminate broken 
processes 
ST10: I wish employees knew what to expect with a change Ensure employees understand what to expect with a 
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process and embraced it change process 
ST10: I wish regulation compliance was covered with 
employees Ensure employees understand regulation compliance 
ST10: I wish corporate communication were clear and 
concise, eliminating confusion 
Ensure corporate communication is clear and 
concise 
 
 
Table E2: Social Group Clustering 
 
S1: I wish security training included how to handle email 
appropriately Ensure in-depth training on acceptable email use S3: I wish security training included corporate email privacy 
rights 
S2: I wish security training were not online training Minimize the use of online training 
S2: I wish security training included novice and beginner 
training 
Ensure training is appropriate for the trainee’s level 
of expertise 
S7: I wish security training interested the less technical user 
S9: I wish security training acknowledged the various levels 
of sophistication 
S4: I wish security training was not too technical 
S3: I wish security training should be current and cutting 
edge 
Ensure training is up to date with current security 
issues 
S6: I wish managers were involved in providing awareness Ensure managers are involved in providing training 
S2: I wish security training were hands on Ensure hand’s on training 
S3: I wish security training included points relevant to 
employees Ensure training is relevant to all employees 
S2: I wish security training included interaction with real 
security issues 
Ensure training utilizes real world examples, 
including the corporate consequences of bad 
security 
S4: I wish security training included the consequences to the 
company of security breaches 
S7: I wish security training included consequences to 
corporations for and individuals inappropriate actions 
S8: I wish security training included real examples of 
incidents and the damage caused 
S3: I wish security training included corporate email privacy 
rights 
Ensure training covers privacy rights S7: I wish security training included privacy training 
S1: I wish security training included the importance of 
customer privacy 
S9: I wish security training included cultural differences 
Ensure training considers employee cultural 
differences 
S10: I wish security training considered culture (not 
corporate culture)  
S6: I wish cultural backgrounds were taken into 
consideration 
S5: I wish employee dissatisfaction related to security were 
addressed 
Ensure training addresses how employee 
dissatisfaction affects security 
S5: I wish factors affecting employee decision making were 
addressed Ensure training addresses factors affecting 
employee decision making S4: I wish it were explained that a person’s mood affects decision making 
S6: I wish peer pressure were considered 
S1: I wish security training included confidentiality of 
information from outside parties Ensure training includes confidentiality policy 
S1: I wish security training included personal data security Ensure training covers personal data security 
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S1: I wish security training included how to handle the media Ensure security training includes how to handle the 
media 
S1: I wish security training included physical security of data 
around employee computers 
Ensure training addresses physical security, 
including employee work spaces 
S2: I wish security training included how to protect home 
computers 
Ensure training addresses protecting employee’s 
home computers 
S2: I wish security training included continuing education as 
threats change 
Ensure training includes continuing education as 
threats change 
S2: I wish security training included password strengthening 
that minimized writing down passwords 
Ensure training addresses strong passwords while 
minimizing the need to write them down 
S3: I wish security training included the most common 
threats and how to prevent them 
Ensure training covers the most common threats and 
how to prevent them 
S4: I wish it were explained why a security policy were 
necessary Explain why security policies are necessary 
S4: I wish the importance of security were stressed to 
employees 
Ensure the importance of security is addressed with 
all employees 
S4: I wish employees were told that people do make 
mistakes and it is not the end of the world 
Ensure employees are told that making mistakes is 
alright 
S5: I wish security training included a description of 
corporate values Ensure training describes corporate values 
S5: I wish security training included expectations of 
employee moral values Ensure training addresses employee moral 
S5: I wish security training included expectations of 
employee ethical values Ensure training addresses employee ethics 
S5: I wish security training included technical aspects Ensure training includes technical aspects 
S5: I wish security training included legal aspects Ensure training covers legal aspects of security 
S8: I wish security training included emotional intelligence Ensure training addresses the relationship between 
emotional intelligence and security 
S8: I wish security training included values of high integrity Ensure training addresses employee integrity 
S8: I wish security training stressed the importance of 
security 
Ensure employees are aware of the importance of 
good security 
S9: I wish security training included identity theft Include identity theft in security training 
S9: I wish security training included corporate information 
theft 
Ensure training addresses corporate information 
theft 
S9: I wish security training included social interaction 
between companies and individuals 
Ensure training addresses the social interaction 
between companies and individuals 
S9: I wish security training included data protection Ensure training addresses data protection 
S9: I wish security training included appropriate employee 
usage of applications 
Ensure training address acceptable software usage 
policy 
S10: I wish security training considered sex (male/female) Ensure training takes into consideration an 
employee’s gender 
 
 
 
Table E3: Technical Group Clustering 
 
T1: I wish there were stricter requirements for passwords 
Ensure training includes strict password policy T2: I wish password protection were included in training 
T5: I wish security training included password training 
T2: I wish security awareness training were interactive with 
someone to answer questions Ensure interactive training 
T10: I wish security training included were interactive 
T4: I wish security training were simplistic Ensure simplistic training 
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T4: I wish training were concise Ensure concise training 
T7: I wish security training were more in-depth Ensure in-depth training 
T7: I wish trainee knowledge level were taken into 
consideration before training Ensure training to the knowledge level of the trainee 
T10: I wish security training included humor for a lasting 
impression Ensure humor is included in training 
T10: I wish security training included bright imagery Ensure training includes bright imagery 
T6: I wish security training included hands on workshops Ensure hands on training 
T4: I wish training included past examples and consequences 
to the company 
Ensure training includes company or industry past 
examples of security breaches 
T5: I wish security training included the adverse affects of 
bad security 
T10: I wish security training included company or industry 
specific examples 
T2: I wish email security was included in training 
Ensure training includes email acceptable use policy T2: I wish email policies were adequately explained to employees 
T5: I wish security training included email security 
T3: I wish security training included the risk of e-mail 
compressed files 
Ensure email training includes the risk of 
attachments 
T1: I wish virus updates were known to employees 
Ensure in-depth virus and worm training 
T1: I wish there was virus training available to employees 
T2: I wish virus training were more in depth 
T5: I wish security training included antivirus software 
T2: I wish worm training were more in depth 
T3: I wish security training included the risk of e-mail 
attachments 
Ensure email training includes the risk of 
attachments 
T3: I wish security training included the risk of web links Ensure training includes the risk of web links 
T9: I wish security training included full hard disk 
encryption 
Ensure training includes hard disk encryption 
T9: I wish security training included email encryption Ensure training includes email encryption 
T5: I wish security training included encryption Ensure training includes encryption 
T4: I wish training taught the basics of data protection Ensure training includes data protection 
 T4: I wish training taught the greatest threats to data 
 T9: I wish security training stressed the importance of 
annual backup recovery practice to make sure it works 
Ensure training stresses annual data recovery 
practice 
T9: I wish security training included the need to keep more 
than one backup separated physically Ensure training stresses the need for physical 
separation of multiple backups T5: I wish security training included appropriate storage 
facilities 
T1: I wish there was backup training available to employees Ensure training includes data backup T5: I wish security training included database backup 
T4: I wish training could change the mindset of employees 
to make them aware of “critical issues” Ensure the creation of a security culture T9: I wish security training included creating a security 
culture 
T1: I wish there was phishing training available to 
employees Ensure training includes phishing 
T2: I wish pharming training were available (like phishing) 
T2: I wish spam training were more in depth Ensure training include in-depth spam 
T2: I wish there were policies about confidentiality of 
information Ensure data confidentiality training 
T2: I wish Internet policies were adequately explained to 
employees Ensure Internet usage policy is explained 
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T3: I wish security training included deleting previous 
recipients email addresses on forwarded emails 
Ensure training includes deleting previous recipients 
email addresses in forwarded emails 
T4: I wish training informed employees of the cost of 
security awareness 
Ensure employees are told the cost of security 
awareness 
T4: I wish training provided employees with ways to get 
help after the training (reference points) 
Ensure employees have access to references and help 
after training 
T5: I wish security training included stress management Ensure stress management is included 
T5: I wish security training included corporate values Ensure training on corporate values 
T5: I wish security training included security policies Ensure training on security policies 
T5: I wish security training included security procedures Ensure training on security procedures 
T5: I wish security training included filters  Ensure training on the use of filters 
T5: I wish security training included audits Ensure training covers audits  
T5: I wish security training included Internet navigation Ensure training on navigating the Internet 
T5: I wish security training included device hardware 
security Ensure training on the security of device hardware 
T5: I wish security training included spyware Ensure spyware training 
T7: I wish security training demonstrated all issues and 
ways to avoid them 
Ensure all security issues are demonstrated with 
ways to avoid them 
T8: I wish security training included physical security Ensure physical security is included 
T8: I wish security training included appropriate responses 
to various emergencies 
Ensure appropriate responses to various security 
incidents 
T8: I wish security training included online threats and how 
to deal with them. Ensure training on avoiding online threats 
T9: I wish security training included the usage of VPN’s 
when out of the office Cover VPN usage for telecommuting 
T9: I wish security training defined roles and responsibilities Ensure roles and responsibilities are defined 
T9: I wish security training included how to handle cultural 
issues (people culture) that may affect security Ensure training covers people’s cultural differences 
 
 
Table E4: Control Group Clustering 
 
C2: I wish security training included examples of past 
security breaches Ensure past examples of security breaches in training 
C3: I wish security training included examples of breaches 
C4: I wish security training included examples from the 
trainee’s workplace 
Ensure security examples from the trainee’s 
workplace 
C2: I wish security training included consequences of 
security breaches Ensure examples of the corporate consequences of 
security breaches C4: I wish security training included corporate 
consequences of bad security 
C1: I wish security training included interaction with 
trainees Ensure interactive training 
C4: I wish security training were interactive 
C4: I wish security training included lectures at the 
workplace Ensure training in the form of lectures 
C5: I wish security training were interesting Ensure interesting training 
C3: I wish security training included a summary of what 
was taught Ensure a summary of topics at the end of training 
C1: I wish trainers had appropriate credentials and looked 
the part Ensure qualified trainers 
C4: I wish security training included personalization to a 
particular role in the company Ensure training is directed to specific job roles 
C5: I wish security training was taught at the level of the Ensure training matches expertise level 
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trainee 
C3: I wish security training demonstrated how to properly 
perform security Ensure appropriate security demonstrations 
  
C4: I wish security training included punishments for non-
compliance Ensure training includes consequences for non-
compliance C7: I wish security training included employee 
consequences 
C7: I wish security training included physical security of 
their workstations Ensure training includes physical security 
C5: I wish security training included physical security 
C7: I wish security training included Internet policy 
Ensure training includes Internet usage policy 
C5: I wish security training included Internet policy 
C10: I wish training included acceptable Internet usage 
C5: I wish it was recognized that employees were going to 
use the Internet for personal use 
C2: I wish security training included guidelines for 
reporting security breaches Ensure training provides guidelines for incident 
reporting C2: I wish security training included how to handle 
incidents 
C5: I wish security training included policy taking about 
home corporate information via email attachment Ensure training provides guidelines for transporting 
corporate data home C5:  I wish security training included policy about taking 
home corporate information via portable media 
C1: I wish training emphasized the benefits of following 
security policy, instead of emphasizing the punishment or 
negatives of not following security policy 
Ensure training emphasizes the benefits of following 
policy and not the negatives of not following policy 
C2: I wish security training included confidentiality Ensure training includes data confidentiality C10: I wish training included customer data confidentiality 
C4: I wish security training included the role of security Ensure training demonstrates the benefits of security C4: I wish security training included the benefits of security  
C4: I wish security training included the challenges of 
security 
Ensure training acknowledges the challenges of good 
security 
C5: I wish security training included common security 
vulnerabilities 
Ensure training covers the most common 
vulnerabilities 
C5: I wish security training included policy on corporate 
ID’s 
Ensure training covers corporate identification card 
policy 
C5: I wish security training stressed the importance of 
everyone being involved Ensure training stresses the involvement of everyone 
C5: I wish security was not so strict that employees felt 
distrusted 
Ensure proper security without employees feeling 
distrusted 
C6: I wish security training included email policy Ensure training includes email policy C11: I wish training discusses email attachments 
C7: I wish security training included personal privacy of 
others at the office 
Ensure training includes personal privacy of 
coworkers 
C8: I wish training covered anti-virus software 
Ensure training includes virus scanning, detecting, 
and updating 
C9: I wish training included virus attacks 
C10: I wish training included virus training 
C11: I wish training included antivirus training and 
scanning 
C8: I wish training included password protection 
Ensure training includes strong password policy C9: I wish training included passwords C10: I wish training included strong password training 
C11: I wish training taught employees to use screen saver 
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passwords 
C11: I wish training included a policy about changing BIOS 
passwords frequently 
C8: I wish training included firewall configuration Ensure training includes firewall configuration C9: I wish training included firewalls 
C8: I wish training included data backup Ensure training includes data backup 
C8: I wish training included consistent security policy Ensure security policy is consistent 
C8: I wish there was a published formal standard Ensure a published formal standard 
C8: I wish training included host network intrusion 
detection Ensure training on host network intrusion detection 
C8: I wish training included ethics training Ensure employees receive ethics training C9: I wish training included ethical conduct 
C8: I wish training included workstation control Ensure training on workstation control 
C8: I wish training included violation reporting Encourage reporting violations 
C9: I wish training included Internet Protocols Ensure training covers Internet Protocol (IP 
addresses) 
C9: I wish training included Domain Name Service Ensure training covers Domain Name Services 
(DNS) 
C9: I wish training included Access Points Ensure training covers access points 
C9: I wish training included encryption Ensure training covers encryption 
C9: I wish training included security management Ensure training includes security management 
C9: I wish training included wireless networking Ensure training includes wireless networking 
C9: I wish training included hacking threats Ensure training includes hacking threats 
C9: I wish training included social engineering Ensure training includes social engineering 
C9: I wish training included network failures Ensure training covers how to handle network 
failures 
C9: I wish training included contingency planning Ensure training includes contingency planning 
C9: I wish training included special training, such as 
CCNA, CCNP, MCSC, and Linux 
Ensure employees get specialized certification 
training, such as CCNA, CCNP, MCSC, and Linux 
C10: I wish training included a policy to only keep 
necessary customer information 
Ensure there is a policy to only keep necessary 
customer information 
C10: I wish training included a policy about not using 
personal emails or devices for company data 
Ensure there is a policy about not using personal 
emails or devices for company data 
C11: I wish training included protection from SPAM Ensure training includes protection from SPAM 
emails 
C11: I wish training taught employees to not send 
attachments back to the original sender when replying to 
emails 
Ensure employees are taught to not send attachments 
back to the original sender when replying to emails 
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Appendix F: Final Group Objectives 
 
 
Table F1: Socio-Technical Group Final Objectives 
 
Objective Orientation 
1. Ensure password protection is fully utilized T 
2. Ensure a reward system for disclosing security breaches S 
3. Ensure appropriate ethics training S 
4. Ensure a trust relationship between employees and the company S 
5. Ensure training covers employee integrity S 
6. Ensure rules to identify who has appropriate access to computers T 
7. Ensure organizational structure designates proper access to the appropriate people S 
8. Ensure promoted employees have more access to data T 
9. Ensure examples are fully utilized in security training G 
10. Ensure training with visually stimulating videos G 
11. Ensure trainees are asked questions to verify understanding of training concepts G 
12. Ensure management appears in training videos G 
13. Ensure training is appropriate for the various roles within the organization G 
14. Ensure training is not too technical G 
15. Ensure training is simple and short G 
16. Ensure video training attempts to put the trainee in the shoes of the actor G 
17. Ensure only appropriate software is installed on corporate computers T 
18. Ensure a mix of the technical, formal, and informal control systems S 
19. Ensure the highest security while minimizing effects on employee’s ability to work 
effectively 
G 
20. Ensure clearly defined roles and responsibilities S 
21. Ensure data confidentiality policies are in place T 
22. Ensure there is a policy concerning company business on personal computers G 
23. Ensure there is a policy concerning company business on personal cell phones G 
24. Ensure companies create their own networks T 
25. Ensure there is an Internet usage policy G 
26. Ensure unnecessary hardware, including USB ports, are removed from computers T 
27. Ensure promoted employees are given more executive powers S 
28. Ensure employees clearly understand processes, procedures, and rules S 
29. Ensure there are software installation polices in place T 
30. Ensure employees receive motivation training S 
31. Ensure employees receive commitment training S 
32. Ensure user involvement through incentives and motivation S 
33. Ensure companies have proper structure S 
34. Ensure companies have proper risk assessment G 
35. Ensure employees understand the importance of security G 
36. Ensure employees are told security is related to their salaries and careers G 
37. Ensure employees are trained on logging on and off computers T 
38. Ensure companies have a good infrastructure T 
39. Ensure companies properly use intrusion detection systems (IDS) T 
40. Ensure companies properly use firewalls T 
41. Ensure companies have secure web servers T 
42. Ensure companies use policies and standards to set up controls S 
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43. Ensure companies protect databases from intrusion T 
44. Ensure companies are aware of less obvious threats, such as personal portable devices T 
45. Ensure employees are aware that security is everyone’s responsibility and not just an 
individual 
G 
46. Ensure employees are given examples of corporate consequences of bad security G 
47. Ensure employees are a good fit for the position before they are hired G 
48. Ensure the hiring of committed employees S 
49. Ensure the hiring of responsible employees S 
50. Ensure potential employees are screened before hiring S 
51. Ensure employees are aware of consequences of non-compliance G 
52. Ensure data access is limited to appropriate individuals T 
53. Ensure computers are set to not remember information T 
54. Ensure the use of fingerprints or retinal scans to protect sensitive data T 
55. Ensure limited physical access to secure areas T 
56. Ensure employees are informed G 
57. Ensure the utilization of single design T 
58. Ensure constant checking for system glitches T 
59. Use “friendly hacking” to identify security weaknesses T 
60. Create knowledge outlets identifying who should know what and why S 
61. Limit the use of automated systems G 
62. Define what data is to be monitored T 
63. Define rules as to how data is used T 
64. Create acceptable computer usage policies G 
65. Ensure computers are updated regularly T 
66. Ensure employees are aware of where they can access policies and procedures G 
67. Ensure employees know how to suggest changes to policies and procedures G 
68. Ensure employees in high security areas are well trained G 
69. Ensure companies work to eliminate broken processes G 
70. Ensure employees understand what to expect with a change process G 
71. Ensure employees understand regulation compliance G 
72. Ensure corporate communication is clear and concise G 
 
 
 
Figure F1: Socio-technical Orientation Percentage 
 
 
 
 
25.00%
34.72%
40.28% Social
Technical
General
 
 
178 
 
 
Table F2: Social Group Final Objectives 
 
Objective Orientation 
1. Ensure in-depth training on acceptable email use G 
2. Minimize the use of online training G 
3. Ensure training is appropriate for the trainee’s level of expertise G 
4. Ensure training is up to date with current security issues G 
5. Ensure managers are involved in providing training G 
6. Ensure hand’s on training G 
7. Ensure training is relevant to all employees G 
8. Ensure training utilizes real world examples, including the corporate consequences of 
bad security 
G 
9. Ensure training covers privacy rights T 
10. Ensure training addresses data protection T 
11. Ensure training considers employee cultural differences S 
12. Ensure training addresses how employee dissatisfaction affects security S 
13. Ensure training addresses employee integrity S 
14. Ensure training addresses factors affecting employee decision making S 
15. Ensure training includes confidentiality policy T 
16. Ensure training covers personal data security T 
17. Ensure security training includes how to handle the media G 
18. Ensure training addresses physical security, including employee work spaces T 
19. Ensure training addresses protecting employee’s home computers T 
20. Ensure training includes continuing education as threats change G 
21. Ensure training addresses strong passwords while minimizing the need to write them 
down 
T 
22. Ensure training addresses employee ethics S 
23. Ensure training covers the most common threats and how to prevent them G 
24. Explain why security policies are necessary G 
25. Ensure the importance of security is addressed with all employees G 
26. Ensure employees are told that making mistakes is alright G 
27. Ensure training describes corporate values S 
28. Ensure training addresses employee morale S 
29. Ensure training includes technical aspects T 
30. Ensure training covers legal aspects of security G 
31. Ensure training addresses the relationship between emotional intelligence and security S 
32. Ensure employees are aware of the importance of good security G 
33. Include identity theft in security training T 
34. Ensure training addresses corporate information theft G 
35. Ensure training addresses the social interaction between companies and individuals S 
36. Ensure training addresses acceptable software usage policy G 
37. Ensure training takes into consideration an employee’s gender S 
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Figure F2: Social Group Orientation Percentage 
 
 
Table F3: Technical Group Final Objectives 
 
Objectives Orientation 
1. Ensure in-depth training G 
2. Ensure training to the knowledge level of the trainee G 
3. Ensure humor is included in training G 
4. Ensure hands on training G 
5. Ensure training includes company or industry past examples of security breaches G 
6. Ensure training includes strict password policy T 
7. Ensure training includes email acceptable use policy G 
8. Ensure email training includes the risk of attachments T 
9. Ensure training includes the risk of web links T 
10. Ensure training fully utilizes encryption T 
11. Ensure simplistic training G 
12. Ensure training includes data protection T 
13. Ensure training stresses annual data recovery practice T 
14. Ensure training stresses the need for physical separation of multiple backups T 
15. Ensure training includes bright imagery G 
16. Ensure training includes data backup T 
17. Ensure the creation of a security culture S 
18. Ensure training includes phishing T 
19. Ensure training includes in-depth SPAM training T 
20. Ensure training covers people’s cultural differences S 
21. Ensure data confidentiality training T 
22. Ensure concise training G 
23. Ensure Internet usage policy is explained G 
24. Ensure training includes deleting previous recipients email addresses in forwarded 
emails 
T 
25. Ensure employees are told the cost of security awareness G 
26. Ensure employees have access to references and help after training G 
27. Ensure in-depth virus and worm training T 
28. Ensure stress management is included S 
29. Ensure training on corporate values S 
30. Ensure roles and responsibilities are defined S 
31. Ensure training on security policies G 
32. Cover VPN usage for telecommuting T 
27.03%
24.32%
48.65%
Social
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33. Ensure training on security procedures G 
34. Ensure interactive training G 
35. Ensure training on the use of filters T 
36. Ensure training covers audits  T 
37. Ensure training on navigating the Internet T 
38. Ensure training on the security of device hardware T 
39. Ensure spyware training T 
40. Ensure all security issues are demonstrated with ways to avoid them G 
41. Ensure physical security is included T 
42. Ensure appropriate responses to various security incidents G 
43. Ensure training on avoiding online threats T 
 
 
Figure F3: Technical Group Orientation Percentage 
 
Table F4: Control Group Final Objectives 
 
Objective Orientation 
1. Ensure interactive training G 
2. Ensure a summary of topics at the end of training G 
3. Ensure training matches expertise level G 
4. Ensure training includes consequences for non-compliance G 
5. Ensure training includes physical security T 
6. Ensure training includes wireless networking T 
7. Ensure training includes hacking threats T 
8. Ensure a published formal standard G 
9. Ensure training on host network intrusion detection T 
10. Ensure employees receive ethics training S 
11. Ensure training on workstation control T 
12. Ensure training includes data backup T 
13. Ensure training includes firewall configuration T 
14. Encourage reporting violations G 
15. Ensure training covers Internet Protocol (IP addresses) T 
16. Ensure training covers encryption T 
17. Ensure training includes security management G 
18. Ensure training includes social engineering S 
19. Ensure training covers how to handle network failures T 
20. Ensure training includes strong password policy T 
21. Ensure training includes contingency planning T 
11.63%
48.84%
39.53% Social
Technical
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22. Ensure employees get specialized certification training, such as CCNA, CCNP, 
MCSC, and Linux 
T 
23. Ensure training includes Internet usage policy G 
24. Ensure training provides guidelines for incident reporting G 
25. Ensure training is directed to specific job roles G 
26. Ensure training provides guidelines for transporting corporate data home G 
27. Ensure training emphasizes the benefits of following policy and not the negatives 
of non-compliance 
G 
28. Maximize examples in training G 
29. Ensure training includes data confidentiality T 
30. Ensure training demonstrates the benefits of security G 
31. Ensure trainers are qualified G 
32. Ensure training includes virus scanning, detecting, and updating  T 
33. Ensure training covers Domain Name Services (DNS) T 
34. Ensure training covers access points T 
35. Ensure interesting training G 
36. Ensure training acknowledges the challenges of good security G 
37. Ensure security policy is consistent G 
38. Ensure training covers the most common vulnerabilities G 
39. Ensure training in the form of lectures G 
40. Ensure training covers corporate identification card policy G 
41. Ensure training stresses the involvement of everyone G 
42. Ensure appropriate security demonstrations G 
43. Ensure proper security without employees feeling distrusted S 
44. Ensure training includes email policy G 
45. Ensure training includes personal privacy of coworkers T 
46. Ensure there is a policy to only keep necessary customer information T 
47. Ensure there is a policy about not using personal devices for company data T 
48. Ensure training includes protection from SPAM emails T 
49. Ensure employees are taught to not send attachments back to the original sender 
when replying to emails 
T 
 
 
Figure F4: Control Group Orientation Percentage 
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Appendix G: Delphi Results 
 
Table G1: Socio-Technical Group Shortened List 
Objective Percentage Selected by Group Participants 
1. Ensure data confidentiality policies are in place 70% 
2. Ensure there is an Internet usage policy 70% 
3. Ensure clearly defined roles and responsibilities 70% 
4. Ensure employees clearly understand processes, procedures, and rules 70% 
5. Ensure data access is limited to appropriate individuals 60% 
6. Ensure employees are aware of consequences of non-compliance 60% 
7. Ensure companies are aware of less obvious threats, such as personal 
portable devices 
60% 
8. Ensure computers are updated regularly 60% 
9. Ensure employees are given examples of corporate consequences of bad 
security 
60% 
10. Ensure employees understand the importance of security 60% 
11. Ensure password protection is fully utilized 60% 
12. Ensure potential employees are screened before hiring 60% 
  
 
Table G2: Social Group Shortened List 
 
Objective Percentage Selected by Group Participants 
1. Ensure training is up to date with current security issues 90% 
2. Ensure training describes corporate values 90% 
3. Ensure training utilizes real world examples, including the corporate 
consequences of bad security 
80% 
4. Ensure training includes confidentiality policy 80% 
5. Ensure training addresses strong passwords while minimizing the need to 
write them down 
80% 
6. Ensure training covers legal aspects of security 80% 
7. Ensure training covers personal data security 80% 
8. Ensure training covers privacy rights 80% 
9. Ensure training covers the most common threats and how to prevent 
them 
80% 
10. Ensure the importance of security is addressed with all employees 80% 
11. Ensure training addresses data protection 80% 
12. Ensure training addresses employee ethics 90% 
13. Ensure training addresses employee integrity 80% 
14. Ensure training addresses corporate information theft 70% 
15. Ensure hand’s on training 70% 
16. Ensure managers are involved in providing training 70% 
17. Ensure training addresses the social interaction between companies and 70% 
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individuals 
18. Ensure training includes continuing education as threats change 70% 
19. Ensure training considers employee cultural differences 70% 
20. Ensure training includes technical aspects 60% 
21. Ensure training addresses the relationship between emotional intelligence 
and security 
60% 
22. Ensure training addresses factors affecting employee decision making 60% 
23. Ensure training addresses how employee dissatisfaction affects security 60% 
 
 
Table G3: Technical Group Shortened List 
 
Objective Percentage Selected by Group Participants 
1. Ensure training includes email acceptable use policy 90% 
2. Ensure in-depth training 90% 
3. Ensure email training includes the risk of attachments 90% 
4. Ensure the creation of a security culture 90% 
5. Ensure training on security policies 80% 
6. Ensure training includes data protection 80% 
7. Ensure data confidentiality training 70% 
8. Ensure training includes phishing 70% 
9. Ensure training includes strict password policy 70% 
10. Ensure training includes the risk of web links 70% 
11. Ensure training includes data backup 70% 
12. Ensure training on corporate values 70% 
13. Ensure in-depth virus and worm training 60% 
14. Ensure Internet usage policy is explained 60% 
15. Ensure roles and responsibilities are define 60% 
16. Ensure spyware training 60% 
17. Ensure training fully utilizes encryption 60% 
18. Ensure training includes company or industry past examples of security 
breaches 
60% 
19. Ensure employees have access to references and help after training 60% 
20. Ensure training on avoiding online threats 60% 
21. Ensure all security issues are demonstrated with ways to avoid them 60% 
22. Ensure training to the knowledge level of the trainee 60% 
 
 
Table G4: Control Group Shortened List 
 
Objective Percentage Selected by Group Participants 
1. Ensure training includes email policy 91% 
2. Ensure training includes strong password policy 82% 
3. Ensure training includes Internet usage policy 82% 
4. Ensure training includes security management 73% 
5. Ensure training demonstrates the benefits of security 73% 
6. Ensure interactive training 73% 
7. Encourage reporting violations 64% 
8. Ensure a published formal standard 64% 
9. Ensure a summary of topics at the end of training 64% 
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10. Ensure appropriate security demonstrations 64% 
11. Ensure training includes hacking threats 64% 
12. Ensure training includes physical security 64% 
13. Ensure training provides guidelines for incident reporting 64% 
14. Maximize examples in training 64% 
15. Ensure security policy is consistent 64% 
16. Ensure training includes consequences for non-compliance 64% 
17. Ensure training includes data backup 64% 
18. Ensure training includes data confidentiality 64% 
19. Ensure there is a policy about not using personal devices for company 
data 
55% 
20. Ensure trainers are qualified 55% 
21. Ensure training covers the most common vulnerabilities 55% 
22. Ensure employees receive ethics training 55% 
23. Ensure training emphasizes the benefits of following policy and not the 
negatives of non-compliance 
55% 
24. Ensure training matches expertise level 55% 
25. Ensure training on workstation control 55% 
 
 
Table G5: Socio-Technical Group Final Ranking 
 
Mean 
Rank Objective Orientation 
1.20 1. Ensure employees clearly understand processes, procedures, and rules Social 
2.60 2. Ensure clearly defined roles and responsibilities Social 
3.10 3. Ensure potential employees are screened before hiring Social 
4.50 4. Ensure data access is limited to appropriate individuals Technical 
5.20 5. Ensure employees are aware of consequences of non-compliance General 
6.60 6. Ensure data confidentiality policies are in place Technical 
6.70 7. Ensure employees understand the importance of security General 
9.00 8. Ensure employees are given examples of corporate consequences of bad security General 
9.10 9. Ensure password protection is fully utilized Technical 
9.10 10. Ensure companies are aware of less obvious threats, such as personal portable devices Technical 
10.50 11. Ensure there is an Internet usage policy General 
11.30 12. Ensure computers are updated regularly Technical 
Kendall’s W 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
.318 .734 .825 
 
 
 
Table G6: Social Group Final Ranking 
 
Mean 
Rank Objective Orientation 
1.10 1. Ensure the importance of security is addressed with all employees General 
4.40 2. Ensure training is up to date with current security issues General 
4.90 3. Ensure training addresses employee ethics Social 
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5.10 4. Ensure training covers the most common threats and how to prevent them General 
7.10 5. Ensure training covers personal data security Technical 
7.50 6. Ensure training utilizes real world examples, including the corporate consequences of bad security General 
7.70 7. Ensure training addresses data protection Technical 
8.20 8. Ensure training addresses employee integrity Social 
8.50 9. Ensure training covers legal aspects of security General 
10.00 10. Ensure managers are involved in providing training General 
11.30 11. Ensure training includes continuing education as threats change General 
11.80 12. Ensure training describes corporate values Social 
13.10 13. Ensure training addresses the relationship between emotional intelligence and security Social 
13.50 14. Ensure hand’s on training General 
14.20 15. Ensure training addresses corporate information theft General 
14.50 16. Ensure training covers privacy rights Technical 
16.20 17. Ensure training addresses how employee dissatisfaction affects security Social 
17.00 18. Ensure training addresses the social interaction between companies and individuals Social 
18.70 19. Ensure training includes technical aspects Technical 
18.90 20. Ensure training considers employee cultural differences Social 
19.70 21. Ensure training includes confidentiality policy Technical 
20.20 22. Ensure training addresses factors affecting employee decision making Social 
22.40 23. Ensure training addresses strong passwords while minimizing the need to write them down Technical 
Kendall’s W 
Round 1 Round 2 
.193 .744 
 
 
Table G7: Technical Group Final Ranking 
 
Mean 
Rank Objective Orientation 
4.10 1.  Ensure all security issues are demonstrated with ways to avoid them General 
4.20 2. Ensure training to the knowledge level of the trainee General 
4.90 3. Ensure in-depth training General 
5.80 4. Ensure training on security policies General 
7.00 5. Ensure training on corporate values Social 
7.20 6. Ensure training includes company or industry past examples of security breaches General 
7.50 7. Ensure the creation of a security culture Social 
8.70 8. Ensure employees have access to references and help after training General 
8.80 9. Ensure roles and responsibilities are defined Social 
9.90 10. Ensure data confidentiality training Technical 
10.90 11. Ensure Internet usage policy is explained General 
11.20 12. Ensure training on avoiding online threats Technical 
13.10 13. Ensure training includes strict password policy Technical 
14.20 14. Ensure training includes data protection Technical 
14.40 15. Ensure training includes the risk of web links Technical 
15.80 16. Ensure training includes email acceptable use policy General 
16.00 17. Ensure email training includes the risk of attachments Technical 
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16.80 18. Ensure in-depth virus and worm training Technical 
17.50 19. Ensure training includes data backup Technical 
17.70 20. Ensure spyware training Technical 
19.10 21. Ensure training includes phishing Technical 
20.10 22. Ensure training fully utilizes encryption Technical 
Kendall’s W 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
.270 .582 .627 
 
 
Table G8: Control Group Final Ranking 
 
Mean 
Rank Objective Orientation 
1.00 1. Ensure training demonstrates the benefits of security General 
2.00 2. Ensure interactive training General 
3.09 3. Ensure security policy is consistent General 
4.27 4. Ensure training includes security management General 
5.45 5. Ensure training includes email policy General 
5.82 6. Ensure a published formal standard General 
6.91 7. Ensure training includes data confidentiality Technical 
8.09 8. Ensure trainers are qualified General 
8.91 9. Ensure training matches expertise level General 
9.55 10. Ensure training covers the most common vulnerabilities General 
10.91 11. Ensure employees receive ethics training Social 
12.27 12. Ensure training includes Internet usage policy General 
12.91 13. Ensure appropriate security demonstrations General 
13.91 14. Ensure training includes strong password policy Technical 
14.91 15. Ensure there is a policy about not using personal devices for company data Technical 
16.00 16. Ensure training emphasizes the benefits of following policy and not the negatives of non-compliance General 
17.00 17. Maximize examples in training General 
18.00 18. Ensure training includes hacking threats Technical 
19.09 19. Ensure training provides guidelines for incident reporting General 
20.00 20. Ensure training includes data backup Technical 
21.18 21. Ensure training on workstation control Technical 
22.00 22. Encourage reporting violations General 
23.18 23. Ensure training includes consequences for non-compliance General 
24.00 24. Ensure training includes physical security Technical 
24.55 25. Ensure a summary of topics at the end of training General 
Kendall’s W 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
.130 .675 .992 
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